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In the name of Allah, 
the Beneficient, the Merciful. 
And the earth We have spread out (like a carpet); set thereon 
mountains firm and immovable; and produced therein all Ends 
of things in due balance. 
And We have provided therein means of subsistence, - for you 
and for those for whose sustenance you are not responsible. 
[Al-Quran; XV, 19-20] 
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This study is about poverty and social security in Peninsula Malaysia and 
explains options for the future. The analysis uses an approach which looks at 
economic and social development in the context of the historical factors which 
have influenced the structural formation of the Malaysian society. It seeks to 
explain poverty as a product of economic underdevelopment and dependency. 
Most of the poor live in the rural areas, working in the subsistence agriculture 
sector. Unquestionably development policies implemented sinceý, 1971 have 
been successful in reducing the incidence of absolute poverty, but 
simultaneously available evidence shows an increase in relative poverty and 
inequality. Conceivably, in its effort to ameliorate poverty and low income the 
Malaysian government has not adopted an equitable programme of resource 
allocation. This study is concerned with the unequal distribution of resources 
between the economic and social sectors. An anal s's of the distribution of 
government resources in the social sector of welVasrlý, health and education 
shows a distribution which is biased towards the urban areas and benefit the 
upper income groups rather than the poorer groups. Moreover, there are no 
adequate income maintenance and social security provisions for the poor. 
Hence this study seeks to recommend ways of providing an expanded 
programme of income maintenance and social security and make provisions for 
those who have been excluded by institutions responsible for workers' social 
security and old age income maintenance. Considering that political efforts to 
alleviate the problem of poverty and income inequalities need to incorporate 
egalitarian objectives. and means, the concluding chapter of this study proposes 
a non-contributory income maintenance programme especially for those 
employed in the subsistence agricultural and the urban petty commodity 
producer sectors. Only then can there be a pronounced trend towards a vertical 
redistribution of income and resources from the rich to the poor and from the 
urban to the rural sector. 
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FIELD OF STUDY 
This thesis examines the state of economic and social development, poverty 
and social security in Peninsula Malaysia, and recommends the reformulation 
of income maintenance policies with the aim of providing a wider coverage of 
social protection for the country's population. This study focuses on Peninsula 
Malaysia only and excludes the states of Sabah, Sarawak and the Federal 
Territory of Labuan. Peninsula Malaysia is chosen as the area of study in 
preference to all of Malaysia because most data are available for Peninsula 
Malaysia only. Occasionally, unless otherwise specified, the terms Malay 
Peninsula, Malaya (especially for accounts before the country's independence 
in 1957), and Malaysia are used synonymously with the term Peninsula 
Malaysia. 
The study uses an analysis which emphasises the need to understand poverty 
and inequality in the context of development and underdevelopment, both at 
the country and global levels. Accordingly it is necessary to trace the historical 
factors which have shaped the country's economic and social structure, 
particularly economic policies which were introduced by the colonial 
govemment. 
1 
* *' ** 
Despite rapid economic growth in independent Malaysia, evidence suggests the 
persistence of severe income disparities. Malaysia could not be considered to 
be among the more egalitarian countries. Malaysian development policies have 
failed to effect a. distribution of income and, resources as equitable as some 
other middle-income Asian countries, for example, as shown in - Table 1.1, 
South Korea and Thailand. - i; 
I 
Table 1.1 
Percentage Share of Household Income 
by Household Groups 
Household Groups 
Lowest Middle Highest 
Year 40% 40% 20% 
Souih'Korea' 1976 16.9 37.8 45.3 
Thailand 1975/76 15.2 35.0 49.8 
Malaysia 1973 11.2 32.7 56.1 
Source: World Bank (1988), Table 26, pp. 272-73 
(adapted). 
Due to its varied labour market, ý Malaysia does not have a coherent social 
security and income maintenance scheme. Programmes which provide benefits 
for employment injury, disability and old age income ý security are meant for 
those in the regular waged or salaried employment only. What is distressing is 
the fact that workers in the subsistence agricultural or rural sector, especially 
the self-employed smallholders, tenant farmers and labourers who are more 
often adversely affected by fluctuations in world commodity prices, are the 
ones who lose out for the lack of an indiscriminate social security and income 
2 
maintenance programme. Additionally those employed in the ý urban petty 
commodity producer sector, like the market stallholders'and pedlars, do not 
have adequate income maintenance provisions. 
This study was generated out of an interest ý with questions pertaining to 
equitable redistribution of resources and income. This study contends that the 
function of the statel should be to mitigate the structure of inequality and 
contribute towards a more egalitarian social policy - on grounds which include 
long-term economic prosperity. Therefore, while dealing with Malaysia as one 
country, the analysis has implications for, development generally, and for 
middle-income states such as Malaysia in particular., 
METHODOLOGY AND WORKPLA 
fý 
This study draws heavily on published and unpublished materials, including 
official reports, books, articles in journals and newspapers. I 
Altogether twelve chapters are included in the study. Chapter One introduces 
the subject of study and the layout of the subsequent chapters. Chapter Two is 
a review of theories of development and underdevelopment , and this forms the 
basis of the study's perception on the problems of poverty and inequality, 
especially with reference to the Third World. 
1. The "state" is defined as "a set of agencies claiming supreme authority for 
the coordination and continuity of a population within a particular territory, 
backed by a virtual monopoly of force" (McLennan, et. al., 1984, p 3). 
Sociologists and political scientists have debated in recent years the extent to 
which the "state" has fulfilled Liberal-Pluralist or Marxist prescriptions. On all 




Chapter Three examines the foundation of Malaysia's political economy. This 
chapter traces the historical background of economic development'and the 
penetration of the capitalist mode of production in Peninsula Malaysia. 
Colonial economic policies determined Malaysia's position as a producer of 
primary commodities of tin and rubber, and were also responsible for the 
country's dependency on foreign - capital and immigrant , labour, ý and the 
underdevelopment of the Malay peasantry. 
Chapters Four and Five are concerned with economic and social development 
policies in independent Malaysia. The - first of these chapters analyses, the 
development policies of the independent government up to the year 1970, 
when the emphasis was on the development of physical infrastructure 
especially in the rural areas. Chapter Five analyses the economic and social 
development policies from 1971 to 1990, ý in -, particular policies that were 
implemented under the New Economic Policy with the declared objectives of 
ameliorating poverty and restructuring society. The chapter concludes that 
while it is true the state has successfully reduced the incidence of poverty from 
49.3 percent in 1970 to 17.3 percent in 1987 (R5MP, P 47) evidence shows 
first Ahat relative inequalities persist in the society, and second that the 
improvement - is based - on static assumptions and does not really represent a 
sufficiently reasoned or scientific indicator of development. 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight are concerned with poverty. Chapter Six 
examines the theories of poverty and inequality, in particular the concepts of 
subsistence poverty, basic needs and relative poverty. Chapter Seven 
concentrates on'theories of poverty in Malaysia. Structuralist explanations of 
poverty, together with underdevelopment and dependency provide us-with a 
better understanding of the problem of poverty, particularly in the rural areas. 
Chapter Eight presents the official perception of poverty, based on statements 
4 
in the various Five Year Development Plan documents, and then critically 
reviews the different methods of estimating the'poverty, line in Peninsula 
Malaysia. 11 1ý1, - 
Chapter Nine critically, analyses development trends since, 1971. -Under, the 
New Economic Policy the poverty eradication programme is given top priority 
in the development strategy. Nevertheless, precisely because economic 
development policies emphasise the promotion of the industrial sector and the 
cultivation of cash crops like oil palm, rubber and cocoa, Malaysia is not self- 
sufficient' ý in food production. -,. If present, trends persist, self-reliance, 
particularly in food production, and the substantial, impact it can'have on 
reducing poverty, has along way to go. 
It had already become widely recognised, at the, beginning of the 1970s t that 
Malaysia has been more closely involved with the process of global production 
organised by the multinational companies. While, this process has increased 
employment in the country and increased too the proportion of women in the 
labour force, it' also permits a degree of exploitation of, female labour. - The 
suppression of wages and lack of job security in multinational companies have 
serious implications for female poverty and social security. These -are, the 
central themes which will be discussed in Chapter Ten. 
Chapter Eleven reviews the concept of income maintenance and social 
security. Ifigeneral industrialisation has been accepted as the main instigator of 
modem social security, particularly in the West. Definitions of social security 
put forward by international agencies like the International Labour 
Organisation and the International Social Security Association appear to stress 
social insurance and provident funds. However such schemes tend to cover 
workers in the waged or salaried sectors only. Hence it is argued that the 
5 
concept of social security presently understood in Malaysia is a narrow one 
because social security schemes and provident funds specifically exclude those 
who are employed in the traditional agricultural and urban petty commodity 
producer sectors. Therefore thisstudy advocates the inclusion of those who are 
employed in the traditional and smallholding agricultural sector, and those in 
the urban petty commodity producer sector, into a wider social security and 
income maintenance programme which will be termed in this study as a social 
protection programme. 
The concluding chapter explores the possibility of securing a fundamental shift 
in the structure of inequality in favour of the rural subsistence and urban petty 
commodity producer sectors through a transformation of the functions of social 
security and income maintenance. ý It suggests ways of increasing the real 
income of the poorer groups. The central recommendation of this study, 
however, is an alternative option of extending social security and income 
maintenance into a wider, social protection programme for those in the rural 
and urban petty commodity 'producer sectors, especially rice farmers, 
agricultural smallholders, fishermen, petty traders and pedlars., Only then' will 
market related economic processes generate a more egalitarian role for social 
security. And -this too inludes Ahe role of the state and of international 
organisations,, who both will need to play a more prominent role in the future 
development, of the international , economy and, global relations. The 
implications for forms of international regulations and creative - international 





r1be aim of, this chapter is to present a theoretical framework by which 
economic systems - specifically the Malaysian economic system - could be 
understood. Considering that the objective of this thesis is an enquiry into the 
state of social security in Malaysia, this thesis is written within the social 
policy perspective. On this account, iý this chapter focuses on theories of 
development rather than merely theories of economic growth. 
Economic growth is a necessary but an insufficient condition for development. 
Seers (1979, p 12) advances three central problems crucial to a country's 
development, namely the state of poverty, the level of unemployment and the 
extent of inequality. Adequate educational levels and political and economic 
independence of the nation are additional essential conditions for development. 
These all relate to "structure" or the overall cohesion and interrelationship of a 
society. Thus questions pertaining to a country's development are questions 
which are central to the study of social policy. Accordingly there has been a 
significant shift from the conception of social policy "as peripheral, residual 
and primarily concerned, with reacting to the imperatives of externally- 
determined economic and social change, to one which virtually equates social 
policy with social development". (MacPherson, 1982, p 184). Alternatively the 
shift can be expressed as one that has taken place "internationally", from the 
preoccupation with social policy as affecting institutional development in the 
7 
industrialised West or North to'a conception which includes many of the 
principal interests of middle-income and poor countries. An -attempt to 
comprehend how development comes about is therefore fundamental to any 
discussion of social policies. 
In the following sections of this chapter we shall critically discuss the major 
approaches to the study of development. Two main paradigms dominate the 
literature on development and change. In the 1950s and early 1960s 
modernization theory played the leading role. This accounts for the process of 
development using ideas originally found in the works of Durkheim and 
Weber. The late 1960s saw the emergence of dependency or underdevelopment 
theory, which are based on Marxist theories of imperialism and capitalism. 
From the mid-1970s, however, the development debate became more complex, 
resulting in the proliferation of critical evaluations of modernization and 
dependency theories, and the emergence of alternative forms of the 
dependency analysis based on a world-system and unequal exchange 
perspective. 
DERNIZATION THEORY 
Modernization theory was largely inspired by structural functionalism, with its 
underlying idea that societies have to fulfil certain functions in order to exist 
and these ý functions can be carried out in different ways through different 
structures and institutions. Functionalism,, with its traditional-modem 
dichotomy, is usually associated with the works of Durkheim, Weber and later 
Parsons. The argument central to modernization theorists was the notion of a 
distinction between traditional and modem societies, conceptualised in 
essentially Weberian terms. Most modernization theorists (for example, 
8 
Parsons, 1951; Lerner, 1958; McClelland, 1961) argued that the transition 
from a traditional society depended on a prior change in the values, attitudes 
and norms of the people. 
Smelser (1969) considers modernization as a process of structural 
differentiation whereby several interrelated technical; economic and ecological 
processes occur. He outlined four processes that give rise to modernization. '' 
"(1) in the realm of technology, the change from simple and 
traditionalized techniques towards the application of scientific, 
knowledge; 
(2) in agriculture, the evolution from subsistence, farming 
towards commercial production of agricultural goods. This 
means specialization in cash crops, purchase of non-agricultural 
products in the market, and often agricultural wage labour; 
(3) in industry, the transition from the use of animal and human 
power towards industrialisation proper, or 'men aggregated at 
power driven machines, working for monetary return with the 
products of the manufacturing process entering into a market 
based on a network of exchange relations'; 
(4) in ecological arrangements, the movement from farm and 
village towards urban centres. 
I [Smelser, 1969, pp 126-7] 
Based on the above explanation, thus in a traditional society the mode of 
production is non-traditional or small-scale subsistence production, using 
family labour in a rural environment. On the contrary, in a modem society 
industrialization and scientific technology occurs, with high-scale production 
geared for exchange and the existence of a wage labour in an urban 
environment. Furthermore, modernization means development, and could be 
understood'as an increase in the complexity of societies;, new kinds of roles , 
such as wage labour, and institutions, such as the financial market, emerge 
with - specialized activities and functions. This conception became the 
conventional conception in many powerful countries in the 1950s and 1960s. 
9 
STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
In the 1950s and early 1960s the concept of "economic growth" played a 
leading role in the literature on development and change., This was primarily 
an economic growth theory of development which stressed that savings, 
investment and foreign aid were the essential components that would enable 
Third World, countries to ý transform their economies from poor agricultural 
subsistence type of production to the modem industrial economy. In the light 
of this theory Third World countries could initiate their development by 
proceeding along an economic growth path which is historically similar to the 
one experienced by more developed countries. 
The stages of economic growth theory argues that the typical less-developed 
economy is characterised by an extremely low ratio of material to human 
resources and a backward technology, which yields low levels of per capita 
income. Due to mass unemployment, either openly or in disguise, substantial 
growth is likely to be precluded by the low levels of savings possible at low 
levels of per capita income, plus the fact that domestic entreprenuership and 
technology lie. at stagnant levels. Thus -in simple terms, the problem of 
development was identified as raising resources on a scale to achieve a level of 
investment that would change the structure of the economy. Todaro, (1989, p 
64) maintains that the stages of economic growth doctrine came about partly 
due to the "Cold War" politics of the 1950s and early 1960s and the resulting 
competition for the allegiance of newly independent nations of the Third 
World. , 
The most influential advocate of the stages of economic growth theory was the 
American economic historian, W. W. Rostow, whose book "The Stages of 
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Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto (1960)" describes the 
transition from underdevelopment to development by an interpretation of the 
history of the now advanced countries to a general theory of growth. Advanced 
countries b7(me achieved economic development through several sequential 
stages of a single continuum of self-sustaining growth, and all countries must 
proceed in a similar way. Rostow (1960) postulates that: "It is possible to 
identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of the 
five categories; the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, take-off, 
the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption" (Rostow, 1960, 
p 4). From the beginning this was an extraordinarily simple - if not bold - 
classification of the world's societies. 
The advanced countries of the West had at various times passed the stage of 
economic take-off for substantial growth while the underdeveloped countries of 
the Third World were either still in the traditional stage or the pre-conditions 
stage. The central Problem for development was the mobilization of resources 
from the domestic economy and foreign savings in order to generate sufficient 
investment to accelerate economic ýgrowth. In macro-economic terms the 
formulation between investment and growth was expressed in what is known as 
the Harrod-Domar model, which simply means that the rate of growth of the 
GNP is determined jointly by the national saving ratio and the national capital 
or output ratio. More specifically, the growth rate of the national income will 
be directly or positively related to the saving ratio, and inversely or negatively 
related to the economy's capital or output ratio. Thus the more an economy is 
able to save and invest out of a given GNP, the greater will be the growth of 
the GNP. 
Following the principle of the Harrod-Domar model, therefore one of the 
fundamental requirements for economic growth is simply to increase the 
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proportion of national income which is saved. Increased savings, directed by 
the state to industry, ý with protection against industrial imports, was the 
formula for development. Neverthelessi, there is one constraint on 
development, that is, if a country could not generate savings and investment at 
its intended level it could seek to overcome this capital constraint to growth 
either through foreign aid or private foreign investment. Indirectly this form of 
international economic relations justifies'the transfer of capital and technical 
assistance from developed countries to the Third World. 
t! 
DIFFUSION OF VALUES 
While economists like Rostow (1960) advocated the diffusion of capital and 
technology from the West to Third Vorld nations, others like Lerner (1958) 
advocated the diffusion of Western cultural and attitudinal values, such as the 
motivation to succeed. Lerner's (1958) conception of a traditional society is 
one which is agrarian, rural, pre-literate and authoritarian, whereas modem 
society is industrial, urban, literate and democratic. Based on his observations 
of Middle Eastern societies, Lerner (1958) called for an intellectual effort to 
"reformulate Islam in a modernizing society. What is required ..... to 
"motivate" the isolated and illiterate peasants and tribesmen who compose the 
bulk of the area's population is to provide them with clues as to what better 
things of life might be" (Lemer, 1958, p 409). Presumably what Lerner had in 
mind were values such as the consumption of mass-produced non-durable 
goods from the United States and other Western countries. 
In a later work Lerner (1967) commented on the phenomenon of rapid 
urbanization combined with the extensive unemployment and poverty of shanty 
town life in the Third World, and asserted that this reflects a breakdown in the 
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"transition" towards modernization, and accused the developing societies as 
"societies in-a-hurry" (Lerner, 1967, p 24). He was iý the opinion that people 
in the Third World were impatient, and that if they want to get more of the 
goods that development delivers they ought to work harder in order to achieve 
the level of success experienced by the West. 
CRMQUE OF MODERNISATION THEORY 
By the middle of the . 1960s there emerged a number of criticisms of 
modernization, theory. ' Rostow (1960) derived his five stages of growth from 
an analysis of the British industrial revolution. The take-off period-is crucial, 
whereby obstacles to economic growth are removed, and adequate capital 
investment initiates growth. In view of this, Roxborough (1979) claims that 
"this model of development emphasises on entrepreneurship and capital 
accumulation as a pre-requisite for economic growth" (Roxborough, 1979, p 
16); and is therefore disposed to favour capitalism. II 
Webster (1984) asserts that -modernization theory is "an over simplified model 
of development that lacks two essential ingredients: an inadequate historical 
input and a structural perspective" (Webster, 1984, p 62). Although the theory 
incorporates functionalist dualism which describes the co-existence of two 
types of societies, the "traditional" and the "modem", there is no historical 
analysis of the different types of traditional societies which are diverse in terms 
of their social, economic-, and political structures, and in particular why 
societies had become poorer, or had been denuded of wealth and high cultural 
artefacts. 
Furthermore, Third World countries differ in terms of their social and political 
structures. Most Third World countries in Africa and Asia were at one time or 
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another colonies of West European countries., As a consequent, not only were 
they in many instances exploited economically and ruled autocratically, their 
economic structures and social institutions have been modelled upon their 
former rulers and we find diverse institutional and social patterns in these 
countries. 
Colonial powers such as the British in Malaya and India exercised the system 
of "indirect, rule", which meant they used pre-existing structures of political 
authority by incorporating them into the framework of the colonial state. As it 
were, they exploited the existence of the indigenous society by preserving the 
structure, of authority but subjugating them to new ends. For instance, in 
Malaya the Malay Sultans were legally, recognised as the head of Islamic 
religion and Malay customs, the aristocrat class were integrated into,, the 
colonial administration and absorbed into the civil service, but governmental 
decision-making'was in the hands of the colonial rulers, leaving the Malay 
Sultans and chiefs as rulers in name only. At the same time the Malay peasants 
were left to be subsistence producers (Means, 1976, ). , 
Likewise in -India, the Indian princes were integrated into the colonial 
administration, some of them receiving material rewards for their loyalty. The 
landed class were conciliated, their estates safeguarded and their status 
enhanced - they became important props of the administration (Low, 1973). 
In West Africa the French practised a philosophy of assimilation, which meant 
that the colonial territories were integrated politically and, economically as 
overseas departments of France, with the centralisation of power in Paris. 
Also, the French resorted to a form of paternalism, using appointed "chiefs" as 
government agents. Meanwhile in Indochina 
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(Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos), and in. North Africa (Morocco and Tunisia) 
French control was exercised more through indigenous ruling groups (Mair, 
1962; Crowder, 1968). 
In contrast, institutional diversity is less prominent in Latin America, where 
the Spanish, and Portuguese had established colonies as early as the sixteenth 
century. At the time of arrival of the Spanish conquistadores in the early 
sixteenth century, the Incas of Peru and the Aztecs of Mexico, for example, 
lived in organized social and political systems. These societies could produce 
intricate works of gold, silver and other precious metals. Their agriculture 
technology, however, was extremely simple and cultivation was carried out by 
use of hand-plough. The Spanish destroyed these ancient kingdoms, plundered 
their treasures, melted down their gold and silver works, and subsequently, 
these highly organised civilizations were annihilated almost without trace under 
Spanish rule (de la Vega, 196 1). 
Latin American colonies were basically run as overseas feudal estates for 
Spanish settlers, and most of them were granted independence by the mid- 
nineteenth century (Gibson, 1966; Stein and Stein, 1970). With a common 
colonial heritage Latin American countries tend to possess similar economic, 
social and cultural institutions. For example, with reference to Table 2.1, 
compared to other Third World countries (with the exception of newly- 
industrialised Asian states of South Korea and Singapore which greatly 
accelerated the growth of their manufacturing outputs) in general, due to their 
longer history of independence, Latin American countries possess more 
advanced industrial sectors. 
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Table 2.1 
Structure of Production 




Distribution of GDP 
(percent) 
Manufacturing --H-Ttuie Agricu 
Latin America 
Peru 1090 20 11 
Brazil 1810 28 11 
Mexico 1860 21 9 
Africa 
Tanzania 250 6 59 
Kenya 300 12 
ý30 Morocco 590 17 21 
Asia 
India 290 19 32 
Malaysia 1830 n/a n/a 
South Korea 2370 30 12 
Singapore 7410 27 1 
Notes: n/a -not available Source: World Bank (1988), Tables 1&3, pp 222-223 
& pp 226-227 (adapted). 
The basic assumptions of modernisation scholars were that the process of 
economic and political modernization in the Third World would necessarily 
and specifically reproduce the industrial capitalism or the liberal democracies 
of the West. For instance, Einstedt (1966) projected a model of modernization 
based on the experience of Western Europe and North America and projecting 
that model onto countries of the developing world of South America, Asia and 
Africa. According to Einsteadt (1966, p 1) "modernisation is the process of 
change toward those types of social, economic and political systems that have 
developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century 
to the nineteenth [century]". To Einsteadt therefore modernization and 
development meant replicating the experiences of the West. 
I 
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In reality the path or stages or speed of development varied greatly between 
different countries. In previous as well as present times some countries grew or 
changed rapidly while others stagnated. It is sometimes difficult to identify the 
reasons for these variations. In., theory'what modernization theorists did not 
realize was that development was not simply a matter of removing obstacles; 
or injecting various components such as capital, technology; and the transfer of 
structural and attitudinal conditions,, for, example well-integratedý money 
markets, highly developed transportation - facilities and the - motivation to 
succeed that are prevalent in the West. The diverse economic and institutional 
factors prevalent in the Third World countries must be understood before we 
attempt an effective analysis of development in the Third World. 
By the' middle of the-, 1960s it was apparent that the economic, social and 
political conditions of the Third World were, short of the expectations 
generated by development models created, in the West. While there has been 
sustained foreign investment in Third World countries, the societies have not 
been transformed and the structure of the economy have scarcely changed. 
Third World countries remain as low-income and middle-income economies, 
and highly vulnerable to changes in the global economic system. 
DEPENDENCY THEORY 
One forceful criticism of the economic take-off model of development is that it 
entirely ignored the impact of colonialism and imperialism in the Third World. 
The writing of Andre Gunder Frank (1969) [1967] initiated one of the most 
important lines of analysis of the processes and problems of Third World 
development within the political economy and economic history perspective, 
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centred on the themes of monopoly capitalism or exploitation and imperialism 
or oppression. 
Dissatisfaction with the role of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and its failure to comprehend the growing problems of Latin America in the 
1960s led Frank to adopt a- structural perspective, and expanded -- the 
"development of underdevelopment" hypothesisl. Frank (1967), argues that 
underdevelopment began with the penetration of capitalism in the Third World 
and it persists as a function of continuing capitalist relations. - His general thesis 
is that: "Development and underdevelopment each cause and are caused by the 
other in total development of capitalism" (Frank, 1967, p 240). Frank 
confirms his thesis by citing his case studies on Chile and Brazil. The conquest 
of these countries by Spain and Portugal in the early sixteenth century 
succeeded in incorporating the countries fully into the world mercantile and 
later industrial capitalist system. The colonialists also introduced the 
monopolistic metropolis-satellite economic structure. The dominant economy 
of the West, which. Frank terms as "metropolises", were at the centre, while 
the colonies or "satellites" were subordinate, weaker and dependent of the 
centre. 
Furthermore, once a country is converted into a satellite, the metropolis not 
only exploits the satellite's domestic economy but also dominates its political 
1. The dependency and underdevelopment theory was first outlined by Paul 
Baran (1957). He postulated that the advanced capitalist countries had become 
developed by expropriating economic surplus from overseas countries which 
they first traded and later colonised. The overseas countries, meanwhile, 
became underdeveloped by aiding the domination of the West, and because of 
their economic interaction with the advanced industrialised countries are left 
with a narrow specialised, "port-oriented primary production structure. The 
national economy is dominated by a small landed and merchant elite whom 
Baran termed as "compradors", who serve as a vital link between the domestic 
economy and the advanced industrial states. An outcome of this active 
interaction between the compradors and the advanced industrial state is the 
tendency of the former in adopting the cultural life-styles of the latter. 
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and social life. The West was able to advance industrially because it was 
under-developing the Third World countries to specialize in export-oriented 
production and supply the raw material needs of the industrialized West. In 
this metropolis-satellite dichotomy the satellite was kept dependent upon the 
metropole by a sucking out of economic surplus to the metropole; thus 
dependent development was created. Third World elites, whom Frank refers to 
as "comprador elites", were incorporated into the system by becoming 
intermediaries in the transfer of surplus production between the peasant 
producers and the rich merchants and then to the international market. 
With the depletion of raw materials in the colonies the metropolis power would 
transfer their interests elsewhere. Ibus the ex-mining districts in Brazil, Peru 
and Bolivia, which once were vital to the development of the metropolis were 
abandoned by the metropolis when the mines depleted, and these areas 
degenerated into a state of underdevelopment. Hence we see the coexistence of 
rich and poor nations in an international system, dominated by unequal power 
relationships between the metropolis or developed countries and satellites or 
underdeveloped countries. 
Frank (1967) postulates that the exploitation by the metropole on the satellite 
can be stopped only by breaking the chain of dependency, in particular that of 
the weak comprador elite class, through a socialist revolution of the working 
class. The development of the satellites could occur only through a qualitative 
transformation of socio-economic relations brought about by proletariat 
revolution on a world-wide scale. 
Arguing along Frank's (1967) analysis of "development of 
underdevelopment", Dos Santos (1973) presents a cogent definition of 
dependency and underdevelopment. According to Dos Santos: 
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"underdevelopment, far -- from - constituting -a state of backwardness prior to capitalism, is rather a consequence and a 
particular form of capitalist development known as dependent 
capitalism ..... dependence is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of the countries are conditioned by 
the development and expansion of others ..... Dependence [then] is based upon an international division of labour which allows 
industrial development to take place in some countries while 
restricting it in others,, whose growth is conditioned by and 
subjected to the power centres of the world" 
[Dos Santos, 1973, pp 76-77] 
Dos Santos (ibid. ) argues that dependency is a "conditioning situation" because 
the possibilities of action and behaviour of men are determined by various 
alternatives internal to dependency itself, and establishes the possible limits of 
development and its forms in dependent countries. Alternatively dependent 
countries may seek to change the "conditioning situation" by breaking off the 
relationship and seek to consolidate an independent economy, examples of 
which can be seen in Third World countries like China, North Korea, Vietnam 
and Cuba (although Cuba relies on sugar exports for a large part of its 
income). Unlike capitalism, socialist countries do not base their society and 
their power on the expansion of consumption; hence they are able to face 
external economic pressures more easily and thus maintain their political 
independence. 
While Frank (1967) was more concerned with similarities between the 
economic structures of dependent economies, Dos Santos (1973, pp 67-71) 
distinguishes the different types of relations of dependency that exist in the 
satellite economies. Firstly, there is colonial dependency, with the export of 
raw materials to the centre and the import of luxury goods for the consumption 
of the ruling class. Secondly, there is industrial-financial dependency which 
occurs during the import-substitution phase and hence a greater dependency on 
foreign trade because foreign currency is used to purchase inputs which are 
vital to national industries. The decision whether to import products such as 
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petrol, chemicals and machines depends on balance-of-payments deficits which 
are caused 'by ý declining- prices of primary products; thus subjecting the 
economy to the control of foreign, capital. Thirdly, there is industrial- 
technological dependency when international capital in alliance with state 
bureaucracy establish transnational corporations in the dependent country, and 
the mass consumption sector becomes increasingly important. As a result of 
rural-urban migration, there is a growth -of marginal population living in 
shanty towns, creating social and economic marginality. 
The debate on, forms of dependency was extended further by Szentes (1971). 
In his comprehensive attempt to develop a political economy of 
underdevelopment, Szentes (1971, pp 168-189) distinguishes four forms of 
dependence: direct, economic dependence, trade dependence, - financial 
dependence, and technical dependence. (The discussion -in the following 
paragraphs are based on Szentes' analysis. ) 
Under direct economic dependence the key positions in the economy are 
controlled by foreign monopoly capital. For example, North American capital 
is in control of between 80 percent to 100 percent of mining concerns in Latin 
America; and the American United Fruit Company controls the largest banana, 
sugar, coffee and cocoa plantations in Colombia and Ecuador. In the Middle 
East foreign capital has a total impact on the entire economy of countries in 
this region. The American monopolies have an unchallenged control over the 
oil of Saudi Arabia, Bahrein and Kuwait, and further controls 80 percent of the 
proven oil reserves of the region, 60 percent of its output and 90 percent of the 
total oil tanker fleet. It is in this context that we must understand the United 
States' foreign policy in -the Gulf, region, which could be interpreted as 
America's effort in ensuring an interrupted supply of relatively petrol to 
consumers in its domestic market. 
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Direct economic dependence usually reduces a country's ability for long-term 
planning, and autonomous growth, because it becomes reliant on foreign 
investors for the mobilization of capital and technology in the production and 
marketing of its primary resources., Apart from the repatriation of profits and 
dividends, there is always the possibility of a sudden pull-out of foreign capital 
as a possible means of economic and political blackmail. 
Trade dependence takes two forms. Firstly, there is relational, dependence in 
the case of dependence in trade, relations on a few advanced, capitalist 
countries, resulting from the direct economic dependence and colonialism. The 
satellites' - dependence on foreign trade could also be the result of credit- 
financing of, exports and the, extension -of, loans and aids 
by-metropolitan 
countries; as is the case between United States and ýthe Latin American 
countries. 
The second form of trade dependence is the overall dependence of the entire 
economy on cyclical changes in the capitalist world market. ýThis is a form of 
dependence that has its own roots deep in the structure of the economy and is 
more difficult to abolish than relational dependence., For example, exports 
make up about 70 percent of Saudi Arabia's national income., The severity of 
Africa's structural economic imbalances and the vulnerability of African 
economies to the external environment can be observed by the fact that exports 
form between 20 percent (in Uganda and Kenya) to 50 percent (in Mauritius 
and Zambia) of the output in the monetary sector of the respective countries. 
In the Third World, financial dependence occurs when foreign banks control a 
substantial share of the money market and credit system of the country. The 
banIdng operations in former British colonies in Africa, for example, are 
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usually handled by subsidiaries of major British banks such as Barclays Bank 
and the Standard Bank of South Africa. These banks could influence the 
development of the whole economy of the country in question, through the 
credit finance of trade and by imposing credit restrictions; and thus restrict the 
growth of the economy by transferring a considerable part of around 30 to 40 
percent of their assets to the metropolitan banks. 
Furthermore, less developed countries depend on advanced capitalist countries 
on foreign matters. The Third World is increasingly dependent on loans and 
grants from leading capitalist countries and international organizations such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, leading to increasing 
indebtedness of the developing countries, such, as the Mexican debt crisis, of 
1982. In September 1982 Mexico triggered a near-panic situation when it 
almost defaulted its loans, causing a major re-scheduling exercise by several 
banks and governments of its US$80 billion external debt -a total of US$10 
billion had to be re-scheduled. The World Bank (1988, -p 30) states that the 
outstanding long-term debt of developing countries has continued to increase 
since 1982; the total external debt of highly indebted countries (like Mexico, 
Brazil and Argentine) rose from US$390 billion in 1982 to an estimated 
US$485 billion at the end of 1987; and that valuation effect caused by the 
decline of the US dollar accounted for most of the increase since 1985. At the 
end of 1986 Brazil had an outstanding external debt of US$97.2 billion, 
Mexico US$91 billion and Argentine US$43 billion (World Bank, 1988, Table 
18, p 257). 
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Technical dependence is the most recent yet increasingly important form of 
dependence which grew out of, the industrialization programmes in many 
developing countries. These countries are dependent on physical technology 
such as capital goods, patents and licenses and scientific equipment; as well as 
intellectual technology such as the import of experts, advisers, technicians and 
teachers or the sending abroad of students on foreign scholarships. -- 
When advanced countries extend '"technical" assistance to developing 
countries, they do it in such a way that the realization, of the licenses, 
blueprints, standards and technological specifications as well, as the smooth 
operation of the plant installed by ý them, the working, and repair of t the 
machinery and equipment - should be dependenV on the deliveries 'of 
metropolitan firms. More often, plants which are established by transnational 
corporations are built for the purpose of the manufacture of component parts; 
they are only appendices of the metropolitan firm and do not undertake the 
entire process of production; thus safeguarding the technological secrets of the 
metropolitan countries. 
While Frank (1967) calls for a world-wide proletariat revolution as a means 
for overcoming dependency and underdevelopment, Szentes (1971; chapter IV) 
examines the prospects of how -dependency, could be liquidated prior to the 
collapse of - capitalism. According to ý. Szentes (1971): "Though 
underdevelopment is an international product, development still has a basically 
national framework" (Szentes, 1971, p 293); however, the process of 




The process involves the breaking of monopolistic position of foreign capital 
and the transformation of the distorted structure of -the economy and the 
society via agricultural development, industrialization and state planning. 
Among the lesser steps that should be taken are the establishment of national 
banks, airlines, 'indigenous, investment and development corporations, ' 
domestically trained technicians and professionals. For that reason, massive 
state intervention in the economy -is a precondition for the liquidation' of 
underdevelopment. To this purpose what is essential is a "centrally coordinated 
development- programme" (Szentes, 1971, -, p 297) which would enforce 
restriction and regulation of economic spontaneity arising from the existence of 
private capital, the primary task being the development of productive forces 
and the creation of an integrated national economy. Implicitly Szentes has 
proposed for state capitalism, which may further develop either into capitalism 
or socialism. Judging from the trends that are occurring in Eastern, Europe, ý it 
is explicit that market-oriented economies are more attractive than socialism. 
CRITIQUE OF DEPENDENCY THEORY 
While not in disagreement with'many aspects of the analyses inspired by the 
dependency approach, ý critics, of 'dependency theory have argued that the 
viability of key analytical notions'of dependence itself is questionable. Lall 
(1975), for example, recognizes dependence as a continuous variable affecting 
different nations as a matter of degree, and views dependence "in terms of a 
pyramidal structure of socio-cultural -dominance (a scale rather than a unique 
condition of dependence) -in the capitalist world, with -the top hegemonic 
position held by the most powerful capitalist country and the bottom by the 
smallest and'poorest ones, and a more or less continuous range occupied by 
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various developed countries, with relative position changing between the two" 
(Lall, 1975, p 803). Therefore it is quite impossible to distinguish dependent 
from non-dependent economies; and there are several examples of a number of 
advanced countries that depend heavily on foreigners for their industrial 
technology, such as Canada, Belgium and Denmark (Lall, 1975, p 804). In 
addition, Lall refutes the "analytical usefulness of lumping different types and 
stages of the capitalist development process in the various less developed 
economies under one category of dependence" (LalL 1975, p- 806). 
Furthermore Frank's (1967) metropolis-satellite dichotomy differed little from 
the modernization theory's traditional-modem dichotomy, and there was no 
adequate classification between different modes of production and because of 
that any production for a market meant the existence of capitalism. 
Other critics also argue on the ambiguity of the distinctions between 
dependency and inter-dependence. Webster (1984. - p 87) argues -that 
dependence growth is not unique to the Third World. Canada depends heavily 
on capital from the United States and yet it is a developed economy, while the 
United States is dependent on Third World reserves as demonstrated by the oil 
crisis of 1973.1 
Cardoso (1982, pp 118-9)[1972] argues that instead of "development of 
underdevelopment" there occurs a kind of dependent capitalist development in 
the Tbird World. In countries like Argentina, Brazil, - Mexico and India there is 
an internal ý structural fragmentation. The most advanced sectors of their 
economies are connected to the international capitalist system, while the 
backward economic and social sectors of these countries become "internal 
colonies" and are subordinate to the advanced sectors. What happens further is 
the creation of dualism in terms of internal differentiations due to capitalist 
expansion. This state of dualism is functional to capitalist expansion because it 
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helps to keep wages at a'low level and diminishes political pressures inside the 
modem sector since the social and economic position of those belonging to this 
sector is always better in comparative terms. 
Underdevelopment; according to Frank (1969) is measured in terms of the 
exchange and transfer of the surplus from satellites to metropoles, but he did 
not examine the way in which the surplus is sucked out of the satellites. Laclau 
(1971) argues that the existence of capital and a market did not'define a 
capitalist mode of production. He further argues that it is crucial to know how 
the surplus that is extracted 'is produced and whether-there are specific 
characteristics of the productive system that limit its development. Laclau 
(1971) mentions the fact that capitalist development has taken place in Third 
World countries. For example, transnational corporations are located in several 
Third World countries and these enterprises pay low wages in order to 
maintain profitability and thereby exploit the surplus value of labour. Frank 
(1967), on the other hand, did not mention or analyse the exploitation of 
surplus value of labour., -, 
Warren's (1973) critique of theories of neo-colonialism is argued basically on 
the premise that capitalism liberates rather than suppresses development in the 
Third World, and that "political reaction, dependence on and alliance with the 
US (or other) imperialism, plus economic nationalism may be a very handy 
combination for an undeveloped capitalist country attempting to become more 
advanced" (Warren, 1973, p 11). Thus the assertion that capitalism caused 
underdevelopment was not true since this assertion would deny the possibility 
. of 
development occurring along capitalist lines, in Third World countries. 
Furthermore, Warren (1980) argues that aspects of underdevelopment or 
dependency which are being experienced by Third World countries are actually 
stages of socio-economic transition to capitalism, and he concluded that 
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colonialism and capitalism have been positive factors in Third World 
development (Warren, 1980, pp 128-9). Moreover, Frank (1969) did not show 
how a revolutionary change can take place in the satellite, although he claims it 
is the only way of removing world poverty. The problem here is that both 
could be said to be right, depending what is defined as "colonialism" or 
"capitalism". 
Although "dependency" may be a useful descriptive term in referring to certain 
aspects and implications of international class relations, there is no reference to 
class formation or the mechanisms of neo-colonial , transition and the 
development of foreign and local-comprador classes in the satellite economies. 
Leys (1975) points to the "heavily economistic character ' of most 
underdevelopment theory" (Leys, 1975, p 20), despite a commitment to 
historical and non-disciplinary analysis. Underdevelopment ý literature tend to 
accept the pervasiveness and continuance of capitalism and offer somewhat 
apocalyptic proletariat/socialist revolution as the only alternative to 
exploitation and underdevelopment. What is needed is both a more detailed 
analysis of the economic and social history of prior development and a more 
detailed and programmatic exposition of "practicable" steps towards 
institutional change. 
Leys (1975) criticises the failure of underdevelopment theorists to comprehend 
the fact that a country's social formations play an important part in the 
exploitation of dominant classes on the masses. As a result, underdevelopment 
theory "concentrates on what happens to the underdeveloped countries at the 
hands of imperialism and colonialism rather than on the total historical process 
involved, including the various forms of struggle against imperialism and 
colonialism which grow out of the conditions of underdevelopment" (Leys, 
1975, p 20)). 
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On the point of a revolutionary break with capitalism, Leys, (1975,, p 23) 
stresses that, this will call for a large degree of enforced collectivism in return 
to, what may be a faint chance of-success. As the probable social cost of 
revolution is held to be higher than that of underdevelopment, Leys (1975, p 
24) suggested cthat underdeveloped countries , should , either ý play a very 
subordinate role in the international . capitalist . system or seek an independent 
role in an alternative system of poorer but non-capitalist countries. ý, ýI*I 
By the mid-1970s critics of dependency theory -nurtured the, notion' that 
capitalism generates growth in satellite countries, whereas dependency theorists 
underlined the prevalence of economic stagnation, due to the extraction of 
surplus, in the satellite countries. Neo-marxist critics of Frank's dependency 
theory, like Wallerstein (1974,1979) and Amin (1974) outlined alternative 
varieties of the dependency theory, by relating dependency to a single "world- 
system" type of analysis. 
WORLD SYSTEM 
Wallerstein (1979) suggests the only Idnd of social system that exists today is a 
world-system which he defines as "a unit with a single division of labour and 
multiple cultural systems ..... there can (however) ý be two varieties of such 
world-systems, one with a common political system and one without. We shall 
designate these ý respectively as world-empires and world-economies" 
(Wallerstein, 1979, p 5). 
Example of - world-empires are the pre-modem civilizations of Egypt, China 
and Rome and the Islamic empires of, the Middle Ages; where economic 
exchange occurred via long distance trade and were basically redistributive in 
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economic form. In contrast the emergence of the modem world economy in 
sixteenth century Europe resulted in European economic predominance of 
market trade or capitalism. Therefore the essential character of the world- 
system is that it is a capitalist world-economy. ,! II- 
Wallerstein (1979, p 18) postulates that the capitalist World economy is based 
upon three structural positions: core, --periphery and-semi-periphery, and had 
become stabilized by about 1640. The strength of the state machinery in core 
states is a function of the weakness of other state machineries. Core states are 
the strongest while those in the periphery are the weakest. Intervention of core 
states upon peripheral states occur through war, subversion and diplomacy. 
The functioning of a capitalist world-economy requires that countries pursue 
their economic interests within a single market. The core states seek to distort 
the market for their benefit by exerting influence on the weaker states, and by 
avoiding the normal operations of the market whenever it does not maximize 
their profit. Thus we get the operation of "unequal exchange" (Wallerstein, 
1979, p 18), resulting in an appropriation of surplus value of the whole world- 
economy by core areas. 
One reason for the creation of a semi-peripheral structural position is its role in 
maldng a capitalist world-economy -run smoothly (Wallerstein, 1979, p2 1). 
Although it appears that semi-peripheral states are accorded a specific 
economic role, in actual fact the reasons for the existence of these states are 
less economic and more political. Accordingly, the core is not faced withýa 
unified opposition from the periphery because of the existence of a middle 
stratum which is both exploited and exploiter. Thusýpolitical reasons are the 
basis for the emergence of semi-peripheral states, and they assume a mediating 
role, in politics and economics, between the core and the periphery. 
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Hoogvelt (1982, p 193) points out that the semi-peripheral states -are the 
middle-income countries, who'take advantage of rising wages and a decline in 
the comparative costs of production in the core countries. ' These semi- 
peripheral states import technology from ihe'core states and export semi- 
processed products to them. It is within this context that Brazil had purchased 
Germany's Volkswagen plant, inclusive of trade-mark, technology, plant and 
machinery. Automobiles and steel, being the declining sectors in core countries 
are the rising sector in the semi-peripheral states. At the same time the semi- 
peripheral states import raw materials from the periphery and export finished 
manufactures to the periphery. Another example of a semi-peripheral state is 
South Korea, a country which produces its own Hyundai automobiles and 
heavy vehicles, and additionally produce finished manufactures, particularly 
electrical and electronic goods, for export to the core and peripheral countries. 
While there is the possibility of semi-peripheral states improving their position 
while peripheral states upgrade to become semi-peripherals, it is not possible 
for all countries to develop simultaneously because the basic nature of ý the 
capitalist system limits entry into'its middle and top levels. therefore the 
development of some countries are at the expense of others. Furthermore, - as 
we shall illustrate below, it is'safe to assume that the development of some 
peripheral states are covertly corroborated by stronger semi-peripheral'and 
core states. 
Malaysia is an explicit example of a peripheral state which is trying to upgrade 
itself. This is evidenced by the state's promotion, since 1984, of trade relations 
with South Pacific countries like Tonga, Fiji and Papua New Guinea; a move 
which could be interpreted as the Malaysian state's strategy to dominate the 
trade of these tiny Pacific states. Likewise; during the Fourth Malaysia Plan 
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period (1981-85) the Malaysian government's Heavy Industries -Corporation 
(HICOM) established several joint venture projects with Japanese and South 
Korean concerns, which include a cement plant in Kedah, a steel billet plant in 
Trengganu, and, the Malaysian car project. - The automobile prcject, ý a joint 
venture between HICOM and Japan's Mitsubishi Corporation, launched a new 
prototype car Proton, which rolled off the assembly plant, in mid-1985. The 
state aimed to dominate the domestic automobile market, thus driving out the 
existing producers, and on this basis - develop the skills , and , engineering 
capacity to produce for the export market2. Currently, twelve different models 
of Proton are exported to Western countries including the, United States' and 
Britain. 
ýf! -C 
For other peripheral countries - that want to improve themselves, Wallerstein 
(1979, p 76) suggests three different strategies: the strategy of seizing the 
chance, the strategy of promotion by invitation, and the strategy of self- 
reliance. The strategy of seizing the chance means that at moments of world- 
market contraction, peripheral - states take advantage of the weakened political 
position of the core states and try to negate their economic problems relating to 
balance-of-payments, unemployment - and -a reduction of state income by 
introducing import substitution industries. . examples of states that . 
have 
followed this path are Brazil, Mexico and South Korea. However, -this strategy 
has one , disadvantage, ,, -since - industrial ,- development 
2. In arguing, against Malaysia's automobile project, Karmokolias (1990) 
asserts that in developing countries there appear to be more opportunities in 
component than car manufacturing., The production of less-intensive, simple 
technology components such as wire harnesses, upholstery, interior trimmings, 
batteries, exhaust systems and odometers will be feasible in less 
technologically advanced countries, like Malaysia. Automotive component 
exports from Malaysia increased from US$2.7 million in 1980 to US$3.7 
million in 1985 to US$5.7 million in 1987, an increase of 37 percent between 
1980 to 1987 (Karmokolias, 1990, table 2, p 49). 
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leads these states to import machines from core states and thus technological 
dependence becomes inevitable. 
The second strategy of promotion by invitation occurs -in times ý of world- 
market expansion, through economic and political collaboration with external 
capitalists. Several peripheral countries 'have experienced rapid economic 
growth by encouraging foreign capital investment in the manufactured exports 
sector. Countries like Taiwan, Singapore,, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Sri Lanka 
and Mauritius make enormous efforts in inviting transnational corporations to 
locate their industries in special "export processing zones" in each of those 
countries. Industries that are located in these countries are mainly light 
industries such as electronics and textiles and garments; unlike the intermediate 
level of heavier industries, such as the automobile industry, found in-Brazil 
and South Korea, and now in Malaysia. 
The third strategy of development for a peripheral country is that of self- 
reliance. Tanzania is a prime example of this-type of strategy. In the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967 Tanzania adopted the ujwnaa path to development. This 
meant the nationalization of most of the small industries and commercial sector 
in the country,, and placed rural development on the ujwnaa principle at the 
forefront of development strategy. The Tanzanian state emphasized priority to 
rural development, as against the previous policy of giving priority to urban 
areas, industrialization and foreign investment. The ujwnaa village is a 
nucleated settlement of peasants, dependent mainly on agriculture, working on 
a communal production, although individual households are allowed to retain 
private plots on which they grow crops for their own consumption. 
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How far has Tanzannia, succeeded in self-reliance? Hyden (1980, pp 115-16) 
commented that the ujamaa programme has not been totally successful; with 
poor performance in food production and earningsfrom communal work in 
most ujamaa villages were very low. Furthermore, food imports also rose. 
Maize imports rose from 92,000 tons in 1972 to nearly 300,000 tons in, 1974; 
while wheat imports rose from 46,000 tons in 1972 to 47,000 tons in 1974 
(Hyden, 1980, p 141). Also, Tanzania faced an enormous balance-of-payments 
problem, and that in 1979 and 1980 the country's, total balance-of-payment 
deficit was E620 million (Kitching, 1989, p 118)., 
IIf 
Nevertheless, Kitching (1989, p 123) agrees that the process of "villagization" 
resulted in several positive features. These include the provision of basic social 
services to the rural population, near-universal, primary - schooling, a quite 
successful adult literacy drive, a system of preventive and curative health care, 
and the provision of clean water supply in rural areas. 
Our discussion thus far appears to imply that dependency is a problem specific 
to underdeveloped Third World countries. Contrary to this belief, in an 
analysis of 146 countries, both in the centre and periphery, and by constructing 
an index of economic, political and socio-cultural dependency, Richards (1987) 
concludes that "the empirical results give no evidence that the dependency 
problem is an exclusive attribute of underdeveloped capitalist economies" and 
that "socialist revolution in the Third World is not a sufficient condition for 
autonomous political-economic development" (Richards, 1987, p 21). 
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All 146 countries in Richards' (1987) sample are ranked according to the 
factors of dependency -mentioned in. the, preceding paragraph. 
3. For social, 
technological and cultural dependence (an indication of the means by which the 
socio-cultural and technological structures of dependent nations are penetrated 
and permeated by the ideas and values systems of centre industrialized 
countries), 16 out of the top 20 positions are African countries, like Ruwanda, 
Upper Volta and Liberia., 
The most interesting observation is that Canada and Mexico, rank first and 
second respectively in-terms of trade dependency, a fact explained by these 
countries' proximity to the undisputed centre of the world capitalist economy, 
the United States. 
In terms of financial dependency, Latin American countries accounted for 12 
out of the top 20 positions and -that 10 out of the top 20 most financially 
dependent countries are Third World nations which fall into Wallerstein's 
(1979) semi-peripheral countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and India. 
3. Malaysia's order of rank according to the various dependency factors are as 
follows: 








Source: Richards (1987), Table 3, pp 13-14 (adapted). 
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Where military dependency is concerned, African countries have a high degree 
of dependence, given that much of Africa is politically and militarily unstable. 
Also, a number of highly military dependent countries happen to be vital 
American strategic interests, such as Egypt, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Turkey. 
GLOBAL ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL 
One other alternative form of dependency analysis as expounded by Amin 
(1974,1976), examines world capitalism in terms of two categories: the centre 
and the periphery. In his model of the global, accumulation of capital, Amin 
(1974) defines two distinctive patterns: "one applying to development at the 
centre, the other 'to dependent development in the periphery. Central 
development is characterised by the dominance of economic activity to satisfy 
mass consumer needs and the consequent demand for production goods. The 
power of the, masses is enlisted in a "social contract" which allows the 
establishment of a limited economic viability, at a national level. However the 
internationalisation of productive capital increasingly threatens that stability. 
The peripheral systems are dominated by production of luxury goods and 
exports and the consequent'lack of importance to internal mass markets. This 
leads to growing inequality, technological dependence, political weakness 
among oppressed - in sum, marginalization" (Amin, 1974, p 9). 
The basic difference between the centre' and the periphery is that capitalist 
relations in the centre developed on the basis of expansion of the home market, 
whereas capitalist relations in the periphery were introduced from outside. 
Furthermore, peripheral countries which have achieved rapid industrial growth 
through export-oriented manufacturing sectors, such as Taiwan, Singapore and 
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Malaysia, are few in number, and, in view of political instability in the Third 
World countries, are unlikely to be extended to all Third World countries. 
According to Amin (1976) growth in peripheral economies is "blocked" since 
the periphery is "complementary and dominated" (Amin, 1976, p 288) by the 
centre. Peripheral countries are prevented - from ý- accumulating capital 
indigenously,, since ý capital at the periphery is transferred to the centre. 
Economic relations between the centre and the periphery is characterised by 
the centre's domination on . the - periphery. This results in an - "unequal 
exchange" (Amin, 1974, p 13) between the centre and the periphery. In the 
theory of unequal exchange it means: "the products exported, to the periphery 
are important to the extent [that] the return to labour will be less than what it is 
at the centre. And it can be less to the extent that society will, by every means 
- economic and non-economic, be made subject to this new function, i. e. 
providing cheap labour to the export sector" (Amin, 1974, p'43). The wage 
rate of the export sector is kept as low as the'economic,, social and political 
conditions allow it to be. 
As a result of this super-exploitation in the production of commodities which 
the Third World exchange with the industrialised countries, there is a form of 
hidden transfers of value from the periphery to the centre. Amin (1976, p 144) 
estimated the amount was US$22 billion annually, or twice the amount of aid 
and private capital that the periphery received. While this amount is negligible 
from the point of view of the centre as it amounted to only two or three 
percent of their gross internal product, it is significant to peripheral states as it 
represented 20 percent of their GNP; sufficient to account for the blocldng of 
the growth of the peripheral and increase the gap between the centre and the 
periphery. It is this unequal exploitation that leads to unequal exchange which 
in turn leads to unequal development. The structure of the economy and 
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society in peripheral states continually reproduces the condition for renewed 
unequal exchange in new historical periods and circumstances. 
Amin (1974, p 19), proposes that only a radical'and complete break with the 
world capitalist system will provide the necessary conditions for genuine 
development, and that the problem of underdevelopment can be definitely 
overcome within a, global socialist society. However, ''Amin'(1974) did not 
explain how the change can take place because the basic problem with Amin's 
writings is that they lacked the notion of differentiation. Smith (1982, pp 12- 
18) criticises Amin's insistence on essential unity of peripheral states despite 
the diversity of national economies between various Third World countries. 
Amin (1974), believes that the economic and social structure of the peripheral 
states can only be comprehended at the world level. Thus differences between, 
for example, Brazil and Nigeria or India and Tanzania are dismissed as 
secondary. Amin (1974) ignores the political implications of these differences 
which have effects on the economic, social and political organization in each 
peripheral state. By assuming that the national economy of the peripheral have 
noý freedom of manoeuvre in relation to world capitalism, Amin (1974), 
therefore, denies that national economic policy has a legitimate role to play in 
the process of political struggle and -dispute. Policies towards transnational 
corporations, 'policies towards wages - (which significantly affects income 
distribution) and policies on trade unions, for example, all have significant 
effects on the conditions of operation of capitalism. 
Likewise, the lack of differentiation also makes it difficult to organise and 
direct locally relevant political protests and class struggles in the peripheral 
countries. For instance; industrialisation in North Nigeria did not bring about 
labour exploitation, unlike the super-exploited labour in Southeast Asia. 
Therefore social, and political forces representing the interests of workers in 
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Southeast Asia would necessarily reflect the struggle to protect their rights, 
while that may not be the case with Nigerian workers. 'Thus the national 
economy is a vital unit of analysis because political struggle is organised at the 
national or'sub-national level and not at the global level. 
Amin's (1974) call for a complete break with the world capitalist system has 
been dismissed as "dangerous arrogance' by Smith (1982, p 20). Kampuchea 
is a tragic example of a peripheral country which tried to isolate itself from the 
world capitalist system, with disastrous consequences. In its attempt to 
withdraw from the world economy while striving for an agricultural self- 
sufficiency rural order, the regime relied on repression and provoked the wrath 
of many other countries, particularly Vietnam. ,-, I -z 
FOOD IMPERIALISM 
I 
Contrary to Samir Amin's proposals of a complete break with the capitalist 
economies, there are several examples that illustrate how central capitalist 
interests have sought a variety of means to influence the consumption habits in 
peripheral countries and therefore create consumer dependency. For instance, 
food imperialism is a common phenomenon -in several underdeveloped 
countries. In a study concerning the, relationship between 'bread and 
underdevelopment in Nigeria, Andrae and Beckman (1985) argue that from 
being self-sufficient in food until the late 1960s, Nigeria has become trapped 
by the entrenchment of wheat bread as a staple food and the increasing 
dependence on North American wheat - over 90 percent of the wheat imported 
into Nigeria comes from the United States. The availability of foreign 
exchange earnings from oil enabled the Nigerian economy to have access to 
rapidly rising, cheap imports Hence bread enters into a consumption pattern 
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where grains such as sorghum and millet and other starchy foods such as 
cassava and legumes account for three-quartersýof the food intake in the 
average household. - Wheat imports increased dramatically,,, from-, an average 
level of 75,000 tons per annum in the first half of the 1960s, wheat imports 
had increased by eighteen times this level to 1.5 million tonnes in 1981, and to 
a further 1.8 million tonnes in 1984 (Andrae and Beckman,, 1985, p 18). 
Nigeria's commitment to a self-reliance food policy have led to a "misguided" 
policy of producing wheat instead of other grains such as millet and sorghum, 
which previously constituted a large proportion of the people's diet. Optimistic 
assumptions by foreign consultants resulted, in a massive ýmisdirection of 
national resources. The factory gate cost of domestic wheat was estimated at 
some six to eight times the cost of imported wheat while the value of subsidy 
of domestic wheat was equivalent to one tenth of total government revenue in 
1980 (Andrae and Beckman, 1985, pp 126; 127), bearing in mind that at the 
same time Nigeria was faced with a foreign exchange crisis due to a decline in 
oil revenue. 
f-, 
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Thus wheat has become not only an important source of foreign exchange for 
the United, States but also it is a foreign political tool of much -political 
potential (Andrae and Beckman, -p 140). The wheat trade consists of a high 
level of concentrated transnational corporate power which is actively supported 
by - the United States government. In - Nigeria' the importation of wheat is 
accompanied by a rapid diffusion of advanced processing technology in milling 
and baking, which highly enhances the competitive force of wheat compared to 
domestic food processing, which is highly labour intensive and closely tied to 
the household economy. Therefore purchasing bread in the market is a more 
convenient alternative for consumers. -tII 
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Andrae and Beckman (1985, pp 153-156) recommended several options for 
Nigeria to disengage itself from the "wheat trap". For example, a- large 
proportion of the wheat content in a loaf of bread could be substituted with 
local crops such as sorghum, maize, millet and cassava. A cut in the supply of 
cheap wheat imports, such as by raising the prices, might increase demand for 
the mixed bread variety. In addition there is ample scope for developing the 
local food'processing technology-so that producers can perform labour saving 
functions that areý essential in making bread attractive to, the consumers. 
Furthermore the question of self-sufficiency in food production can be solved 
by relying on the vast scope for commercial transformation of peasant 
production, incorporating new forms of ownership and control of land and 
labour. 
Another example which illustrates the link between imperialism and self- 
reliance in food production could be seen'in the Yemen, a country that has an 
established tradition of emigration. Enclaves of Yemeni workers are found in 
Britain and North America, and prior to the 1990 Gulf crisis Yemeni workers 
were employed throughout the Arab peninsula and the Gulf States. 
Private transfers from emigrant workers have come to play a major role in the 
balance-of-payments of the country. From a level of 328 million Yemeni Rials 
or 14 percent of the national disposable income in '1971/72, private, transfers 
rose to a peak level of 6351 million Yemeni Rials or 46 percent of the national 
disposable income in 1977/78 (el-Mallakh, 1986, p 44). 'As a result of these 
private transfers the country was able to overcome a persistent balance-of-trade 
deficit and enjoy positive balance-of-payments current account in the mid- 
1970s. However, trends in the 1980s showed a decline in the level of private 
transfers. By 1984 it' amounted ý to only 4417 million Yemeni Rials, a drop of 
21 percent from the level of the previous year (el-Mallakh, 1986, p 44). The 
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decline in the level of private transfers was due to the decrease in demand for 
Yemeni - workers in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, where there is a 
preference for the more skilled Asian labour force from Korea, Thailand and 
the Philippines. Moreover; the massive construction programmes initiated in 
the early 1970s had begun'to subside in the 1980s., At present it could be safely 
presumed that the amount of private transfers would continue to decrease 
substantially as a result of the repatriation of Yemeni workers from Saudi 
Arabia, as a consequence of the Yemen's support for Iraq in the Gulf War, 
which took effect from September 1990. 
A drop in the level of -remittances prompted the Yemeni government to adopt 
an austerity programme in 1983, which called for increased tariffs, cuts in the 
budget allocations and measures to curb imports. Although in 1984 private 
transfers dropped quite substantially by 21 percent, the government was able to 
reduce its balance-of-payments deficit by 41 percent, mainly due to its 
reduction in imports (el-Mallakh, 1986, p 44). 
Emigration has significant effects on the domestic labour force, particularly 
in the agricultural sector, as a typical Yemeni emigrant is a rural unskilled 
young male worker. As a consequent, the Yemen relies quite substantially on 
imported food. Food imports increased from a level of 2033.7 million Yemeni 
Rials or 26.5 percent of total imports in 1979/80 to 2209.4 million Yemeni 
Rials or 32 percent of total imports in 1982. Meanwhile, in 1976 domestic 
cereal production yielded a marketable surplus of 119,222 tons; but between 
1976 and, 1980 domestic cereal production dropped by 17 percent, causing a 
deficit of 53,500 tons in 1980 (el-Mallakh, 1986, pp, 156; 158). 'Simultaneously 
cereal imports increased from 158,000 tonnes in 1974 to 247,000 tonnes in 
1986, while food aid in cereals expanded from 33,000 tonnes in 1974/75 to 
57,000 tonnes in 1985/86 (World Bank, 1988, p 234). Subsidised grain 
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imports from the West have the effect of undermining local prices, leaving 
little incentive for farmers to cultivate the traditional cereals of sorghum, millet 
and barley. Table 2.2 shows the comparative grain retail prices, in a local 
market in Dhamar for the years 1980 -82, which shows that prices of imported 
grains are comparatively cheaper than those of home-grown grains. - ., '-, 
Table 2.2 
Comparative Prices of Grains 
(in Yemeni Rials) 
1980 -" 1§81' * 1982 
Imported wheat 2.19 2.13 2.15 
Local sorghum (red) 3.00 "2.50,, 
2.0,4 
Local sorghum (white) 3.00, 2.75 2.87 
Source: Swagman (1988),; Table 7, p 54. " f'ý 
Traditional cereal production is both land and labour intensive, besides, 
emigration has caused scarcity of agricultural labour. In general cereals and 
grains are produced for home consumption, any surpluses are given away as 
gifts-to relatives and close friends. Only the larger landowners are able to 
produce surpluses for the market. However, there is a lack of a well-structured 
market for selling surplus grains. Since it is traditionally dishonourable for 
tribesmen - the main producers of cereals - to have close dealings with the suq 
(the market), surpluses are marketed through agents or middlemen. (Swagman, 
1988, p 52). Moreover, changing patterns of consumer tastes has reduced the 
demand for local cereals in the urban areas. Consumers prefer white loaves or 
ruti and shami, two types of bread made of white flour and produced in 
commercial bakeries (Swagman, 1988, p 54). 
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In consequence; the government's call, for an increase in domestic - cereal 
production and improve its competitiveness with cereal imports may not be 
effective without the necessary legislation, like restriction of grain imports and 
the abolition of food aid., Subsidies for domestic grain may be a viable policy 
provided that there is no competition from imported grain. 
A popular alternative to domestic cereal -production is the Yemeni'farmers' 
preference for the cultivation of qat4, due to its low labour and minimal input 
requirements, and yet provide high returns. Weir (1985" p 73) estimated that 
for a typical individual land-holding of 0.2 hectare the annual gross income for 
the qat farmer is US$5000 to US$7000, and of this 85 percent is net profit. 
The gross margin per hectare of qat in ý comparison with all l'other crops is at 
least tenfold. Unlike local grains and cereals, a vast marketing network exists 
for qat. 'For transporting a sack of qat bunches on his back from the fields to 
the regional market, -a porter is able to earn 100 Yemeni Rials per trip 
(Swagman, 1988, ' p 58). A qat agent in Sana'a was reported to be earning 
30,000 Yemeni Rials in one month (ibid. ). 
Qat and coffee can be cultivated under similar soil and weather conditions. 
Hence it is financially advantageous to cultivate qat rather than coffee, because 
the rewards for labour in coffee production is estimated to be 39 Yemeni Rials 
per man-day; whereas in qat production the amount is 161 Yemeni Rial per 
man-day, increasing to around 700 Yemeni Rials per man-day in the second 
year of production (EI-Mallakh, 1986, p 100). While agriculture on the whole 
made up 61.4, percent of the GDP in 1973-74, the qat industry alone 
contributed to one-third of the GDP (Kennedy, 1987, p 133). 
4. Qg or Catha edulis, is an evergreen shrub; the shoots and new leaves, when 
chewed, produces a mild stimulant. 
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It has been argued that in general returns from the cultivation, of qat has re- 
distributive effects on agricultural development., Weir (1985) stressed on ý the 
economic impact of qat cultivation. In the mid-1970s revenues from the sale of 
qat, it was assumed, -have enabled a mountain village community to construct a 
dirt track linking their village and the Red Sea port of Hoedaida. Hence, "the 
advent of -motor transport resulted 
in a dramatic increase -in commercial 
activity generally, and a wide range of foodstuffs and other commodities could 
now be imported cheaply" (Weir, 1985, pp 79-80). Money was also invested 
in the building of shops in the market-place, drilling wells and the installation 
of water-pumps. -- - ), ý 
Nevertheless, we should be aware that the period of the mid-1970s coincided 
with the boom, period in the oil-producing countries, which resulted in a 
tremendous increase in the amount of private transfers received from Yemeni 
emigrant workers. Remittances could have been the major financial factor in 
initiating development in the village communities of Yemen. 
The economic benefits of qat production accrues to individual farmers only, 
and if any benefits that -accrue to local communities these are the result of 
private investments as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The state does 
not benefit directly from the sales'of qat, precisely because of the unreliable 
tax system. Kennedy (1987, p 157) mentions a field tax equivalent -to 10 
percent of the commercial value, of the crop, which is not always correctly 
assessed, and because the tax collectors are local residents; farmers often evade 
the tax altogether. % -1 11 
The institutionalization of qat use has been well documented (Makhlouf, 1979; 
Weir, ý 1985; 'Kennedy, 1987). Qat parties are seen as an essential medium of 
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social interaction. It is common for people to spend up to a third of their 
incomes on qat (Weir, 1985, p 107). Bornstein (1974, pp 30-32) estimated that 
in Sana'a, on average, expenditure onýqat amounted to 13 percent of total 
household budgets, compared to 11.5 percent on meat, fish and eggs and over 
15 percent on cereals. 
This study, however, contends that such studies which support the constructive 
economic, social and cultural impact of qat cultivation in the Yemen are in 
reality an ultimate campaign which mislead farmers on priorities for food-crop 
cultivation, and an attempt to ý inculcate the "transfer-of-taste" by the 
consumption of imported foodstuff. If the claims by Western researchers that 
farmers could reap higher financial returns from-the cultivation of qat goes 
without challenge from the Yemeni government, in the long-term it would 
jeopardise the policy of self-reliance in food production. The expansion of 
domestic food production is vital for the reproduction of an expanding labour 
force. -Without proper marketing and pricing systems that can provide 
incentives for farmers, an increase in the production of food crops will be 
dismal. - 
Since the relations between the centre and the periphery are relations of 
domination, then food dependence on the part of the periphery is used both as 
an economic and political tool by the centre. The case of a peripheral country, 
like the Yemen, not being able to feed her population adequately is not because 
of backwardness of her agricultural productivity but rather as a result of 
imperialist domination. As George (1988), concedes "food aid programmes 
can create or simply increase dependency on foreign types of food ..... and it 
is part and parcel of the wider problem of the penetration of the economy and 
culture of the third world countries by the ideology and the products of the rich 
countries" (George, 1988, p 134). Both the poor, and perhaps to a larger 
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extent, the rich in Third World countries are affected by increasing 
dependency on foreign products, such as tinned milk or milk powder or the 
craze for fast-food such as beef-burgers. While it is true that food aid 
programmes aremecessary in cases of famine and hunger, George (1988, p 
135) points out that famines are not caused by' the overall lack of food but 
rather they are caused by unequal distribution of food and/or money to buy 
food; and therefore any policies addressed to rectify such- problems must 
reflect on this specific point. It 
In the final analysis, the expansion of domestic food production necessarily 
must take effect before the import capacity of the economy collapses, not only 
due to a fall in revenues but because of competing claims on export earnings, 
and above all to disengage the country from food imperialism. Clearly there is 
a strong case for the commercialisation of peasant economy in the expansion of 
domestic food production. There is aýcompelling awareness amongst less 
developed countries of their commitment towards, self-reliance in food 
production. The critical point,, however, is that -politicians, administrators, 
scientists and workers must beprepared to tolerate a decline in real income in 
support of a policy of self-reliance and break the comprador nexus. In the 
long-run the welfare and survival of workers depend a lot on a policy of food 
self-reliance. __t" - 
Thus far, this chapter has highlighted on different themes that help to explain 
the' "structural'control" of development, which has to be understood for two 
reasons with reference to the poorest sections of the population in Malaysia 
and elsewhere. First, social security 'can only be explained and its potentialities 
revealed in relation to the institutions of "structural control". Second, more 
generally, 'the conditions of life of the poor "tend to matters outside social 
security or its influence - like national diet and food consumption. 
wavf-PSITY 




SHIFFING ECONOMIC TRENDS, 
What has emerged in the international economic scenario is not only the 
unevenness of accumulation between the First World and the Third World, but 
there are ample evidence of uneven development within the Third World itself. 
South Korea, for example, has begun to escape the trap of dependence on 
foreign technology. The country is capable of developing its own capacity for 
technological innovation and manufactures electrical and electronics goods. 
For instance, ' appliances manufactured by Samsung Electronics of Korea are 
marketed in Britain. 
Luedde-Neurath (1988) discloses how the South Korean market remains 
relatively ý impervious to foreign goods and services. ý The state keeps strict 
controls over exchange rates, finance and export licenses. All foreign 
investments are tightly screened and, must conform to strict guide-lines on 
technology transfer, licensing agreements, local purchasing and contract rates. 
Even so state officials arbitrarily refuse permission to foreign investors if they 
decide it is not in the national interest. 
On yet another spectrum, contrary to the call for global socialism by 
dependency theorists, unprecedented political revolutions in Eastern Europe in 
1989 showed that socialist countries are transforming into market economies. 
This newArend began in Poland in mid-1989, when a controlled free elections 
enabled Solidarity to win the majority of contested seats and formed a new 
government. Political changes in Poland were followed by events in Hungary, 
the government of which announced the demise of the communist party in the 
autumn of 1989. Next came changes in East Germany and the opening up of 
the Berlin Wall, and the proposed unification of East and West Germany. 
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Political revolution also took place in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia; and finally 
at the end of 1989, amidst enormous bloodshed, came the political 
liberalisation of Rumania. 
The political liberalisation of these Eastern European countries also meant the 
reform of their Soviet-type central'planning economic systems. ý Hare (1990, p 
5) mentions that since 1980 Hungary had initiated several market-oriented 
economic reform, such as the 'formation of commercial banks, the 
establishment of small-scale production units, and the - introduction of 
legislation allowing for the formation of joint-stock or the limited liability 
companies. In 1988 Hungary reformed its tax system, introduced personal 
income tax and a form of value-added tax. ", ýi- Ii 
In addition, several other capitalistic, trends have transpired as a result of the 
political changes in Eastern Europe. 'In the transformation into market 
economies these countries have to depend on Western economic support, given 
in the form of loans by agencies such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and the European Community. Furthermore, Western European 
countries, like France and Britain have announced their willingness to extend 
educational training and technical assistance to East European countries; thus 
increasing the West's financial and technological - as well as cultural 
domination. I 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS , 
This section will summarise the arguments that have been developed in this 
chapter. The discussion has reviewed the main paradigms in the development 
debate, which are the modernization, the dependency and the world-system 
perspec ives. 
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This study repudiates the modernization perspective because it stresses upon 
the diffusion of Western notions of development that ý are more, often not 
suitable for Third World countries. On - the other hand, the dependency 
perspective is more dynamic in its , analysis of development and 
underdevelopment, since it traces the historical causes of a country's economic 
backwardness, and thus has contributed greatly to our understanding of the 
development and underdevelopment debate. Nevertheless, the dependency 
theorists have failed in their call for global socialism and therefore their ideas 
have not been tested adequately. 
Additionally, -, the discussion analysed the world-system perspective based 
primarily on the writings of Immannuel Wallerstein. This is the preferred 
perspective adopted in this study) By giving more priority to social factors of 11 
development this 'perspective allows a better interpretation of the economic 
underdevelopment, especially pertaining to Malaysia. However, this approach 
cannot be accepted unequivocally without drawing upon the various valuable 
insights offered by the other approaches critically reviewed earlier in this 
chapter. ýII.. II 
In the adoption of the ideas emanating from the thinIcing of world-system 
theorists, this study nevertheless does not recommend total disengagement 
from global capitalism. Instead, as will be explained in the following 
paragraphs, what is essential is the attempt to reconcile the national economy's 
vulnerability to external forces by adopting selective delinldng strategies which 
will lessen dependence on the global economic system. 
The strategy of self reliance as advocated by world systems theorists implies 
giving priority to social factors of development. This further implies 
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developing more concern for social policies. Within this framework priority 
must be accorded firstly for policies that promote food self-reliance in order to 
sustain the local economy and provide long-term employment especially for the 
rural population. A food self-reliance policy necessitates priorities allocated for 
developing technical and financial infrastructure, so that food production 
would be more lucrative compared to, for instance, unskilled production'work 
in transnational corporations. 
Additionally, priority must be allocated to building agricultural processing 
industries and to producing consumer goods; therefore replacing previously 
foreign activities with locally-sustained ones of a non-exploitative nature. The 
long-term goal is to reduce dependency on foreign imports and also to expand 
selected export sectors. Relations with the centre countries are to be kept to a 
minimum in favour of exchanges with developing countries. For a peripheral 
country to be self-sustaining the bulk of the surplus must be invested in 
domestic production, 'not transferred or repatriated to the centre countries., 
It follows that if the national income is less dependent on fluctuations of world 
prices of raw materials, for instance, there are more possibilities to generate 
resources for a programme of social security, -encompassing minimal but 
equitable standards of provision, that would cover contingencies at all levels 
for wage-labour, the self-employed, the aged, the handicapped and children. 
Since the transfer of surplus from the peripherý/to the centre is the hallmark 
of capitalism, admittedly the vested foreign powers may attempt to block the 
domestic utilisation of national income and resources; because in the opinion 
of these powers a peripheral economy must be dependent on foreign powers 
for its needs - hence aid or loans or both are advanced in 
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areas of health care, education and technological development. Subsequently, 
the peripheral economies spends a larger proportion of its income on servicing 
these loans. 
What the Third World needci2to work for is a lessening of the dependence of the 
Third World on markets, capital and technologies of the First World. There 
ought to be a greater potential for trade expansion among developing countries, 
an improvement in their terms of trade vis-a-vis the industrial world, and 
reduced dependence on transnational corporations. The possibility of 
autonomous, self-sustained growth for the Third World is currently ruled out 
by their dependent status. 
Hence in addition to a policy of self-reliant, because we cannot totally ignore 
the existence of a global economic market, there is a need for a stronger co- 
operation between Third World countries at the regional and international 
levels. Since Third World countries are relatively weak and therefore likely to 
be equal partners, they should co-operate more between themselves in trade, 
exchange of technology and information, establish common institutions and 
integration schemes as part of a collective self-reliance strategy. In this way 
relations between Third World countries could be seen as mutually 
advantageous rather exploitative. 
Above all, Third World countries need to continue to press for international 
agreements and regulations to their advantage, for instance in relation to prices 
of raw commodities, so that they would be less affected by adversities of 
global economic crises. A balanced approach between self-reliance in global 




PA171ERNS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
INTRODUCTIO 
To be able to understand the present state of affairs in the contemporary 
Malaysian economic structure requires a comprehension of the incorporation of 
the Malayan economy into the global economic system, the role of the colonial 
administration shaping the specific character of the country and the social 
formation that has been created by this process. It is our contention that the 
type of economic development introduced in the colonial period has led to the 
state of dependence of the Malaysian economy which has only in part been 
countered by subsequent policies. Malaysia is highly dependent on other 
countries, particularly the metropolitan countries, for its trade, financial and 
technological development, and cannot take a sufficiently "impartial" judgment 
of the policies to be adopted to meet its needs. 
The discussion in this chapter will focus on the historical factors crucial in the 
formation of the Malaysian economic structure and the subsequent 
underdevelopment of the economy. Since the discussion encompasses over one 
hundred years of Malaysia's history, there is no attempt to be exhaustive. 
Instead the argument will highlight the salient patterns of colonial economic 
and social control that help to explain the existing inequalities in contemporary 
Malaysia. Only broad trends will be discussed. 
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PENINSULA MALAYSIA -a brief introduction -- 
The topography of the country and physical situation of the environment in 
which the population live condition many of the difficulties encountered in 
Malaysian development. The country comprises of Peninsula Malaysia, which 
is situated on the southern-most part of South East Asia; and Sabah and 
Sarawak, which are two states on the island of Borneo. Peninsula Malaysia 
covers an area of 131,794 square kilometres; while Sabah and Sarawak 
together cover roughly 198,000 'square kilometres. A central range of 
highlands known as the Main Range, which forms the spine of the peninsula, 
running roughly north-south, separates the'westem and eastern states, except in 
the south. The highest point in the peninsula, Gunong Tahan, is about, 2207 
meters above sea-level. The typical topography of the peninsula consists of the 
long, narrow coastal fringe of, mangrove swamps, bordered by broad alluvial 
plains of up to sixty kilometres wide in some places. In general settlements are 
located in the coastal lowlands and river plains. The lowlands gradually rise 
into the highlands, - where hill and highland forests are the typical type of 
vegetation (Andaya and Andaya; 1982, ý p 1). 
I 
Peninsula Malaysia lies between 1 degree and 7 degrees north of the equator. 
Average daily temperatures range between 25 degrees to 33 degrees Celsius. 
Rainfall is heavy, about 2000 to 4000 millimetres per annum. The east coast 
states of Peninsula Malaysia are prone to the northeast monsoon rains from 
November to March, while -the west coast receives relatively even rainfall 
(Andaya and Andaya, 1982, p 2). 
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in 1989 the population of Malaysia was estimated at 17.3 -million. Peninsula 
Malaysia's share of the population was 14.3 million; of which 8.2 million 
were Malays, 4.5 million Chinese, 1.4 million Indians and 0.09 million other 
ethnic groups (TER 1988/89, p 7). 
) rl -I 
POLMCAL ORGANIZATIO 
Peninsula Malaysia was formerly known as the Federation of Malaya. The 
country gained its political independence from Britain on 31 August, 1957. On 
the same date in 1963 the Federation of Malaysia was formed out of a merger 
between the former Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah (formerly North 
Borneo) and Sarawak (like Malaya,. the -last three states were also former 
British colonies). Singapore seceded the Federation in 1965 1. 
Malaysia is a federation of eleven states in Peninsula Malaysia, and Sabah and 
Sarawak. The peninsula states are Perlis, Kedah, Pulau Pinang (also known as 
Penang), Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Melaka on the west coast, and 
Kelantan, Trengganu and Pahang on the east coast. The southernmost state is 
Johor. Individual states have their own Sultans as constitutional heads of states. 
Each'state also has its, own State Legislative, Council, whose members are 
elected representatives. The states have retained certain rights, particularly the 
right to alienate new land. - This suggests the cautious approach adopted since 
Federal union to economic and social integration. Previous -forms of political 
control and structure have been allowed to persist in substantial part. 
1. For accounts on the formation of Malaysia and the reasons for Singapore's 
seccession, refer to Andaya and Andaya, 1982, (pp 270-280); and Bedlington, 
S. (1978), Malaysia and Singapore, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
55 
At the Federal level the Head of State is the King, a constitutional monarch 
whose term of office is for a period of five years. Only the nine Malay Sultans 
have the exclusive right to elect the King from amongst themselves. e 
Federal Parliament consists of two Houses: the Dewan Rakyat (Lower House) 
whose members are elected, and the Dewan Negara (Upper House) whose 
members are appointed by the King. As a former British colony, Malaysia is a 
member of the Commonwealth. ' 
THE MALAY PENINSULA -A BRIEF ECONOMIC HISTORY 
During the pre-colonial era the Malay peninsula -was sparsely populated and 
politically disunited. It was covered mostly by dense tropical jungle. At ý the 
end of the eighteenth century the peninsula had a population -which was 
probably "no more than a quarter million...,. '; People lived in settlements strung 
along the coasts and rivers where transport by small boat, drinldng water and 
irrigation water were available. Malay political units ..... were shaped around 
river estuaries where rice growing was easy and where the coastal riverine 
strings of villages met" (Dobby, 1956, p 128). 
The pattern of Malay political and social organization was a feudal one, where 
authority was handed down through the patrilineal descent. ý At the apex of the 
feudal structure was a hereditary ruler, the Sultan or Raja, who personified the 
state and whose supreme power was legitimized by custom and religion. The 
Sultan or Raja ruled over a hierarchy of state officials, and it was common for 
the ruler to delegate authority to his territorial chiefs, " especially in the 
inaccessible parts off the state. This delegation of power allowed the chiefs to 
exercise various royal privileges such as - the right to levy taxes on produce 
entering or leaving the district., Often, especially in the case of a weak ruler in 
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power, the territorial chiefs were able to seize authority independently of the 
Sultan's wishes and to exercise practical authority within their respective areas. 
In summary, before -British intervention in the - Malay peninsula, the Malay 
political system was identified by "the feudal structure, the decentralization of 
authority, and the'local nature of the affairs of the state" (Lim, 1977, p 4). 
The peasants formed the base of the Malay political and social structure. They 
lived in basically self-sustained communities, or - kwnpong scattered along - the 
coasts and throughout the river valleys of the peninsula. Generally they 
practised two Idnds of cultivation, that is, shifting cultivation on the hill slopes 
and sedentary cultivation on the lower grounds. Their major crops were rice, 
sago, bananas, maize, tapioca, sugar cane, pepper and gambier. Supplies were 
further supplemented by activities like hunting and fishing. Lim (ibid. ) 
mentioned that the levels of material culture was simple and concerned mainly 
with the basic requirements of food, shelter and ý clothing. Agricultural 
production was mainly for subsistence consumption by the producing unit 
itself, the peasant family. 
Additionally the granite ranges of the interior produced rich tin deposits which 
was washed down by the rivers and deposited in the coastal river beds and 
alluvial plains. Villagers could pan for tin from the nearby rivers. The tin 
mining activity was especially important as -it was a profitable supplement to 
agriculture. 'From the forests came products such as timber, rattan and resin. 
The Malays may have been active in the -distribution and sale of forest 
products. However, they were not the principal colectors of forest products-; 
this was the task of the forest dwellers or the'abrogines. While the hinterlands 
produced tin and forest products, in the coastal regions there'were also rich 
harvests of sea products such as black coral (Andaya and Andaya, 1982, pp 
10; 12). Trade was carried out in the larger villages. Goods such as salt, iron 
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goods, cloth and ornaments, were bartered for tin, forest and sea products. As 
a consequence of this form of trade, the Malay economy was based on a 
monetary system of exchange. The sale of surplus foodstuffs or cash crops to 
Chinese mining communities also became the main source of income of the 
Malay peasants (Gullick, 1958, pp 20; 31). 
Apart from the, Malay peasants of the coastal and riverine settlements a fair 
number of Chinese had settled in the peninsula since the end of the seventeenth 
century. Winstedt (1968, p 49) mentions that at the end of the seventeenth 
century and the beginning of the eighteenth century a certain English Captain 
Alexander Hamilton estimated, about 1000 Chinese families had settled in 
Johor. Unsettled conditions in South China and especially the outbreak of the 
Taiping rebellion in 1815 further acted as a stimulus to migration,, mainly from 
the southeast provinces of Kwantung, Fulden and Kwangsi. Purcell (1965, p 
259) documented that by 1840 the demand for pepper and gambier had brought 
more Chinese into Johor. Those who could satisfy the Malay authorities as to 
their means were allowed to form settlements on the banks of some named 
river, and the titles were called Surat Sungal (literally, river document). 
Referred to as the Kangchu system (literally, owner of the river), this system 
continued until its abolition in 1917. 
Sustained Chinese tin mining'in the Malay peninsula began in 1824 (Jackson, 
1961, pp 32; 35). By that time some 400 Chinese were said to be working in 
Perak, presumably in Kinta, as traders and miners. At the same time there 
were some 200 Chinese miners in Lukut, and in 1828 there were almost 1000 
of them in Sungei Ujong, both these mining centres were located in Negri 
Sembilan. Tin was discovered in Larut, Perak between 1840-1850, and by 
1862 there were some 20,000 to 25,000 Chinese miners in Larut. 
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EUROPEAN MERCANTILISM IN THE MALAY PENINSULA 
As is the case for most underdeveloped countries, trade colonialism formed the 
first phase in the spread of capitalism and imperialism. British colonisation of 
Malaya was a result of increasing competition for markets and new materials 
by metropolitan powers of the West. British trade influence in the Malay 
peninsula was, established in 1786, when the British East India Company 
started operating in Penang. The company not only engaged in spice trade but 
it also paved the way for the final takeover by Britain of the whole Malay 
peninsula about one century later. 
Prior to British colonisation of the Malay peninsula, the Portuguese and the 
Dutch had at one time or another exerted influence in Melaka. The tin and 
spice trade was the initial motive for the penetration of European mercantile 
powers in the Malay Archipelago - in particular Portugal announced that it 
intended to divert the ýspice trade away from the Moslems (Andaya and 
Andaya, 1982, p 56). The port of Melaka was located in a strategic position 
for these powers to gain control over the profitable trade route in the Malay 
archipelago. The Portuguese captured Melaka in 1511, but in 1641 the Dutch 
took over control of Melaka. The Dutch 
4able 
to preserve their dominant 
position in the region until the late eighteenth century when, in the political 
settlement at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Melaka was ceded to the British 
in 1795 (Andaya and Andaya, 1982, p 108). Unlike British rule in the Malay 
peninsula, Portuguese 'and' Dutch rules over Melaka did not transform the 
social and economic structures of the Malay peasantry. 
The British maintained Penang and Melaka mainly as trade bases. However, in 
1819 British influence in the region was advanced further when Raffles 
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acquired Singapore from the Johor Sultanate. The'Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 
further delineated a British sphere of influence in the Malay peninsula. By then 
the British possessions of Penang, Melaka and Singapore were established as a 
crown colony, known as the Straits Settlements (Andaya and Andaya, 1982, p 
122). They were regarded adequate for the metropolitan country's interests. 
The Straits Settlements provided bases which, helped to protect the sea link 
between China and India. As a policy of territorial expansion was likely to be 
expensive and could provoke a conflict with other metropolitan powers in an 
area which the British had affirmed considerable influence, the British 
maintained a policy of non-intervention in the Malay peninsula2. 
BRMSH INTERVENTION IN THE PENINSULA 
The rapid growth of the Straits Settlements and its economic prosperity in the 
valuable entrepot trade between the region and the rest of the world led to the 
presence of foreign interests in the Malay peninsula. European and Chinese 
economic groups had invested considerably in the Malay states especially in 
the tin trade. These investors were determined to achieve direct British 
presence in the Malay states "which would novonly protect their investments 
but also pave the way for the broadening of their operations in the states" 
(Lim, 1977, p 8). 
The Chinese immigrant miners brought along with them their traditional socio- 
political organizations in the form of triad societies (Andaya and Andaya, 
1982, pp 141-143; 149-150). Violent disorders broke out between two rival 
societies, the Ghee Hin and the Hai San, as they battled for control of mining 
areas. Simultaneously Malay chiefs scrambled for opportunities to exploit tin 
2. For an extended discussion - on British policy in the period between the 
signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty (1824) and intervention in the peninsula, 
see Tarling (1957). 
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resources as the tin ore brought them wealth with which they could buy men 
and material needed in their pursuit to gain extra territorial rights. t 
The disorders caused by Chinese triad societies and the power derived from tin 
exploitation became factors of instability in the Malay political system (Lim, 
1977, p 8). In the 1860s and 1870s disputes over succession claims in Perak 
and Sungei Ujong turned into bloody civil wars. By the same time the British 
began to reassess their policy of non-intervention in the Malay peninsula. 
Towards the end of 1873 the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Andrew 
Clarke, was given the task of reporting to the British government on whether 
any measures could be taken to restore peace and order in the peninsula and 
"especially to consider the advisability of appointing British officers to reside 
in the states" (Lim, 1977, p 8). 
Although British intervention in the Malay peninsula was carried out on the 
pretext of the fear of intervention by other European powers in the area, it was 
clear that economic factors were important in the change of British policy in 
the Malay states (Lim, 1977, p 9)., The settlement of disputes between rival 
Chinese factions and intervention in a succession dispute amongst the Malay 
chiefs of Perak paved the way for British control in the Malay peninsula. The 
Treaty of Pangkor, signed between the British and the Perak chiefs in January 
1874, ended the succession dispute. The Sultan of Perak was compelled to 
accept a British officer, with the official title of British Resident, to administer 
the state. In August 1874 Clarke used a piracy incident off the coast of 
Selangor as an excuse to appoint a British officer in Selangor. Before the end 
of the year another British officer was appointed in Sungei Ujong. The 
confederation of Negri Sembilan was formed in 1895. In February 1888 a 
British Resident was appointed in Pahang. 
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In 1895 the four states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang -were 
brought into a union known as the Federated Malay States; and were placed 
under the centralised control of the Governor of the Straits Settlements. The 
other Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Trengganu, Kelantan and Johor were 
known as the Unfederated Malay States (Andaya and Andaya, chapter 5). By 
1914 each of these states had a British Adviser, acting the same capacity as the 
British Resident in the Federated Malay States. Although the Malay peninsula 
was divided into the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malays States and the 
Unfederated Malay States, British political control in the peninsula was 
complete. As for administrative organization, British Malaya had two forms of 
government. The crown colony of the Straits Settlements was under direct 
British administration, headed by a Governor who was also the High 
Commissioner of the Federated Malay States. The Federated Malay States and 
the Unfederated Malay States were ruled indirectly by British 
Residents/Advisors, who controlled all legislative and administrative matters 
and who was responsible to the Governor/Hogh Commissioner. As result, 
powers of the feudal Malay rulers were greatly eroded by British intervention 
in the peninsula. But as Andaya and Andaya (1982, p 200) points out the 
creation of this political unit did not reflect any sense of common allegience to 
any centre and the social and economic differences between the component 
parts were often extreme. 
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE STYLE 
In establishing their governance over the Malay states the British practised the 
method of indirect rule, a policy of "conciliation" with the Malay rulers and a 
policy of "minimum interference" with the Malay peasantry (Andaya and 
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Andaya, 1982, p 205). The traditional institutions, although not abolished, 
were not entirely incorporated into the colonial administrative system. Instead 
they were required to change and adapt to new demands, which were primarily 
to serve the purposes of the colonial political economy. 
In each state the principal figure-, in the colonial administration was the 
Resident, who controlled all state matters. As part of the indirect rule strategy 
the traditional royal status and symbolic ritual and ceremonial functions of the 
Sultan and chiefs were left undisturbed. However ý they,, maintained minimal 
political authority, mainly relating to Malay social and, religious matters. They 
lost their rights to levy taxes and tithes; in return they were awarded a fixed 
monthly income. Land taxes were paid directly to the colonial government. - , 
According to'Means (1976, p 42) -British, policy in the Malay states followed 
three principles: (1) the legal position of the Sultans was, safeguarded; - (2) the 
government was preserved as a distinctly Malay government; (3) the Malays 
were considered as the indigenous people, and the government accepted special 
responsibility for their welfare and the preservation of their rights as "subjects 
of the Sultan" in each state. As it were pro-Malay policies of the pre-war 
administration helped to preserve the traditional patterns of Malay society and 
its peasant-based economy. On this account Muzaffar (1979, p 51) argued that 
maintaining the Sultan-subject nexus was part of a colonial design which would 
provide legitimacy needed by British in formulating and implementing various 
policies, proclaimed in the name of the Sultan but designed to fulfil colonial 
aspirations. For example, in the Federated Malay States from 1874 onwards 
the issues of royal succession and the choice of ruler, which had till then been 
controlled under customary rules by the major chiefs and the royal family, 
were dominated by political interests of the British administration. Since advice 
given to the Sultans had to be acted upon, in reality the British had assured 
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almost complete control of the decision- making powers of government. - In 
doing so they would have achieved the aim of controlling the economic 
development and exploitation of raw materials, particularly tin, and later, 
rubber. 
Mic role of the Malays in the administration was minor one. IMc British 
established a State Council In each state, which %-a the chief executive body to 
provide the constitutional authority for the legislation enacted within the state. 
Composed of members of the Malay royalty and prominent Chinese leaders as 
well as British officials, each state council v%-as no more than what Urn (1977, 
p, 11) tcmed as a 'deliberate organ concerned with petty affairs of state 
allotted to It by the Resident*. It was mainly used by the British as a ploy 
which affixed the scat of approval on policies and legislation decided by the 
British, and therefore helped to maintain the fiction of Malay rule. In reality, 
executive authority relating to fundamental political matters and the 
maintenance of law and peace was In the domain of the Residents, reflecting 
the supremacy of British authority. 11creforc from the beginning of the 
colonial era It appeared that they were the real rulers of the Malay states. 
71c British fomed a Malay bureaucracy class, the MaJay Administrative 
Service, to run the day-to-day administration in the Malay states. Recruited 
amongst the English-educated Malay aristocracy, these officials had no clear- 
cut authority. All Important decisions were made by the colonial officers of the 
'Europeans only' Malayan Civil Scrvicd. The bureaucratic structure therefore 
was headed by the colonialists, supported by the Malay Administrative 
3.71c colour bar In the Nfalayan Civil Service %2s not opposed by the Malay 
elite. In so far as entry into the Malay Civil Service by examination %%-as 
concerned, the colour bar applied to Malays as well as other non-E-uropcans; 
but two or three kfalay! of aristocratic bukground had already entered the 
Malayan Civil Service without taking the examination (Butcher, 1979, pp 107- 
112). 
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Service. At the base of the bureaucratic structure were the general 
administrative staff and the constabulary service, who were recruited amongst 
Malays who have passed through the formal school system. 
At the local level a new administrative structure, the district, was created and 
headed by a British District Officer. At the grass-roots level. the colonial 
administration relied on the rural elite composed of local chiefs, the penghulu 
(head of Mukim or sub-district) and the ketua kampong (village headman). As 
the system of centralised administration reached out into the villages, the 
position of the rural elite was gradually transformed. Whereas in the traditional 
feudal system, the penghulu inherited his title - he was drawn from among the 
wealthier families and was related to most of the villagers; under colonial rule 
the post became that of a salaried officer. The same process was extended to 
the ketua kampong, who, although not a salaried official, received an 
honorarium. The outcome of this process was not only the recruitment of able 
officers, but also ensured the political loyalty of these minor officials. Good 
people sought these posts so as to enhance their status in the community. 
In summary, the participation of Malays in the administrative bureaucracy was 
of "a subordinate nature, selected by the British rather than asserted by the 
Malays themselves as a matter of principle" (Lim, 1977, p 12). The British 
took advantage of the Malay political structure by integrating traditional 
leaders into the administrative system. Power was shifted away from the local 
level to the centre. Decisions on the distribution of resources at all levels was 
entirely a prerogative of the British. 
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POST-WAR POLMCAL REFORM 
During the Second World War, the Japanese invaded Malaya in 1941, and they 
occupied the country from February 1942 to September 1945. However, 
Japanese occupation in the peninsula did not alter the political structure of the 
Malay Sultans although unlike the British the Japanese showed less deference 
to the Sultans as did the British before them (Andaya and Andaya, 1982, p 
248)., When British administration was reinstated in 1945, they sought to 
change the political structure of the country (Andaya and Andaya, 1982, pp 
253-57). They had rejected their pre-war policy of recognizing sovereignty of 
the Malay Sultans. The British proposed the formation, of a unitary state, the 
Malayan Union, embracing the Federated Malay States, the Unfederated 
Malay States, Melaka and Penang. Singapore would remain outside ýthe 
Malayan Union and retained its status as a crown colony. The feudal posts of 
Malay rulers were to be abolished. Liberal citizenship rights was also 
proposed. The Malayan Union citizenship was to be given to all without 
discrimination of race or creed. 'It would carry with it equality of rights 
including admission to the civil service. Citizenship would be granted to all 
who were bom in the territory, and to immigrants who had been living there 
for ten out of the preceding fifteen years. Future immigrants could obtain 
citizenship only after five years' residence in the Union or Singapore. 
The Malayan Union proposal provoked resentment and hostility of the Malays 
who feared that the proposed common citizenship and a unitary form of 
government together with the abolition of the Malay feudal structure would 
weaken their position as the indigenous people of the land., The opposition 
from various Malay organisations to the Malayan Union proposal led to the 
formation of the United Malay National Organization or UMNO, which 
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successfully held demonstrations and rallies as a show of Malay political 
strength. 
The British eventually adhered to Malay demands. The outcome was the 
formation of the Federation of Malaya on 1 February, 1948. The Malay rulers 
retained the jurisdiction and power they had enjoyed before the Japanese 
occupation. The Federation comprised of the same territories as proposed for 
the Malaya Union. In addition the length of stay in Malaya, knowledge of the 
Malay language was a necessary requirement for immigrants to qualify as 
Malaya citizens. At the same time the newly-formed Malayan Communist 
Party, whose members were mainly Chinese, was outlawed, and a state of 
"emergency" was declared in the Federation and lasted until 1960. 
In 1951 elections were introduced at the local government level, and the 1952 
Kuala Lumpur Municipal elections saw the emergence of a coalition between 
the Malay (UMNO) and Chinese political interests -a rapprochement which 
would defend the status quo of the Malay bourgeoisie and the Chinese 
businessmen (Hua, 1983, p 102). This coalition became the basis of a model of 
ethnic party politics throughout Malaysia's future political development. At the 
same time Malayan politicians had begun the quest for political independence 
from Britain. In 1953 the communal coalition was completed when political 
interests of the three major ethnic groups Malay (UMNO), Chinese (Malayan 
Chinese Association or MCA) and Indian (Malayan Indian Congress or MIC) 
were formally constituted into the Alliance Party. 
The weakened state of the British economy after the war combined with the 
fear of Malays joining forces with the communist insurgency were strong 
reasons for Britain's promise to grant independence to the Federation. As a 
move towards self-government, the first general elections were held in 1955. 
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The Alliance Party won 50 out of the 51 seats contested in the Federal 
Legislative Council. In 1956 the Malayan government and the British started 
negotiations for a new Federal Constitution. The Federation of Malaya gained 
its political independence on 31 August, 1957. 
Thus far this chapter has traced the history of the assertion of British control'in 
the Malay peninsula and the political formation of the Federation of Malaya. 
In the following section-the discussion will focus on the development of the 
colonial export economy. - 
COLONIAL ECONOMIC SCENARIO 
Malaysia's current state of economic underdevelopment must be understood in 
the light of the country's historical role as a source of raw materials for the 
metropolitan economies. What ensued out of this role was the country's total 
dependence upon the development of the world economy. 
In the following section's of this chapter the discussion will account for the 
beginnings of the, incorporation of the Malaysian economy, into the world 
capitalist economy. Within the, international division of labour, - colonial 
Malaya was a producer of primary materials. Malaya's economic growth was 
based on fin and rubber, two primary sectors which could hardly be said to 
possess any dynamics of their own, but could be seen merely as subsystems of 
the capitalist economy. Capital needed for economic investment in Malaya was 
provided by Western entrepreneurs. 
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TIN MINING 
Initial colonial economic development was closely connected with the 
exploitation of tin mineral resources. Although tin had been mined in the 
Malay peninsula, since the ninth century, large scale mining, began only, after 
the discovery of the Larut tin fields in 1848, the consequence of which was the 
influx of Chinese miners., By 1870 some 40,000 miners were mining in the 
district. Concurrently tin was mined, in, Selangor, with some -. 7,000 Chinese 
miners worldng in the mines in and around Kuala Lumpur in 1874, and ten 
years later this figure rose to some 23,000 (Thoburn, 1977, p 58). From the 
mid-1800s tin-mining began in the Kinta valley around _1poh, and 
by 1889 
Kinta's output surpassed that of Larut and it became the centre of the tin 
industry, a position it holds to the present-day (ibid. ). 
Tin-mining began as an almost exclusive Chinese concern. Capital for the 
industry came initially from the Chinese merchant communities of the Straits 
Settlements (Wong, 1965,, pp 60-64). A system of advanced credit, facilities 
allowed the cost of fixed and working capital to be shared between a mine 
owner and a creditor. Fixed capital costs were low-because little equipment 
was needed to operate the open-cast mines. In this form of mining the ore was 
extracted from the ground mainly by hand-labour, using only Chinese hoes to 
dig the ground, and twin baskets slung on each end of a pole to raise the ore 
from the pit. Treatment of the ore was in simple sluice boxes. 
Working capital was kept down by the practice of delaying wages for a period 
of six months or even one year. Many workers worked on "tribute", a system 
whereby they in effect "lent" their labour to the mine owner for a share of the 
eventual profits of the mine. In the meantime workers received advances in the 
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form of food and, opium. Profits of the mine were supplemented by other 
activities. For example, in return for a fixed cash payment mine owners could 
obtain rights to levy taxes on a particular-, commodity or activity, such, as 
opium and gambling. -" 
Chinese immigrant labour initially came to Malaya under an indenture system, 
whereby ý their passage was paid by prospective employers, with ý whom they 
had to work'off their debt (Li,, 1955, pp 85-86). The recruiter paid each man a 
travel fee of 32 Straits Dollars and charged the prospective employer between 
35 to 45 Straits Dollars, the difference became the profit of the recruiter. 
Migrants were seldom 'given enough food, diseases were widespread and 
medical, ý care was rare; many perished -, before they - could get - to their 
destinations. When the indenture system ceased to function, workers were 
drawn from immigrants who had paid for their passage, and were free to 
choose their employers. The indenture system was officially 'prohibited in 
1914. "- Pý 
By the end of the 1890s the Chinese firms began to experience difficulties such 
as drainage problems (Wong, 1965, pp 216-21). At around the same time 
Europeans, who had -been mining tin in Perak since the 1880s, began 
experimenting on, other ways of extracting tin. First they introduced the 
method known as gravel-pumping, a method similar to the method of using 
high-pressure, jets of water to mine china''clay in Cornwall (Allen and 
Donnithome, 1954, p 149). The tin-bearing ground is broken down by means 
of strong jets of water played against the walls of an open-pit. The liquid ore- 
bearing material, washed down by monitors, flows through crudely-cut 
channels to a hollow, then is elevated by means of a gravel-pump to the 
primary treatment plant,, usually a sluice (Thobum, 1977, p 84). 
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In 1912 the dredge was invented and from since then dredging became the 
basis of the growth and supremacy of Western mining firms (Thoburn, 1977, 
pp 82-83). A dredge is structure which floats on a pond or "paddock" largely 
of its own making, and is moved by means of lines fixed to the shore and fixed 
to winches on the dredge. A continuous line of steel buckets, at the front of the 
dredge digs the tin-bearing ground from the bottom. Grounds from the bucket 
are delivered to a primary treatment plant on the dredge where the ore is 
treated to about 15 percent purity, and the "tailings" or waste material is 
pumped over the back of the dredge. The ore is then taken from the dredge to 
a dressing shed on the shore where it undergoes treatment to a purity of about 
75 percent before it is shipped to the smelting plants. The first dredges were 
steam-driven, using coal and firewood as fuel. Today most dredges are run by 
electric power. 
Dredges require large capital outlays which the Chinese firms could not 
finance. The European dredging firms were established as joint-stock 
companies with capital raised from abroad. The dredge has comparative 
advantages over the gravel-pump. In 1937 the cost of tin extracted by dredging 
was a little more than half that of ore worked by gravel-pump method (Li, 
1955, p 52). Moreover, a gravel-pump mine with a monthly yardage of 15- 
20,000 could employ about 30 men, while a dredge with a monthly yardage of 
250,000 would employ over 100 men, therefore the yardage in the dredge is 
three times that of gravel-pump mines (Thoburn, 1977, pp 85-86). By the 
1930s Western firms were producing half of Malaya's tin output (Gullick, 
1958, p 42). As shown in Table 3.1, by 1935 dredging had become the leading 
method of tin-mining in the country. 
Official policy and favouritism were additional causes of the decline in Chinese 
mines and the ascendency of British and European capitalists against Chinese 
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miners. Li (1955, pp 50-52) argues that in a free competition the stronger 
capitalists had an advantage over the weaker ones, and that the capitalists of 
the ruling colonial power, supported by their government, could easily squeeze 
out of business their colonial subjects. In 1873 it was estimated some 40,000 
Chinese miners were in the Larut district. With encouragement by the colonial 
administration, British capital began to be invested in the tin mines in the first 
decade of the present century, and gradually captured the tin enterprise. In 
1910 the Chinese controlled more than three-quarters of the total tin output, 
but by 1937 they controlled less, than, one-third. -British companies became 
financially stronger especially afterý 1912, and from the 1920s the Chinese 
became the marginal producers and usually worked on tin'mines that had been 
exploited and abandoned by Western concerns. This in fact introduced a 
structural factor in terms of inequality and deprivation and in the relative 
wealth and wage system. 
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century tin-mining'dominated 
the economy of the Malay states and because it. was especially successful, it 
contributed solidly to the development of the colonial economy. In 1874, of a 
world tin production of 36,400 tons, the Malay peninsula was estimated to 
contribute only 4,200 tons, but by 1895 the Federated Malay States alone 
contributed 49,592 tons out of a world production of 90,207 tons. Tin became 
an important source of revenue in these states. In 1895 in Perak tin duty 
receipts alone were worth more than 1.5 million Straits Dollars, and in the 
same year tin exports from the Federated Malay States were valued at 
27,714,492 Straits Dollars or 89 percent of the total exports-of the Federated 
Malay States (Lim, 1977 pp 13-14). By 1907 the value of tin ore exports from 
the Malay peninsula had increased tremendously to 78 million Straits Dollars 
out of total exports of 80.6 million Straits Dollars (Li, 1955, p 38). 
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Major urban centres, such as Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur and Seremban, originated as 
tin-mining centres. One significant contribution made by the British in - socio- 
I 
economic transformation of Malaya was theestablishment of the infrastructure, 
P 
especially a communications system. Tin revenues was used to construct 
railway lines4 from these centres to the seaports, from where the tin ore could 
be shipped to Penang or Singapore for smelting before being exported. In 1885 
an eight mile rail track was'constructed between Taiping and Port Weld. Kuala 
Lumpur was connected to the port of Kelang in 1886, ' Seremban to Port 
Dickson in 1891, and 1poh to Teluk Intan in 1895. By 1910 a line had been 
built from Prai in the north-west of the peninsula to Johor Bahru in the south, 
and extended over the causeway, across the Straits of Johor, to Singapore in 
1923 (Thoburn, 1977, p 60). -11. -I 
The network of railway tracks laid to serve the colonial economic interests 
formed the basis of the west coast railway system of present-day Peninsula 
Malaysia. A direct road link between Johor Bahru and the Siamese border was 
completed in 1928., The construction of these forms of transportation system 
not only facilitated, the growth of the tin industry but also opened up the 
country to further settlement and development and expansion of the colonial 
economy. 
RUBBER 
The colonial administration realised that it would be risky for the Malayan 
economy to depend on tin only for its revenue, as depression in the. world tin 
market would cripple the country's economy. Therefore the British envisaged 
that with large tracts of forest land the peninsula could be a source of tropical 
4. The construction of railway lines in the Malay peninsula was facilitated by 
the avaflability of cheap immigrant labour from India. 
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agricultural products for European markets. Chai (1964, p 153) asserted that 
this was the prime objective for the-, introduction of rubber plantations in 
Malaya. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the British had carried out 
experimental work on rubber in the Malay peninsula (Andaya and Andaya, 
1982, pp 213-14). In 1877 rubber seeds were sent from the Kew Gardek in 
England and planted in the Singapore Botanical Garden and at the experimental 
garden in ' the compounds of the - Residency in Kuala , Kangsar,, Perak. ý 
Experiments by H. N. Ridley, Director of the Singapore Botanical Garden from 
1888, largely improved the cultivation of rubber, and in 1897 Ridley had 
invented the "herring-bone" method tapping method, which greatly facilitated 
the development of commercial growing. 
The first commercial planting of rubber in the peninsula was introduced in 
1896 (Allen and Donnithorne, 1954, p 110). In the 1890s the decline of coffee 
prices coincided with the continuous high rubber prices, and therefore 
provided the impetus for commercial cultivation of rubber on a plantation 
basis. Andaya and Andaya (1982, pp 211-212) argued that the colonial 
government's attitude towards the Chinese agricultural practices was 
instrumental in driving them away from their traditional crops of sugar cane, 
tapioca, pepper and gambier. Chinese farming methods were condemned 
because they led to soil exhaustion and a depletion of trees for use as firewood 
in numerous small factories. The colonial administration therefore considered 
Chinese plantations. to be unfavourable to the larger interests of the colonial 
economy. While moving to suppress this type of agriculture the colonial 
authorities expressed their desire for land to be cultivated more permanently. 
Although Europeans had experimented in the cultivation of a number of crops 
such as sugar cane, coffee, nutmeg, cloves and pepper on a plantation basis, 
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only coffee and sugar cane had some degree of success. Rubber seemed to be 
the ideal crop to fulfil the administration's aim of long-term land use by 
Europeans, and rubber cultivation therefore became the agricultural alternative 
to tin-mining. I 
In 1897, as a devise for encouraging capitalists to invest money in rubber, the 
colonial administration adopted a very liberal policy in granting land for 
rubber cultivation (Li, 1955, p 60). One thousand acres apiece were offered to 
planters who would permanently grow rubber. There was no limit to the 
amount of land that could be held for rubber cultivation. Furthermore, there 
was no land taxes levied on rubber land, but all rights to minerals underneath 
the land were vested in the state. This generous land-granting policy was 
rendered possible by the theory that the ownership of the land was vested in 
the state, and the Malay ruler of the state, through the British Resident (who 
was the de facto ruler of the state) could give land to whomever he pleased. 
The British capitalists were the major beneficiaries of this generous land 
policy. Peasants were denied such privileges. Between 1908 and 1912 the 
acreage of land alienated -to rubber plantations in Malaya almost doubled from 
762,408 to 1,498,282 acres (Lim, 1977, p 91). 
Rubber cultivation required a period of about six years before returns could be 
obtained. As it were, rubber cultivation was certainly a high-cost activity. As 
an incentive to the industry, in 1904 the colonial administration set up a 
Planters' Loan Fund, through which large amounts of capital could be obtained 
cheaply. Lim (1977, p 96) mentioned that among some of the loans given out 
by the British administration were 30,250 Straits Dollars to Sungei Kapar 
Estate, 35,000 Straits Dollars to Uganda and Kent Estate, 36,000 Straits 
Dollars to Kuala Kangsar Plantations and 100,000 Straits Dollars to 
Cumberland and Company. 
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The problem of labour in the plantation sub-sector was alleviated by the large- 
scale immigration of Tamils from the south of India (Jackson, 1961, pp 96- 
108). In 1908 the colonial administration set up an Immigration Fund, funded 
by a levy on rubber producers, in order to finance the importation of labour 
from India. Facilities provided under this Fund included a subsidy to steamers 
shipping immigrants from India. -IA I- 
Table 3.2 
Annual New Planting of Rubber in Malaya. 1898-1922 
(1000 mmq 
1899 2 1907 73 1915 122 
1899 2 1908 85 1916 140 
1900 2 1909 79 1917 228 
1901 5 1910 207 1918 228 
1902 4 1911 209 1919 175 
1903 5 1912 192 1920 120 
1904 8 1913 132 1921 59 
1905 18 1914 94 1922 20 
1906 51 
Total planted acreage 1900 : 6,000 acres 
1922 : 2,260,000 acres 
Source: Thorburn (1977), Table 4.2, p. 63. 
Table 3.2 shows that rubber acreage rose from 6,000 acres in 1900 to 
2,226,000 acres in 1922. Rubber planting increased rapidly after 1905. The 
initial capital needed to finance the European rubber plantations came mainly 
from abroad. Drabble (1967, pp, 5-6) mentions that large British merchant 
houses in Singapore like Guthries, Harrisons and Crossfield (agents of the East 
India Company since 1844) and Sime Darby acted as intermediaries between 
the industry and the overseas investors. The British had already accumulated 
large amounts of capital through their merchant ventures. Through the 
merchant houses of the nineteenth century funds could be channelled into the 
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Malayan rubber industry. What ensued was therefore the penetration , of 
European capital and expertise into the Malayan economy. I 
The merchant houses also acted as'"agency houses" who provided managerial, 
marketing and administrative services (Allen and Donnithorne, 1954, p 113). 
These agency houses became the driving force in the growth of the rubber 
industry in Malaya. Furthermore, they were in control of imports and exports 
through their monopoly of shipping, and with the inflow of investments, from 
Britain they were also managers of London capital 
The reason for the rapid growth of the Malayan rubber industry was foreign 
demand. The only markets for Malayan rubber were in the Western 
economies. 'From 1900 the United States alone consumed 40 percent of the 
world's rubber output, while the United Kingdom and Germany together 
absorbed a further 35 percent; and that the growth of the automobile industry 
in the United States was central to this demand (Drabble,, 1973, pp 29-30). 
Thus the rubber plantation industry, like tin-mining, became a major historical 
form of the colonial mode of production, and was very much dependent upon 
the needs and demands of the metropolitan industries. Furthermore, the pattern 
of production that emerged reflected the interaction between international trade 
and foreign finance and the - administration's policy in encouraging foreign 
investment activity in rubber plantation, -a pattern which has forged domestic 
production into its historical dependent mode of production. 
Iý. f., 
By 1915 rubber had taken over fin as the major export of Malaya. In that year 
rubber exports amounted to 93 million Straits Dollars as compared to 61 
million Straits Dollars for tin, in a total export value of 162 million Straits 
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Dollars5 (Li, 1955, p 38). From then onwards the rubber industry was not 
only responsible for the growth of the Malayan economy but it was also the 
major mechanism of foreign penetration and control of the economy. Tboburn 
(1977, p 64) made assumptions that in the boom year of 1911 the proportion of 
national income represented by European rubber investment (excluding the 
value of rubber exports) was about 40 percent. 
In 1921, the year of the first rubber census, European-owned rubber 
plantations accounted for half of the Malayan rubber acreage. Whereas 80 
percent of the Asian acreage were in smallholdings of less than100 acres, 
nearly 90 percent of the plantation acreage were owned by Europeans, 
although by 1932 figures indicated that 25 percent of the plantation acreage 
was in Asian hands (Thoburn, 1977, p 65). 
In their enthusiasm to develop agriculture in the Malay states the colonial 
government pursued a dual policy. In the rubber industry, for example, two 
distinct types of planting, enterprise evolved in the peninsula, differing in 
organizational form and factor mix. Firstly, there was the plantation form of 
cultivation, a corporate style enterprise built around the relatively intensive 
utilization of both capital and immigrant wage-labour. The other form of 
rubber cultivation was the peasant smallholdings, of less than 100 acres in size, 
characterised by family enterprise and labour. The first rubber smallholding in 
the peninsula was started in 1887 (Ahmad, 1984, p 162). While it was true that 
European companies dominated the plantation sub-sector the contribution of 
the smallholding sub-sector should not be underestimated. Rudner (1970, p 76) 
cites that peasant smallholdings formed 40 percent of Malaya's rubber acreage 
5. Due to data deficiencies, it is not possible to express these figures as 
percentages of the Gross National Product. Indeed, several years later, in a 
comment on figures on agricultural and mining output for the years 1929-32, 
Bauer (1948a, p 15) admitted that with data available at that time it was 
impossible to compile comprehensive figures on national incomes. 
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before the Second World War. Both these rubber sub-sectors still exist in 
present-day Malaysia. 
The colonial administration's policy in the allocations of public resources such 
as land, permits and subsidies displayed a fundamental bias towards the 
plantation sub-sector. Political, rather than economic, intention was the basis 
for this bias in policy. The provision of land, infrastructure and credit services 
accorded advantages to the plantation sub-sector. 
Lim (1977, -pp 75-79) argues that when large-scale peasant smallholding 
cultivation started in 1909 the colonial administrators began to consider rubber 
as an unsuitable type of cultivation for the peasantry, and hence -formidable 
barriers were introduced so as to prevent peasants from cultivating rubber. One 
policy that was devised to prevent the spread or even cripple peasant rubber 
cultivation was the considerable powers given to the administration in matters 
relating to-land. In 1891 'the first mukim (sub-district) registers were 
introduced, which contained columns describing the nature of cultivation, but 
there was no rigid control on the type of cultivation as long as they had 
economic value., When rubber cultivation became popular with the peasantry 
the administration replaced the causal interpretation of the cultivation condition 
with a more rigid one. In ý 1910 the administration began endorsing land 
applications with a "no rubber" condition. Also a higher land taxation was 
imposed on smallholding rubber land, while land used for coconut, rice or 
other type of peasant cultivation had a lower tax. 
Such policies as mentioned in the preceding paragraph clearly demonstrate the 
colonial administration's deliberate discrimination against rubber cultivation on 
peasant smallholdings. Despite this colonial assault on the development of 
4 
so 
peasant rubber cultivation, by 1912, this sector was already established and 
was set to be the dominant peasant economic activity. - 1, 
THE DISTORTION OF THE LOCAL ECONOMY 
The Malayan economy was adversely - affected by the - colonial policies of 
export of raw, materials. As from 1920 prices began to decline sharply and this 
was an indication of the end of the period of expansion in the economy. There 
had been a general rubber depression in 1920-1 (Andaya and Andaya, 1982, p 
215). The year 1922 marked the end of a period of expansion, based first on 
tin and then rubber exports. For-most of the inter-wars period the Malayan 
rubber industry was plagued by restrictive regulations. As prices and quantities 
demanded dropped, the British administration adapted its export strategy and 
internal resource allocations to cope,, with declining incomes. ý During this 
period several international commodity agreements were concluded through 
British initiative. The Stevenson Scheme was introduced in -1922 and lasted 
until 1928, and the Intemational Rubber Restriction Scheme was implemented 
between 1934 to 1943. These restrictive regulations were introduced in order 
to control the production of natural rubber and therefore stabilise prices. 
Additionally in Malaya the alienation of land for new rubber plantations or 
smallholdings were prohibited. 
It was clear that the rubber restriction schemes imposed during the inter-wars 
period was heavily weighted in favour of the plantation sub-sector and 
discriminated against the Malay smallholders. Rudner (1981, p 88) asserts that 
colonial administration tended to shift the burden of restrictions onto 
smallholder producers disproportionately. In the control of export quotas, 
favoured treatment were accorded to the plantation sub-sector while excessive 
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curbs were imposed on the output by the smallholding sub-sector. Worse yet, 
the prohibition of the alienation of land for rubber cultivation had particularly 
grievous consequences for the smallholding sub-sector who were denied entry 
into new rubber cultivation and kept back in alternative, comparatively 
disadvantaged agricultural cultivation. Meanwhile, the plantation sub-sector, 
with reserve land in stock, on which new rubber trees could be planted, were 
not badly affected by the land alienation prohibition. Although this ban was 
lifted in 1947, the colonial government continued to refuse to alienate land for 
rubber smallholdings, thus effectively restricting the participation of peasants 
in the rubber industry. 
Bauer (1948b, pp 201-202) argues that the discriminatory practices in the 
rubber sector were deliberate implemented by the colonial administration, 
although the fact was that the smallholding was the lower-cost sub-sector in 
rubber cultivation. Bauer (ibid. ) cites two prime weaknesses*of the plantation 
production: the heavy overhead costs resulting from the maintenance of the 
elaborate hierarchy, and the reliance of a large number of hired labourers for 
the performance of essentially simple routine operations such as weeding. ' 
These heavy overhead costs were not offset by higher yields. In fact 
unrestricted annual average yields per mature acre on peasant smallholdings 
were 12 to 30 percent higher than on plantations. In addition, Tregonning 
(1964, p 204) points to the fact that in 1932 Malayan smallholdings produced 
good rubber at a cost of 5 cents (Straits currency) per pound, as compared to 
12 cents (Straits currency) on larger plantations. 
The depression period also caused restrictions of tin exports, initially by the 
Bandoeng Pool in 1921, of which Malaya and the Netherland East Indies were 
parties to the agreement which lasted until 1923. Several years later, following 
falls in the price of tin plate in the late 1920s, a voluntary Tin Producers' 
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Association was formed in 1929. This Association controlled 20 percent of the 
world's tin output, and output was to be restricted on a voluntary basis. The 
scheme, however, was failure, as stocks continued to accumulate and prices 
continued to decline (Yip, 1969, p 17). 
Since the depression period world demand for tin has not expanded greatly. 
Between 1870 and 1900 world tin consumption trebled, between-1900 and 
1930 it doubled, but between 1930 and 1960 it increased slightly (Lim, 1973, 
pp 7-8). The United States had been a major market for Malaya's tin, but since 
the 1920s its demand for tin remained constant at around 2540 tonnes (ibid. ), 
perhaps due to the more economic use of tin and better recycling methods as 
well as the developing of other cheaper materials and the, use of plastic for 
packaging., 
The world depression of 1929-1933 severely effected the Malayan -economy. 
Bauer (1948a, p 18) concludes that the period saw a sharp drop in the levels of 
consumption and general standard of living in the country. Between 1930 and 
mid-1932 daily wages of Indian plantation labourers fell by about 50 to 60 
percent, while Chinese wages fell steeper. Earnings declined sharply as 
employment in the plantation was approximately halved between the middle of 
1930 and mid-1932. 
In the attempt to sum up the distribution of production and exports during the 
depression years the following illustration uses data drawn principally from the 
work of Bauer (1948a, pp 15-17). Net export figures for the period are 
available for the federated Malay"States only but not for Malaya as a whole. 
Trends of net export and import figures for Malaya as a whole, however, did 
not differ greatly from that of the Federated Malay States. 
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The sharp fall in export values in the Federated Malay States; as shown'in 
Table 3.3, was entirely due to the collapse of rubber and tin prices. In 1929 
the gross value of agricultural', output (excluding - fisheries and forestry) was 
estimated at 430 plus or minus 20 million Straits Dollars, of-which rubber 
accounted for 344 million Straits Dollars. In, 1932, the corresponding gross 
value was estimated at 130 plus or minus 15 million Straits Dollars, including 
66 million Straits Dollars for rubber. Gross value for mining output was 
approximately 138 million Straits Dollars for 1929, of which, tin output 
amounted to 46 million Straits Dollars; and for 1932 gross value for mining 
output was approximately 122 million Straits Dollars, of which tin output 
amounted to 40 million Straits Dollars. Rubber and tin were the two major 
commodities in the Malayan economy and the collapse of these two 
commodities showed serious effects on the Malayan slump. This contributed to 
the relative impoverishment of the country because it had been in the interest 
of the colonial power to stress exports and to keep the prices of those exports 
low, partly by adopting policies which restricted market diversification and 
hence opportunity to avoid undue economic dependence on a few selected 
products. 
Table 3.3 
Net Exp-Qrts of Federated -Malay. States Produce. 1929-33 (in Million Straits dollars) 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Total 338 202 118 83 108 
Rubber and latex 202 108 54 37 58 
Tin and tin-ore 117 77 51 31 37 
Source: Bauer (1948a), Table 1, p. 16. 
During the same period net imports into the Federated Malay States declined 
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from 190 million Straits Dollars in 1929 to 63 million Straits Dollars in 1933. 
The Federated Malay States were dependent on imports not only for all 
manufactured goods, but also for practically most foodstuffs. Thus over a wide 
range, net imports would give a reliable indication of the level of consumption 
for the Federated Malay States and Malaya as a whole. Table 3.4 shows a 
severe reduction in consumption between 1929 to 1933, "affecting all classes 
and races, presents an instructive contrast with the experience of Britain, 
where real consumption was well maintained during the slump" (Bauer, 1948a, 
p 16). 
Table 3.4 
Sundry Net Imports into the Federated. Malay. States. 1929-32 
1929 1930 1931 1932 
Tinned milk: 
'000 cases 467 449 342 215 
Tea: '000 lb 4p4O8 3,801 2,969 1,852 
Tobacco, cigars, 
cigarettes: 
'0001b 10,718 8,657 6,417 3,278 
Matches: 
ten millions 566 390 249 179 
Beer and ale: 
'000 gallons 298 234 148 115 
Cotton piece goods: 
'000 yards 30,012 24,969 19,843 18,107 
Kerosene oil: 
'000 tons 31 21 16 14 
Motor spirit: 
'000 tons 47 48 33. 23 
Cycles: numbers 6,065 1,990 709 249 
Motor-cars: numbers 2,536 1,441 491 175 
Source: Bauer (1948a), Table II, p. 17. 
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In view of Malaya's dependence of exports on primary commodities, the fall in 
demand in the prices of tin and rubber led to a decline in its national income. 
This had adverse effects on the welfare of the general public. Since the 
economy was totally controlled by Western expatriates and profits were 
repatriated to Europe, the country did not have adequate national savings that 
could be utilised to maintain consumption levels that existed before the 
depression period. Subsequently Malaya was worse off than Britain during the 
slump of the 1930s. 
IAL STRATIFICATION AND ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPME 
The expansion of colonial capitalist economic activities brought about changes 
in the social formation of the Malay peninsula. Economic expansion relied on 
labour from outside the peninsula; the Malay peasants were not incorporated 
directly into the colonial economic system. The immigrants, the majority of 
whom came from the Malay Archipelago, China and India, transformed the 
entire demographic character of the peninsula. 
In 1891 the population of the Federated Malay States was estimated at 
418,527, which was a three-fold increase over the population estimates of the 
peninsula prior to British intervention (LIm, 1977, p 12). Table 3.5 shows that 
the proportion of non-Malay population in the Federated Malay States grew 
significantly from 1901. The Chinese who had dominated the population of the 
Straits Settlements for a considerable length of time had also, by 1911, 
outnumbered the indigenous population. What emerged out of the liberal 
colonial immigration policy was that by 1931 the non-indigenous population 
comprised 65.4 percent of the total population in the Federated Malay States, 
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Colonial economic expansion had turned the, Malay peninsula into a classic 
example of a plural society. Not only did the different ethnic groups occupied 
different spatial units but they were also engaged in different occupations. In 
general the Malay settlements were concentrated along the coast -and lower 
riverine areas, while the non-Malays were concentrated in the western foothill 
regions and major ports of the west coast of the peninsula. Malays were 
engaged mainly in rice cultivation, while Chinese were engaged in tin-mining 
and the Indians were found mainly in European-owned rubber plantations. 
The immigrant population were engaged in a wide variety of economic 
activities which were new to 'the peninsula. The predominantý Malay 
subsistence agricultural economy was outstripped by mining, plantation and 
other commercial activities associated with a developing ý colonial capitalist 
economy. Whereas labour in the., Malay subsistence economy was self- 
employed and unspecialized, in the colonial capitalist economy Jabour 
consisted of waged workers or immigrants employed for money wages. 
Colonial economic expansion facilitated the introduction of money as a 
medium of exchange. Wage labour therefore regulated the extraction of surplus 
value within the colonial capitalist economy. - 
The creation of the plantation'working class is crucial to the understanding of 
the consequences of foreign penetration on the Malaysian social structure. The 
expansion of European rubber plantations brought, large-scale immigration 
from India, mostly unskilled workers from South India, where widespread 
unemployment made it easy to find recruits. In 1908 Tamils from South India 
formed 43,515 out of a total 57,070 rubber plantation labourers. In 1918 their 
numbers had increased to 139,480, out of a total of 201,964 (Bach, 1976, p 
470). The concentration of Indian workers on plantations isolated them in an 
institution noted for the total control of its inhabitants. The maintenance of 
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separate religion, language and customs impeded their assimilation into the rest 
of the Malaysian society. In addition to the unskilled plantation workers, -there 
were other Indian, immigrants, from North India who came as merchants, 
money lenders and shopkeepers. ' Due to their wider participation in the 
economy, these merchants served as a link for services between the immigrant 
enclaves of the plantations and the rest of the economy. 
Likewise, Chinese immigrant settlements demanded the services of Chinese 
merchants. These -Chinese merchants formed an advantageous commercial 
class, and unlike the Indian commercial class, were able to adopt a financier 
role using, the surplus generated from the Chinese capitalists' ventures in tin- 
mining and large-scale commerce. Furthermore, the Chinese immigrant class 
were not confined to'the tin industry, only. Economic expansion gave them 
opportunities to spread their, activities in the economy. Due to their structural 
mobility the Chinese were not isolated in enclaves like the Tamil immigrants. 
One other significant outcome of colonial economic expansion was the growth 
of urban enclaves and the'creation of new urban centres serving the need of 
capitalist'enterprises of tin and rubber. Whereas in the pre-colonial days royal 
towns were located at the kuala (river mouths), rapid economic growth 
necessitated the relocation of state capitals to major urban centres such as 
Seremban, Ipoh, and Kuala Lumpur. Besides, several small urban centres grew 
along the north-south railway line, of which the major ones like Tampin, 
Segamat, and Kajang were made district headquarters. 
By the 1930s the social formation of the Malay peninsula had been fairly 
established. Colonial economic expansion had resulted in the emergence of a 
colonial entrepreneur class in the mining and plantation industries, the core of 
the -Malay aristocracy in the civil service,, a Malay peasantry, ý and an 
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immigrant Chinese and Indian wage-labour class. In addition colonial 
economic policies had resulted in the differentiation of the Malay peasantry. 
As land was turned into a commodity'and due to its increasing value, a Malay 
rentier class emerged out of the Malay peasantry. Simultaneously, a Malay 
middle-class, composed mainly of bureaucrats in the Malay Administrative 
Service, was carefully nurtured by the colonial administration. The best of 
these officials were sent to Britain for further. training. It was this class that 
conformed to Frank's (1967) -"comprador elites" in the social structure, and 
later they were to form the basis of the independent Malayan government. ' 
In summary, the discussion in the preceding paragraphs explains, how 
economic developments in relation to immigration fostered the emerging social 
structure of inequality in the population, and created different strata 
experiencing particular disadvantages. In explaining the distribution or 
"structure" of poverty in Malaysia, this simultaneous evolution of economy 
and population has to be remembered and carefully monitored. 
LAND POLICIES. SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTU 
AND POVERTY 
Colonisation and the transformation of the economy along a capitalist path 
deliberately excluded the participation of the Malay population in the modem 
economic sector. Under the section entitled "Rubber" we have discussed 
several policy measures that were for the benefit of Western investors in the 
rubber plantation sub-sector, while the Malays peasants were deterred from 
cultivating rubber. 
Colonial land policies were central to the underdevelopment of the Malay 
peasantry. The history of ownership and access to land underlies any account 
90 
of poverty in Malaysia. The colonial government took steps to repudiate Malay 
customary land rules and formulated' a Western-type land tenure system 
(Andaya and Andaya, 1982, p 208). - Land within easy access to the 
transportation system were reserved for, capitalist, commercial agriculture, 
while indigenous Malays were denied of such privileges. In 1880 the British 
introduced a new land tenure system, the Torren System, which was first 
devised in Australia,. This system was based on the principle of private 
property, whereby a title or certificate established an indisputable claim to land 
ownership, thus changing the condition of access and to land. The Malay 
peasants therefore were denied the right of cultivating land as they liked, land 
ownership based on customary practices was abolished. Thus the liberal and 
tolerant attitude of the Malays was exploited by the British colonial 
administration. Colonial policies persistently ignored the development of 
peasant agriculture in favour of European agricultural, mining and commercial 
enterprises. 
At no time were the Malay peasants consulted on any policy measures that 
would affect their day-to-day life. These were some of the external factors that 
impinged upon the lives of the Malay peasantry. Despite the complexity of the 
colonial government's discriminating policies, -the Malay" peasants did not 
revolt against the colonial rulers. 'Instead, "what emerged most clearly was the 
readiness with which many Malayan 'peasants were able to adapt to change" 
(Lim, 11977, p 226). They were able to search for and engaged in the most 
rewarding type of economic activities, such as cultivating rubber on 
smallholding basis, despite obstacles enforced by the British administration., 
Developments in the physical infrastructure such as the building of roads and 
railways and drainage works further supported the expansion of the capitalist 
system. State departments like the Department of Agriculture and the Rubber 
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Research Institute of Malaya were criticised as being biased towards the 
plantation sector. (Bauer, 1948b, pp 42-48). The Department of Agriculture, 
set up in 1905, was very active in promoting rubber cultivation in the 
plantation sub-sector, while discriminatory practices of the Rubber Research 
Institute were biased in advancing the-interests of the plantations as opposed to 
smallholders. I 
Unlike the peasantry of other Southeast Asian countries'which experienced 
colonial rule, the Malay peasantry was never critical to the maintenance of 
British colonial economy (Bums, n. d., pp 1-3). In Java, for example, the 
peasantry was required to devote, a portion of its land to the cultivation of cash 
crops for the export market; while in Burma and the Philippines the peasantry 
were crucial to the commercialisation of the rice and sugar industries. In 
Malaya, on the other hand, the growth of the capitalist mode of production 
was not dependent primarily upon the surplus labour of the peasantry because 
labour for the mining and plantation industries were recruited from China and 
India. 
When commercial agriculture was introduced in the Malay peninsula, the 
British introduced legislations that were meant to keep the Malay peasantry in 
subsistence economy, primarily rice-growing instead of switching ' to 
commercial agriculture particularly rubber cultivation (Lim, 1977, p 113). The 
Malay Reservation Enactment was passed by the Federal Council on 25 
November, 1913, which empowered the British Resident to declare any land 
within the state as Malay Reservation and henceforth the land cannot be sold, 
leased or otherwise disposed to non-Malays. The legislation had been regarded 
by the colonial administration as the "culmination of its search for a means to 
protect Malays against themselves .... preserving for them land which had been 
handed down from generation to generation" (Lim, 1977, p 113). 
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The colonial administration had alleged that a critical situation had existed as a 
result of the sale of traditional Malay land to non-Malays; and viewed this 
form economic of exchange as detrimental to the survival of the Malay culture 
and stability of their social organization. As it turned the fears of the colonial 
rulers were quite exaggerated. Lim (1977, pp 154-156) cites that between 1909 
and 1910 in Selangor 1584 Malay holdings totalling 7564 acres were 
transferred by Malays to non-Malays, but no records of land transfer by non- 
Malays to Malays were available. In Perak in 1912 there, were 961 sales of 
Malay land to non-Malays, while non-Malay sales to Malays in the same 
period amounted to 741, ' and in Negri'Sembilan the number of land transfers 
from Malays to non-Malays were very small to cause any alarm to the state 
administration. IIýII 
Within -the Malay Reservation lands the Malays were, induced to practise 
subsistence agriculture, mainly-'rice cultivation. To achieve this objective, a 
scale of rents favouring the cultivation of rice, -, coconut and food crops but 
discouraging rubber cultivation were set out. However, these inducements 
were not effective as many Malay peasants applie& for land outside the 
designated Malay Reservation areas or violated cultivation,, conditions. 
Consequently the colonial administration was compelled to modify the policy 
and allowed rubber cultivation on a certain proportion of Malay Reservation 
land. Therefore-what was intended to preserve Malay ownership of land by 
restricting disposal rights also embodied an ulterior motive in restricting 
cultivation rights. 
However, the colonial, administration did not cease to find ý ways to block the 
participation of the Malay peasants in rubber cultivation. Rice cultivation, 
often closely associated with traditional Malay village culture, was viewed as 
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the ascribed crop for Malay peasants6. The government's strong disapproval of 
peasant rubber cultivation was due to the increased concern for rice and, food 
crop production to feed British Malaya's growing population (Andaya and 
Andaya, 1982, p 218). In 1917 the Rice Lands Enactment was passed in the 
Federal Council. Under this Enactment any rice land owner could be penalised 
in cases of violation of cultivation conditions. 
The Rice Lands Enactment of 1917 was part of the government's campaign to 
boost local food production, asý a result of increased consciousness of the 
dangers in the country's dependence on imported food (Lim,, 1977, pp 120- 
121). The Federated Malay States imported an average of 190,000 tons of rice 
annually or 82 percent of, its annual rice consumption; Several other 
legislations pertaining to local food production were introduced by the colonial 
government. In 1917 the Coconut Palms Protection Enactment was passed by 
the Federal Council, under which the destruction of coconut palms for the 
purpose of cultivating other crops became a punishable offence. In the same 
year the Silt Control Enactment was introduced in order to maintain the water 
supply to rice fields. -In December 1918 the Food Production Enactment was 
passed, which reserved for the government extensive powers to increase food 
production should the need arise. The main feature of this Enactment was the 
appointment of a Food Controller, with powers to regulate the cultivation of 
rice and other food crops, to compel cultivation on any land which appeared to 
be suitable and appropriate labour for the purpose of cultivation. 
6. Rudner (1970, p 79) mentioned that in recommending double cropping as 
the most promising means of increasing rice output, the Report of the Rice Production Committee of 1953, was even prepared to compel those Malays 
who had already responded to the attractions of rubber smallholdings to return to rice cultivation. 
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According to Lim (1977, p 130) the problem of local food production was 
especially critical between 1918 and 1921 - when rice imports into Malaya were 
severely curtailed due a reduction of normal allowance of rice exports from 
Burma and poor rice harvests in India; while, the local food production 
campaign, on the whole, was a failure. 'The government's attempt to force 
upon the peasants the task of remedying a difficult situation resulted in the 
evasion of responsibilities by other sectors of the population. The 
government's decision to use the country's public revenues, to finance rice 
subsidies chiefly benefited the employers of the mining and plantation sectors, 
because despite increased rice prices- the subsidies made it possible for 
employers to overlook wage increases for their workers. Furthermore, 
although the government resorted to compulsory measures and subtle coercions 
as the chief means of increasing local food production in the critical years of 
reduced food imports, there was hardly any attempt to implement a long-term 
programme of agricultural and technical assistance. For instance, the colonial 
government made no attempts to provide rural credit at reasonable rates for the 
rice farmers, whereas credit facilities were readily available for the European 
extractive industries (Andaya and Andaya, 1982, p 218). It was colonial 
attitudes towards the Malay farmers which caused the failure in sustaining 
improvements in local food production. 
FINANCIAL CREDIT AND POVERTY 
Although Malay peasant surpluses were not critical to the colonial economy, 
nevertheless, - the peasants were affected by market forces and increasingly 
were drawn into the market economy. For instance, the introduction of the 
new land tenure system in 1880, based on the system of private ownership, 
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transformed land into an economic as well as a social commodity, and resulted 
in a process of land accumulation and exploitation within the Malay peasantry 7 
(Shamsul, 1979a, pp 442-443). People in the salaried groups, like teachers and 
government officials, often purchased land when the opportunity arose, 
especially land gazetted as Malay Reservation, which until today has cheaper 
values, because ownership of this type of land can be held by Malays only. 
Moreover, with the introduction of money economy the need for credit became 
a pressing problem for the Malay peasantry, whose traditional economy was 
non-monetized, and thus, unlike the Chinese merchant class, within the Malay 
peasantry there was no accumulation of capital. Due to the colonial 
government's failure to provide for the peasants' need for credit assistance, 
many Malays turned to chettlarS8. These chettlars, who banked money on call 
at 10 percent interest, gave loans to the peasants at up to 36 percent or more 
interest per annum, so much so, in 1911 in Krian only, it was estimated that 
chetty loans to the peasants amounted to 400,000 Straits Dollars (Lim, 1977, p 
84). 
Additionally, credit at high interest rates were (and still are) provided by the 
village shopkeeper, middlemen and wholesalers (Shamsul, 1979a, pp 442-43). 
A chain of wholasalers and retailers emerged out of the expansion of money 
economy and the consumer market, a majority of them settled in rural 
townships and villages. This strict control of financial credit has been another 
important feature in intensifying inequality and therefore vulnerability to 
poverty. Money is advanced usually during the planting seasons and 
7. For detailed studies on this subject refer to S. Husin Ali (1964), Social 
Stratification in Kampung Bagan, Singapore, Malaysian Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society. 
8. Chettlars were an infamous group of professional money-lenders who 
originated from Northern India, and had followed the British colonial 
expansion into Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong and Malaya. 
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repayments are made after the harvest. Often the peasant would use whatever 
land he had as security for a loan. The increasing indebtedness of the peasants 
led to the accumulation and concentration of land and wealth by creditors who 
then assumed the additional role of landlord. 
What transpired out of this process was a class of landlords and absentee 
landlords in the Malay peasantry. The transfers of land ownership in the Malay 
peasantry also resulted in land fragmentation which signified a process of 
social differentiation and polarization. Thus to this day the Malay peasantry is 
divided into a land-owning group who own holdings of more than 10 acres in 
size, and another group who own smaller holdings, and yet another larger 
group of about 60 percent of the peasantry who are landless (Shamsul, 1979a, 
p 443). Subsequently, the majority of the Malay peasantry in the rubber and 
rice sectors are either owners of small land holdings or landless. The Malay 
peasantry can be classified into four categories: 1) owner-operator, 2) owner- 
tenant-operator, 3) tenant, or 4) tenant-labourer (ibid. ). Those who do not own 
land are exploited by landlords who charge exorbitant rents. For instance, 
Bach (1976, p 473) asserted that rice farmers are worse off as tenants, as they 
have to pay between one-third to one-half of their harvest to the landlord. In 
this way the relations between landowner and tenant are characterised by social 
inequality and dependence9. 
Vol, ) 11 In these paragraphs an attempt have been, made to show how colonial policies I 
relating to land and crop cultivation had reinforced the structure of inequality 
in the population, by inducing the Malays to remain in subsistence agriculture 
and by restricting their entry into commercial crop cultivation. The absence of 
9. It is interesting to note that in the north of Yemen, sharecroppers are not 
necessarily considered socially or economically inferior to landowners, but 
rather are seen as partners (Weir, 1985, p 18). 
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formal credit facilities for the Malay peasantry was another feature which 
intensified inequality and hence poverty within the Malay peasantry. 
ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND THE COMMON WEAL 
In what ways did the different ethnic communities gain from the phenomenal 
prosperity of British Malaya? On the whole under colonial rule the economic 
and social development of the Malay peasants was not a matter of prime 
importance. What was more important to the colonial administrators was to 
ensure the profitability of European economic conglomerates that were 
operating in the peninsula. 
The Chinese were self-reliant and economically aggressive and therefore were 
able to create a "colony within a colony" for themselves, whether the British 
administrators looked to their welfare or not. They provided capital, supplied 
both skilled and semi-skilled labour for all the secondary industries and 
businesses. The expansion of the economy also produced avenues of 
employment; while Europeans filled the higher ranks, the lower positions were 
taken up by the Chinese and also the Indians. 
In contrast, the Malays were slow to respond to the new economic demands, 
largely because the British administrators grossly underestimated the ability of 
the Malays to benefit from a secular education system. Swettenham, the British 
Resident General of the Malay peninsula at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
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believed that "education in English would unfit them for normal labour and 
give them noiions above their stations" (quoted in Chai, 1964, p 286). ' Hence 
the colonial administration set up a vernacular education policy which provided 
the Malays with four Oater increased to five) years of schooling, which 
implicitly was intended to preserve the traditional Malay way of life. 
The Chinese and the Indians in the urban areas were able to benefit from 
English-medium education, usually provided by the Christian missionaries. 
The Malay aristocracy class too were able to receive English-medium 
education so as to facilitate their entry into the civil service. As a consequence, 
while the Malay aristocracy class was given the opportunity to. co-exist with. 
the British colonial class, the vast majority of the Malays, who were peasants, 
hardly had any major share in the enormous wealth generated by the colonial 
economic expansion programmes. 
During the colonial rule the welfare of the local population was not considered 
a direct responsibility of the government. Colonial budget and expenditure 
policies on social welfare and the extensions of communications were designed 
primarily for the promotion of the export-sector enclave and the urban tax- 
paying classes. one of the . 
largest items of expenditure in British 
Malayan budgets was for the personal emoluments, pensions and allowances of 
civil servants, who were British and European expatriates. According to 
Emerson (1937, p 90) salaries and, benefits for the expatriate personnel 
represented a substantial volume of invisible imports into the Federated Malay 
States that supplemented capital outflows during the inter-wars years, rising 
from 8 million Straits Dollars in 1916 to 22 million Straits Dollars in 1932. 
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The colonial passion for budget surpluses and reserves, pursued at the expanse 
of the economic and social well-being of the local population resulted in a 
situation where: 
"The Malays remain much as they were in earlier days although 
their land is more limited and their dependence on the world 
economy greater. Among the Chinese there are a few who have 
grown wealthy, as have the Malay rulers and the aristocracy, 
but the bulk of the wealth had been drained away to Singapore 
and further afield to Europe, America and China". ' 
[Emerson, 1937, p 220] 
The discussion in the above paragraphs clearly show that the benefits of 
colonial economic expansion did not "trickle-down" to the vast majority of the 
population. To the colonial government the welfare of the population was not a 
matter of priority compared to the well-being of European expatriates. 
I 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our historical construction of the colonial era in Malaya so far has traced the 
political formation of British Malaya and the incorporation of the colony into 
the world economy. Malaysia's integration into the world capitalist economy 
as a producer of primary commodities for export came initially with the 
discovery of large deposits of tin ore in 1848. Then at the turn of the century, 
the discovery of rubber served to fuel Malaysia's accumulation process, geared 
to the international division of labour. The rubber industry became the major 
mechanism of foreign penetration and control of the economy. Rubber was 
considered as an unsuitable type of agricultural cultivation for the Malay 
peasantry, hence formidable barriers, such as discriminatory land policies, 
were introduced by the colonial government. Thus colonial policies allowed 
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the formation of an independent peasant sector, and at the same time greatly 
assisted in the expansion 'of large plantations and tin mines owned by 
Europeans, and facilitated the subsequent emergence of a dependent immigrant 
labour force. 
In a nutshell, Malaysia had become a perfect example of a peripheral economy 
that exemplified the four forms of 'dependency distinguished by Szentes 
(1973), which we have discussed at some length in chapter Two., British 
Malaya had established direct economic dependence with the centre economies 
of the Western world, and economic enterprises in the tin and rubber industries 
were mainly owned by Europeans. Because her primary commodities were 
exported to the West, Malaya's, trade depended heavily on demands by 
industries in the West. Capital for economic expansion was funded mainly by 
investors from Europe, therefore the country was financially dependent on 
foreign capital. And dependence on credit was also carried down to the most 
local level by the presence of chettiar money-lenders. Ustly, technology 
needed for innovations in the economic expansion was not developed locally 
but had to be imported from the West. This was a structure both of national 
dependence and of internal graduated social dependence. 
I 
Incomes accrued from the export of tin and rubber were considerably 
voluminous. Still, profits gained from colonial economic activities were 
repatriated elsewhere, especially t6 Europe, at the expense of the local 
population. On its own showing the colonial administration neither explored, 
nor made provisions for, the social health of the local population. Social 
policies pertaining to health care, education and welfare of the population were 
limited to the urban centres and were generally geared to serve the colonial 
enclave rather than the population at large. Social security measures for 
workers were virtually non-existent. Thus economic growth was not 
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complemented by developments in the area of social policies. Whatever may 
be argued for the soci ally "benevolent" rule of the colonial administration by 
some interpreters, the evidence produced by any detailed scrutiny of 
development demonstrates little concern for social needs and social welfare. 
The liberal colonial immigration policy of importing labour from China and 
India led to the formation of a multi-ethnic social structure in the Malayan, and 
later Malaysian, society. The stratification of ethnic groups according to 
occupations and spatial distribution became a trade mark of the Malayan plural 
society. These multi-ethnic differentiations later-formed the basis of political 
tensions in independent Malaysia. But, as the above discussion shows, many'Of 
the differences in power and economic opportunities had been produced in the 
course of maldng policy provisions about land, subsistence agriculture, rubber 
cultivation and credit during colonial rule and continuing into the early years 
of post-colonial economic development. I 
At the eve of Malaya's political independence Malaya had been transformed 
from an economy based chiefly on a subsistence agriculture and regional trade 
into an export economy based principally on the primary commodities of tin 
and rubber, a transformation which ascertained the country's position as a 
peripheral economy within the global economic order. This is simultaneously 
an account of the creation of dependency and social stratification, posing 
problems for the management of welfare in a modem national state. 
In the following chapters of this thesis, it will be argued that political 
independence produced neither a restructuring in the economy nor a 
reconfiguration of the social stratification, rather it reinforced Malaysia's 
position as a neo-colonial state. 
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Chapter Four 
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, 1957-1970 
INTRODUCTIO 
An analysis of any social security system would necessitate an appreciation of 
the economic and social development of the society in question. As the crucial 
question in the study of social security relates to financial support, -like 
problems of economic hardship and income maintenance, therefore the nature 
and scope of a social security system depends not only upon the state of 
development of the society, but also on its historical social formation and 
priority accorded to social development and social services. 
As follows, in this chapter the objective is ý to analyse some of the salient 
features of post-independent development in'Peninsula Malaysia up to the year 
1970. The analysis begins'with a brief description of Malaysia's plural society 
and the political structure trhas emerged out of this plural society. The main 
part of the chapter focuses on the economic structure and major indicators of 
macro-economic development in the period between 1957 to 1970. Following 
this, based on the data pertaining to income distribution the analysis will 
attempt to assess the impact of economic development on the population and 
discuss to what extent poverty and inequality exist in the society. 
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ETHT-, UCrrY AND COMMUNALISM - 
As explained earlier in chapter Three the liberal immigration policies of the 
colonial administration had led to the rapid growth of the Chinese and Indian 
population in Malaya. The three major ethnic groups, Malays, ý Chinese and 
Indians were separated from each other by language, religion, dietary habits, 
geographical distribution and economic activities. By 1957 the patterns of 
ethnic distribution in the Malaysian society had already been established; and 
as shown in Table 4.1, to this day these patterns have not altered much. 
Malays form just over half of the total population, while the Chinese form 
roughly one-third and the Indians one-tenth. 
Table 4.1 - 
Peninsula Malaysia: PMulation Estimates by Ethnic Groups 
(in Im, -rcentages) 




Chinese 37.2 35.8 32.8 
Indian 11.2 10.7 10.1 
Others 1.8 0.8 0.6 
Total Population 
(1000) 6,800 10,434 12,968.8 
Sources: - i) Department of Statistics; 1957 Population Census of the 
Federation of Malaya, Report No. 14, Table 1.3, p. 3; 
ii) Fourth Malaysian Plan, Table 4-2, p. 74; 
iii) Fifth Malaysian Plan, Table 4-1, p. 129; [adapted]. 
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The Malays had little contact with the export sector of tin and rubber and the 
new commercial activities in the urban sector. The British made no effort in 
recruiting the Malays into the tin and rubber industries. It was colonial policy 
to keep them in rice cultivation and subsistence agriculture, while those who 
were in rubber cultivation were mainly smallholders with holdings averaging 
three acres each (Lim, 1967, p 114). 
The colonial policy of not granting the Malays access to English-medium 
schools for the fear of the disruptive political consequences further kept the 
Malays from the modem economic sector (Chai, 1964, p 268; 'Snodgrass', 
1980, p 237). While English education was regarded as an instrument of 
change, the two diverging Malay vernacular and English educational systems 
produced two distinct classes each culturally separated from each other - one 
remained in rural poverty while the other became urbanized and relatively 
well-off by material standards. Above all, a wide language gulf separated the 
two classes, and it is within this context that charges against the British for 
planning to divide and rule gain their strongest support (Chai, 1964, p 280). 
The immigrant Chinese and Indian communities, meanwhile, maintained 
strong ethnic connections with the different provinces in China and India 
where they originally came from. This fact strongly influenced the patterns of 
their locations and occupations in the country. Tables 4.2 and 4.3, for 
example, give some ideas of the ethnic concentrations in the primary 
commodities sectors of tin and rubber. The Chinese were concentrated in tin- 
mining, and also in commerce and industries. They took advantage of the 
Christian-missionary sponsored English secondary level education, which 
enabled them to have A high rate of social mobility in the urban areas. On the 
other hand, the majority of the Indians, who came from South India as 
105 
indentured or common labourers, worked on European-owned rubber 
plantations, while other Indians found jobs in certain sectors of the public 
works, telecommunications and railway departments, perhaps due to their 
competency in the English language and their- familiarity with the system of 
British rule. 
Table 4.2 
Ethnic COMMsition of Minip Abour Force. L 
Peninsular Malaysia. 1972 
(in percentages) 
Malay Chinese Indian Other 
Dredging 40 34 24 1 
Gravel Pumping 12 82 5- 
Underground 30 ý8 1 
Open Cast 35 51 13 1 
All Mining 21 69 91 
Sources: Thoburn (1977); Table 5.4, p. 92 
Table 4.3 
Rubber Estate Labour Force in Peninsular Malaysia. 
By Ethnic Group. 1938-72 
(as Pergrnigges of Total Labour Force) 
1938 1947 1957 1968 1972 
Malays 2 20 19 23 33 
Indians 80 52, 51 46 40 
Chinese 17 27 29 31 26 
Source: Thoburn (1977); Table 6.6, p. 135 
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POLMCAL COMMUNALISM 
The Malays were the first ethnic group to form a political party, the United 
Malay National Organisation (UMNO) in response to the formation of the 
Malayan Union in April 19461 Andaya and Andaya, p 256). Since the Malays 
and ý UMNO did not challenge continued British rule, and therefore British 
economic, - political and military interests were thereby assured, the British 
subsequently endorsed the formation of the Federation of Malaya in 1948. , 
Proposals for the formation of the Federation of Malaya, drawn -up in July 
1946, were, negotiated in secret between the British, the Malay rulers and 
UMNO, while excluding other political forces in Malaya ý from the 
negotiations. Hua (1983, ' p 81) asserts these secret negotiations clearly 
revealeded the communalist strategy of British imperialism, whose intention 
was not only to isolate the radical national forces, but also to exclude from the 
proceedings ý the commercial and petty bourgeoisie in, the non-Malay 
communities. 
Following the formation of the Federation of Malaya, the quest for 
independence grew and other political parties came into prominence. The 
Indian commercial bourgeoisie formed the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) in 
August 1946, while the Malayan Chinese, Association'(MCA) , sponsored by 
Chinese businessmen,, ý was, formed in February 1949. Considering, that - the 
condition for independence set, by the British was the ability to foster and 
maintain communal stability, the three communal- political parties accordingly 
1. In Chapter Three it was pointed out that UMNO opposed to the creation of 
the Malayan Union as it meant a loss of sovereignty over the Malay states by 
the hereditary Sultans, as well as a loss of identity by individual states, and the 
liberal terms of offer of citizenship to the non-Malays. 
107 
joined together to form the imperialist-groomed'Alliance2, and subsequently 
won 51 out of the 52 legislative council seats in the first federal elections in 
1955 (Hua, 1983, pp 99; 105; Andaya and Andaya, 1982, p 261). 
Although problems of sharing political and economic power between the three 
communal, parties in the Alliance were inevitable, the colonial government 
viewed this co-operation as step towards the formation of a united Malayan 
nation (Andaya and Andaya, 1982, p 261). Besides the Alliance seemed a 
useful device for the upper strata of the non-Malay compradors to command 
their linkages in the imperialist domination of the Malayan economy. A 
noteworthy feature of the Alliance is that from its inception UMNO was and 
still is the dominant partner, justified by the special position of the Malay 
rulers in the colonial construct and the predominance of, Malays in the 
electorate., Rudner (1975, p 11) points out that in essence the Alliance electoral 
coalition was based on intercommunal compromise and reconciliations worked 
out by the UMNO gentry and MCA comprador elites, ensuring trade-offs that 
satisfied the minimum expectations of each of the ethnic partners. 
When the country gained its political independence in August 1957, Alliance 
leaders clearly recognised the paradoxical position occupied by the Malays. 
Since Malay voters outnumbered all the others, this ensured UMNO's decisive 
political edge over its two other political partners. However, while the Malays 
were the politically dominant group in the'country, they were also the most 
economically backward. Therefore there was the serious need for greater 
Malay participation in the economy while at the same time not depriving the 
enon-Malays of their economic activities. Subsequently the non-Malays would 
2. The Alliance formula was first adopted by UMNO and MCA in the Kuala 
Lumpur Municipal elections of February 1952, in which the Alliance won 12 
out of the 14 seats contested. 
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have to accept the Malay language as the national language, the special Malay 
privileges such as those pertaining to quotas in higher education and 
employment, and wider Malay economic - participation in exchange for 
citizenship and the right to participate in the political process. The Merdeka 
([ndependent) Constitution of 1957, therefore, reinforce the supremacy of the 
Malays while at the same time it safeguarded the interests of the other ethnic 
groups, and in this process, effectively institutionalized communalism, as the 
state ideology. , 
COLONIAL ECONOMIC LEGACY 
At independence in August 1957 the basic characteristics of the economy 
differed little or not at all from what it had been as a colony. One of the 
inherited features of the economy was a basically enclave character of 
imperialist domination in the economy. Moreover, the capitalistic economic 
policies of the colonial administration resulted in the country specializing in the 
production of rubber and tin for export, and surpluses were repatriated to the 
West, while at the same time the country depended heavily on the import of 
essential foods and manufactured goods. Due to the economy's dependence on 
the performance of the export sector, Malaysia is classified as an export 
economy (IMP, p 20). Table 4.4 shows that in 1960 gross export proceeds 
accounted for about 55 percent of the GDP. In the same year rubber and tin 
formed 83 percent of the total value of $3032 million of merchandise exports 




Exp! 2rts and Production for Domestic Use. 1960 
($ million. 1960 prices) 
1960 
GDP I in market price $6918 
Exports of goods and non-fa6tor services $3824 
Exports as % of GDP TTI 55 
GDP for domestic use 3094 
Domesticuse as % of'GDP 45 
Source: First Malaysian Plan, Table 2-3, p. 24 (adapted). 
Since British colonial administration policies and investments in Malaya were 
geared exclusively towards the extraction of resources to meet the demands of 
Britain and other centre economies, Malaya had developed one of the most 
open economies in the world and the country became largely dependent on 
world trade conditions. 
As an illustration, during periods of economic boom, such as in the years of 
1950-51,1955-56 and 1959-60, Malaya's GDP rose to successively higher 
levels. Nevertheless the inherently cyclical nature of a dependent economy 
meant inevitable fluctuations in the country's real GDP between peaks and 
slumps. The annual rate of growth of the GDP varied from 61 percent in 1950 
to -17 percent in 1953 but averaged at 19 percent per annum during 1948 to 
1960. In comparison the annual rate of growth of the GDP for the United 
Kingdom in the same period was 9 percent. Also, the average Gross Exports 
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Proceeds/Gross Domestic Product (GEP/GDP) ratio was high, for the period 
1947 to 1960 the ratio was 47.7 percent or nearly half the average GDp3 
(Lim, 1967, pp 8; 13). Moreover, Malaya was highly dependent on the import 
of foodstuffs, fuel and manufactured goods. In 1961, for instance, foodstuffs 
and petroleum only accounted to about 47 percent of the'total imports (Lim, 
1967, p 8). On the whole, the growth rate for the economy for the period 1947 
to 1960 was 4.5 percent per annurn (Lim, 1967, p 11). Still, fluctuations in the 
GDP accentuated the vulnerability and insecurity of an economy which is 
dependent.. primarily on fluctuating export proceeds, this fact has serious 
implications for the state's ability to provide adequate resoure allocations 
towards a comprehensive social security protection for the population. 
Independent Malaya inherited not only a highly export-oriented economy, but 
also one which was dualistic in nature. The low-productivity traditional sector 
of rubber smallholding, padi cultivation and fishing, dominated by the Malays, 
exists along side the large-scale capital-intensive modem sector, dominated by 
foreign and non-Malay interests. Political independence did not abrogate direct 
economic dependence on the centre states. Foreign domination of the rubber 
and tin industries, for example, are illustrated in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. More 
than 60 percent of the total rubber acreage belonged to European holdings; 
while foreign-controlled tin-mines produced almost 60 percent of the total tin 
output. In the _1960s mosi of the output of the tin industry was controlled by 
three British holding companies, namely, London Tin Corporation, General 
Tin Investment and British Tin Industry (HUa, 1983, p 112). 
3. Comparative GEP/GDP ratios during same period for selected countries 
were as follows: United States 3.9 percent; United Kingdom 16 percent; 
Burma 26 percent; Thailand 13 percent; India 5 percent (Lim, 1967, p 13). 
ill 
Table 4.5 
Ownership of Malayan Rubber Estates. by Nationality. 
1960 
European Asian 
Size No. Acreage No. Acreage 
Below 1000 
acres 110 63357 1629 425470 
Over 1000 
acres 382 1107474.., 153 345871 
Total 492-,, 1170831 1782 771341 
Source: Ooi (1961) p. 214 1 
Table 4.6 
Tin Production in Malaya. by foreign-controlled and 









Total 59,950 100.0 
Source: Yip (1969), Table 0-6, p. 19 
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Unlike other foreign colonies such as Indonesia, India, Pakistan and many 
African countries, Malaysia did not embark on radical policy changes upon 
gaining independence. Instead the country continued to maintain the inherited 
economic structures. There were neither threat of nationalising foreign-owned 
enterprises nor experiments in egalitarian economic and social policies. 
The state itself recognises that the economic structure could be divided 
between the traditional and modem sectors, consisting of five segments, which 
clearly illustrate existing economic imbalances. These segments are: 
"i) The Traditional Rural Sector which comprises uneconomic 
smallholder rubber, single-cropped padi, traditional livestock 
and other agriculture, gathering of jungle produce, inshore 
fishing, and dulang washing and small gravel-pump mining for 
tin. 
ii) The Modem Rural Sector which comprises estate agriculture 
(i. e. rubber, oil palm, coconut, tea and cocoa), Felda schemes 
and double-cropped padi, commercial forestry, modem fishing 
and modem tin-mining. 
iii) The Traditional Urban Sector which comprises those parts of 
manufacturing, construction, commerce, transport and services, 
in which work is done with little benefit from modem 
equipment or techniques; hawkers, stallholders, household 
servants, trishaw riders, and other persons pursuing a multitude 
of activities requiring little or no initial skill or training. 
iv) The Modem Urban Sector which comprises technically 
advanced manufacturing, construction, commerce, utilities, 
transport, communications and modem services including the 
professions and the tourist trade. 
v) The Government Sector which comprises Federal, State and 
Local Government administration and Public Authorities as well 
as the Police and the Armed Forces. " 
[2MP, 1971, pp 36-37] 
Thus as far as social security is concerned, the above classification of the 
economy into several different sectors would eventually raise problems of 
devising income protection schemes for the population. Since the economy is 
conspicuously diversified there appears to be no common basis for a unified 
social security programme. Moreover, there is an apparent element of 
113 
contending societal interests between the different classifications of workers in 
the economic structure. Therefore without any ý strong commitment for 
egalitarian social policies on the part of the state, comprehensive social 
protection for all workers may not be accomplished easily., 
In summary, at the time of political ndependence, Peninsula Malaysia -was 
marked by a high degree of economic dualism and differentiation of spheres in 
its social formation. The'majority, of the Malays lived in rural areas and 
engaged themselves in the - traditional rural, sector, working ý in smallholding 
agriculture and -fishing, and therefore earned low incomes. 'Urban Malays 
worked in the government sector and the lower rungs of the manufacturing and 
services industries. The majority of the Chinese lived in urban areas, working 
in trade and commerce, while rural Chinese were engaged in tin-mining and 
smallholding agriculture. Meanwhile, the majority of the Indians lived in the 
rubber or oil-palm plantations, while those in the urban areas were mainly in 
the professions and government services. 
Economic differentiations resulted in income differentials between the different 
ethnic groups. In 1957 the average income of the'adult Malay male was $1463, 
compared with $3223 for a Chinese and $2031 for an Indian (Silcock, 1963, p 
279). This clearly showed that the Malays were economically backward 
compared to the immigrant Chinese and Indian communities. 
On the other hand, politically the Malays continue to enjoy a superior position 
because of their historical claim as the indigenous people of the peninsula. The 
Chinese, having taken full advantage of the growth opportunities particularly 
in trade and commerce, continue to be economically superior compared with 
Malays and Indians. 
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At the same time, in the government sector the state had inherited a 
"distinctively intense form of civil administration" (Rudner, 1975, p 18). The 
comprador elites in the state bureaucracy did not make any attempt to reform 
the civil service; colonial officials continued to assert predominance in the 
bureaucracy. Rudner (1975, p 19) points out that the Malayan government 
even concluded an agreement with the United Kingdom, providing for even 
more attractive terms for British officers who continued to serve in the 
Malayan civil service. As shown in Table 4.7, Malayanization of the 
bureaucratic elite was adopted on a gradual basis, reflecting the state's 
continued cultural dependence on the former colonialists. This tended to 
perpetuate many of the problems of dependence and poverty, while introducing 
some measures of stability. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1957-70 
During the decade or so following independence Malaysia followed a medium- 
term growth rate in order to establish its credibility particularly with the rural 
electorate4 (2MP, p 52). Public development efforts were directed primarily at 
raising income and productivity and improving social and living conditions in 
the urban, and, in particular, the rural agricultural sectors (2MP, p 10). This 
concern for the agricultural sector could also be interpreted as a policy of 
avoiding massive rural exodus and a means of redistributing economic and 
social gains to the rural areas. 
4. The emphasis on rural development could also be interpreted as a means of 
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How were development strategies related to the reduction of poverty? -A 
review of the earlier five-year development plan documents revealed that the 
development strategies and policies adopted by the state in the late 1950s and 
1960s did not contain explicit attempts of finding solutions to the economic, 
social and political differentiations created by the colonial system. 
The five-year development plans adopted by Malaysia had their origins in the 
Report of a Mission of the International, Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), invited to Malaya in - 1954., Following -the Mission's 
explicit emphasis on the private enterprise character of the Malayan economy, 
the Malayan government was recommended, to adopt policies conducive to 
investment and expansion in the private sectors of the economy, and a capital 
expenditure programme of $776.6 million was proposed for the period 1955- 
59 (IBRD, 1955; p 33). 
Subsequent to the IBRD Mission's recommended , planning - strategy, the 
Alliance government, which came to power in 1955, formulated the First Five 
Year Plan, 1955-60. This Plan took the form of a general statement of 
development policy with provisional department allocations of capital 
expenditure totalling $1138.5 million, with 60 percent of the planned public 
investment directed towards economic development, 30 percent towards social 
development -and 10 percent towards, improving the administrative, structure 
(Malaya, 1956, Para. 12). However,, no specific output targets were included 
in the Plan. 
Rudner (1975, p 36) criticised the Plan's bias towards the modem economic 
sector. The large subsistence agricultural sector had an allocation of, a mere 
seven percent of the planned economic investment. In fact, the government 
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einsisted. that its continued dependence on the United Kingdom for Malaya's 
external security would be an additional boost for foreign investment; thus 
reflecting Malaya's military dependence on its former colonial ruler. 
Nevertheless, the Plan did contain a significant feature in the form of an 
unprecedented nine percent allocation for education, thus illustrating the 
government's commitmenu towards education as an investment in ýhuman 
resources. 
The Second Five Year Plan, covering the period 1961-65, called for a gross 
investment of $5050 million, an increase of two-thirds over the absolute 
allocation for the previous Plan (Malaya, 19961, Para. 73). Out of the total 
allocation, 71 percent was allocated to the economic sector, 24.5 percent to the 
social sector, and 4.5 percent to the government sector. As for the social 
services, allocations for education, health, and housing totalled nearly one- 
quarter of planned expenditure, compared to an actual allocation of 14 percent 
in the First Five Year Plan (Malaya, 1961, Paras. 84-88). The heavy emphasis 
on the economic sector, however, reflected the government's presumption that 
only economic projects would generate greater income. 
The Second Five Year Plan (1961-65), however, -contained an important 
diversion from the First Five Year Plan (1956-60), in that planning objectives 
were defined in output and employment terms., The Plan projected a 15 percent 
increase in employment while national output was expected to grow by 22 
percent at constant 1960 prices (Malaya, 1961, Para. 71). Furthermore, the 
quantitative distribution of investment in the Second Five Year Plan (1961-65) 
marked the beginning of the redistribution of economic growth towards 
development. Also, apart from the desire-for economic growth, the political 
electorate's developmental expectations played 'an important part in 
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the planned transformation of the underdeveloped subsistence agricultural 
sector into a high productivity agrarian sector. 
On the whole, compared to an annual average rate of population growth of 2.8 
percent during 1947-57, and 3 percent after 1957, Malaya's percapita income 
increased by just I percent per annum to 1960. However, during the period of 
the Second Five Year Plan (1961-65), the average rate of GDP growth 
increased to 6.5 percent per annum, raising real percapita incomes to an 
average annual iate'-of 2.7 percent (Rudner, 1975, p 71). 
In the late 1960s public development expenditure for Peninsula Malaysia 
increased somewhat threefold. Actual allocations for public development 
increased from $1007 million for 1956-60 to $2651.7 million for 1961-65 and 
$3610.2 million for 1965-70 (IMP, p 71). As a matter of political expedience, 
emphasis was devoted to the rural development programmes, as the majority of 
the electorate were located in rural areas. In the agricultural sector, priority 
was given to rubber replanting, drainage and irrigation, and land development. 
Priority was also accorded 16-'Projects which provide a more 
infrastructure for the economy, such as the provision of electricity and water 
supply, schools and health facilities, transport and communications. 
Real GDP grew at an average rate -of 6.3 percent per annum in the 1960s 
(IMP, p 37). Growth took place within a framework of relative price and 
financial stability. During the same period mentioned above the retail price 
index rose by less than 1 percent per annum (2MP, p 16). 
Generally, development in the 1960s reflected a success in the programmes of 
diversification. Table 4.8 shows changes in the structure of the economy 
between 1960 and 1970. Although agriculture remained the largest sector in 
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Table 4.8 
Malaysia: Gross Domestic Product by IndusLry of Origin 




and fishing 38 31 
Mining and Quarrying 6 6 
Manufacturing 9 13 
Construction 3 4'- 
Electricity, water & 
sanitary services 1 2 
Transportation, storage & 
communication 4 5 
Wholesale & 
lRetail 
Trade 16 13 
Banking, Insurance & 
real estate 1 4 
Ownership of dwellings 5 4 
Public administration & 
defence 6 11 
Services 11 7 
GDP at factor cost 100 100 
Note: 'figures include Sabah & Sarawak 
Sources: First Malaysia Plan 1965-1970, Table 2-11, 
p. 37; 
Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985, Table 2-1, 
p. 11; [adapted]. 
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the economy, its share in the GDP decreased from 38 percent in 1960 to 31 
percent in 1970. At the same time, manufacturing and the public sectors in the 
GDP rose from 9 percent and 6 percent to 13 percent and 11 percent 
respectively. While rubber, and tin continued to dominate the export sector, 
their share -of total merchandise exports declined from 69.2 percent in 1960 
(IMP, pp 23-24) to 53.8 percent in 1970 (2MP, p 20). In addition, the palm 
oil industry expanded rapidly in the 1960s, so much so its export value grew at 
close to 20 percent per year for the period 1966 to 1970 (2MP, p 20). Changes 
in the structure of the economy meant a reduction in the degree of commodity 
concentration and the greater production for domestic use meant that the 
economy was less susceptible to the unstable conditions of the rubber and tin 
markets. 
It may be argued that throughout the 1960s the state's economic philosophy 
was based on capitalism with democracy, and liberal trade policies which 
highly depended on foreign trade, as well as'the encouragement of foreign 
capital inflows. f Basically, the yardstick -, for development was the GDP's 
growth Tate. Development was focused mainly on economic growth and 
agricultural diversification. The state adopted the assumption that accelerated 
growth would eventually spill over to the poor, as depicted by the state's aim 
of "increasing'the well-being of Malaysia's rural inhabitants and other low- 
income groups" (IMP, p 2). 
Still, despite some diversifications encouraged by the early development plans 
during the late 1950s and 1960s, there is substantial evidence which suggest 
that the rule of the post-independent government did not lead to plans which 
ameliorate poverty and the unbalanced social structure of colonial rule. 
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GROWTH OR DEVELOPMENT 
The preceding section illustrates the achievement of a medium-rate economic 
growth resulting in the "relative development success of Malaysia" (Kasper, 
1974, p 2). Still, in the words of the Brandt Commission (1980, pp 23-24), 
"the prime objective of development is to lead to self-fulfilment and creative 
partnership in the use of a nation's productive forces", we could therefore pose 
several questions pertaining to Malaysia's considerable economic growth. ', 
Seers (1979, p 12) suggests three crucial questions one should ask about a 
country's development: Whatýhas been happening to poverty? What has been 
happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If one or 
two of these core problems have been growing worse, the outcome would be 
growth without development, even if per capita income increased substantially. 
Therefore these are some of the crucial the questions that this thesis 
contemplate to resolve in the subsequent discussion on the state of development 
in Peninsula Malaysia. I 
TRENDS IN THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
This section will attempt to examine the problem of income inequalities5 in 
Peninsula Malaysia. Data for the period 1957-70 are based on the two most 
comparable surveys, the Household Budget Survey of 1957-58 and the Post 
Enumeration Survey of the 1970 Housing and Population Census. These two 
5. Due to a lack of data on other development indicators, like employment, 
wages and poverty levels, in this chapter the discussion will be limited to an 
analysis of the size distribution of income. 
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surveys give a comparable picture on the distribution of a household income in 
1957-58 and 1970. 
Table 4.9 shows an increase in the Gini Coefficient6, and this suggests a 
substantial increase in income inequality between 1957 and 1970. In 1957 
inequality was moderate with the Gini coefficient of 0.41. The top 20 percent 
of households received 48.6 percent of total income, while the bottom 40 
percent of households received only 16 percent. In 1957 the mean monthly 
household income of the top 20 percent income group was at $524, while that 
of the bottom 40 percent was only $86. 
By 1970 the overall income inequality had increased, with the Gini coefficient 
at 0.51. While the top 10 percent of income recipients had increased their 
income by 50.5 percent on average, and the top 20 percent income group 
commanded 55.4 percent of the total income, the position of the bottom 40 
percent group has declined substantially. The mean monthly household income 
of the bottom 40 percent group declined further from $86 in 1957 to only $75 
in 1970, a reduction of 13 percent. Consequently their share of the total 
income has also reduced substantially from 16 percent in 1957 to only 11.6 
percent in 1970, thus proving that they were the worst-off group. 
6. The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure in the study of 
income distribution. It is an aggregate numerical measure of income inequality 
ranging, theoretically, from zero (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). 
The higher the value of the coefficient, the higher is the inequality of income 
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The relatively high rate of population growth of 2.8 percent per annum (Lim, 
1973, p 68), plus the extremely uneven patterns of unemployment and income 
distribution in the colonial period, as well as the cyclical nature of 
commodities prices were some of the reasons that hindered the poor income 
group from having a share in the substantial growth in total income 
experienced during the period 1957 to 1970. 
If the distribution of income is analysed according to rural and urban sectors, 
as shown in Table 4.10, in 1957 inequality appeared to be lower in the rural 
compared to the urban sector. Still, with a mean monthly income of $172, the 
income of rural households was significantly lower than the overall mean 
monthly household income of $215. Moreover, the mean monthly household 
income of rural households was only 56 percent of that of urban households. 
In 1970 inequality was still lower in the rural sector compared to the urban 
sector. However, inequality between, the rural area and the urban appeared to 
have widened, ' the mean monthly household income of rural households'-hid 
deteriorated to only 49 percent of that of urban households. Therefore, within 
the declining share of income of the bottom 40 percent of the population, the 
rural poor were relatively worse-off than their urban counterpart, eventhough 
inequality appeared to be greater in the urban sector and that the share of 




Size of Income Distribution Estimates. Rural and Urban 
Areas. Peninsula Malaysia. 
1957/58-1970 (in pgrcenWe. 
Rural Urban,., 
- , Households Households 
1957/58 1970 1957/58 1970 
Income group 
Top 5 19.0 23.9 20.7 27.5 
Top 20 % 44.5 46.8 49.6 55.5 
Middle 40% 37.3 36.7 33.2 32.8 
Bottom 40%, 18.2 16.5 17.2 12.2 
Mean Household 
, 
Income ($/month) 172 201 307 407 
Median Household 
Incoome ($/month) 131 145 216 283 
Gini Ratio 0.380.46 0.42 0.50 
Source: K. S. Jomo and S. Ishak, 1981 (adapted) 
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During the same period 1957-70 the median household income of rural 
households increased by a mere 10.7 percent from $131 in 1957 to $145 in 
1970. On the other hand, urban households were a lot better-off with an 
increase of 31 percent from $216 in 1957 to $283 in 1970; again proving that 
the rural power gained less from the economic growth of the period. 
Table 4.11 examines the pattern of income distribution estimates among the 
different ethnic communities. In 1957 the Chinese had the highest income 
inequality, followed by the Indians and the Malays. However, compared with 
Chinese and Indian households, Malay households had the lowest income level 
because their mean and median monthly household incomes were below those 
of the national levels. Malay households received a mean monthly household 
income of $139, which was 46 percent and 59 percent of those of Chinese and 
Indian households respectively. 
By 1970 the Malays had topped the list of income inequality, followed by the 
Indians and Chinese. The share of income of the bottom 40 percent of I 
Malay 
households declined by 35 percent during 1957 to 1970. The Malay households 
continued to have the lowest mean monthly household income of $177, or 
equivalent to 44 percent and 57 percent respectively of incomes of Chinese and 
Indian households, or 66 percent of the national level Of $267. 
In terms of median household incomes per month, between 1957/58 to 1970 
the level for Malay households increased by only 8.9 percent while that of the 
Chinese increased by 20.6 percent. The median monthly household income of 
the Indian households increased by 3.7 percent; even so their median income is 
well above the overall level of $167 per month. 
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The inter-ethnic income inequalities was further exacerbated by the fact that 
their income shares did not correlate to their proportions in the population. In 
1957 while Malays comprised more than half of the total population, their 
income share was slightly more than a third of the total income. Conversely, 
the Chinese who comprised a third of the population commanded nearly half of 
the total income. This inequitable pattern of income distribution persisted until 
1970. 
In summary, the foregoing analysis certainly shows the existence of income 
inequalities, both between ethnic groups and within the different household 
income groups. The Malay households had incomes which were much lower 
than those of the Chinese and Indian households. In 1957 the richest 10 
percent of households had an income eight times that of the poorest 40 percent, 
while in 1970 the ratio had increased considerably to fourteen times (refer to 
Table 4.9). Therefore it is true that between 1957 to 1970, rather than 
narrowing, inequalities appeared to be widening in every aspect of income 
distribution. 
COGNISANCE OF POVERTY. 1970 
Although the decade of the sixties was characterised by "a high rate of 
development activity in the country" (2MP, p 10), the impressive economic 
growth failed to check the problem of poverty. Table 4.12 shows the 
distribution of poor households according to occupational categories and 
sectors for the year 19707. The data shows a high incidence of poverty among 
agricultural labourers, padi farmers, fishermen and rubber smallholders. On 




Peninsula Malaysia: Poor Households 
by Rural and Urban Strata. 1970 
Total Total Incidence % 
house- poor of ý among 'holds house- ý poverty poor 
C 000) holds M 
(1000) 
RURAL: 
Agriculture 852.9 582.4 68.3 73.6 
Rubber s/holders 350.0 226.4 64.7 28.6 
Oil palm s/holders 6.6 2.0, 30.0 0.3 
Coconut s/holders 32.0 16.9 52.8 2.1 
Padi farmers 140.0 123.4 88.1 
Other agric. 285.9 185.6 64.9 23.5 
Fishermen 38.4 28.1 73.2 3.5 
Other industries 350.5 123.5 35.2 15.6 
Sub-total (Rural) 1,203.4 705.9 58.7 89.2 
URBAN: 
Mining 5.4, 1.8 33.3 0.2 
, Manufacturing 84.0 '19.7 23.5 2.5 
Construction 
-19.5 1 
5.9 30.2 2.5- 
Transport & 1 
utilities 42.4 13.1 30.9 1.7 
Trade & services 251.3 45.4 18.1 5.7 
Sub-total (Urban) 402.6 85.9 21.3 10.8 
TOTAL 1,606.0 791.8 49.3 100.0 




average the incidence of poverty in the rural areas was 59 percent. Rural poor 
formed 89 percent of the total poor households. Comparatively, the incidence 
of poverty was lower among urban occupational groups; the average incidence 
of urban poverty was 21 percent, which was much lower than the national rate 
of 49 percent. Thus the problem of poverty was greater in the rural sector 
compared to the urban sector. 
Several -factors contribute to the problem of poverty, especially in the rural 
areas. Firstly, there is the existence of economic dualism, which results in 
imbalances in income levels not only between the traditional and modem 
sectors but also between the different ethnic groups, due to the identification of 
race with location and vocation. The Malays predominate in the low-income 
traditional rural sector; they outnumbered the non-Malays by a factor of nearly 
three to one in this sector. Conversely, in the modem sector the non-Malays 
outnumbered the Malays by a factor of about five to two; while in the 
government sector Malays outnumbered non-Malays by about five to three 
(2MP, p 38). By reason of their predominance in the rural areas, therefore, 
Malay poverty is a direct result of the underdevelopment of the Malay 
peasantry which was discussed in Chapter Three. Thus the problem of poverty 
is greater in the'rural areas, where 89 percent of poor households were located 
in 1970 (refer to Table 4.12) 
Furthermore, a development strategy based on agricultural development was 
not able_, W initiate faster economic growth or produce a more equitable 
distribution of income. Since independence, Malaysia's development strategy 
had placed considerable emphasis on' the development of large-scale 
agricultural sector by opening new land schemes and distributing land to small- 
scale farmers. While it is true, that such a policy was aimed at creating new 
jobs in the agricultural sector, thus minimising rural-urban migration as well as 
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evading the problem of dependent agricultural labour which. are, common in 
Latin America, it also meant the allocation of large resources into a slow- 
growth sector. Besides, an agro-oriented development strategy emphasising on 
the cultivation of commodities like rubber, palm oil and cocoa instead of food 
crops for domestic consumption also meant that the country's economy 
continue to depend on cyclical fluctuations in the world commodities market. 
Instead of increasing self-reliance, the state's development policies actually 
reinforced economic dependence. 
Rural development was seen as he main avenue through which the economic 
position of the Malays could be improved. Thus the state made no attempt to 
ameliorate the problem of ethnic imbalance in the ownership of stock of 
corporations. In 1970, forýexample, the control of modem enterprises was 
mainly in the hands of foreign and Chinese interests, who owned 62 percent 
and 23 percent of stocks respectively, while the Malays owned a negligible 1.2 
percent (Kasper, 1974, p 43). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I 
Thus far the analysis has shown that development plans of the late 1950s and 
1960s were aimed quite simply at the expansion of the level of economic 
activity, in particular in the modem sector. The plans were conceived within a 
deliberate national strategy to build on the economic developments of colonial 
rule rather than transform them - independent Malaya's economy continued to 
depend heavily on the export of tin and rubber. There appeared to be no 
conflict of interest between the independent state's economic 
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growth policies and metropole economies which were the main importers of 
Malaysia's primary commodities. In -fact, any conscious plan to introduce 
radical reforms in the economic and social 'structures was, absent from the 
independent state's agenda. 
The growing social inequalities posed peculiar problems because they were 
perceived along inter-ethnic lines; a perception sanctioned by the state's 
communal-based political and social ideology. The independent state inherited 
the colonial economic structure almost intact, but tried to placate inter-ethnic 
inequalities by emphasising on rural development and therefore ascending 
Malay aspiration. 
Nevertheless, within the framework of social security further problems could 
arise. Since the Malays are economically backward their saving capacity would 
be low and therefore they would not be able to make private social protection 
provisions. Would it be justified if the state adopts policies that mitigate the 
position of the Malays? Or should there be a general income protection scheme 
that cuts across ethnic lines? Whatever is the choice, certainly there is a need 
for a more equitable distribution of resources in order to ameliorate inter- 
ethnic inequalities, and this precisely the objectives of the New Economic 
Policy, which will be elaborated further in Chapter Nine. 
Suppressed inter-ethnic resentments could not be contained forever. The 
Malays resented Chinese domination of commerce and trade which gave the 
latter economic advantage over all ethnic groups. On the other hand, the 
Chinese resentment was directed against Malay domination in the political 
formation. 
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Tensions caused by inequalities and ethnic resentments exploded in a post- 
general elections race riots of 13 May, 1969. Subsequently, this date became a 
watershed in the history of state economic and social policies; and the state 




DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 1971 - 1990 
INTRODUCTIO 
Chapter Four presented a review of some of the salient features of the post- 
independent Malaysian economic development strategies up to the year 1970. It was 
noted that despite the emphasis on rural development. during the period 1956 to 
1970, there were explicit signs of increasing social inequalities, perceived along 
inter-ethnic lines. These inequalities could .- be perceived as socio-political 
consequences of an economy divided along ethnic lines, originally laid down by the 
colonial administration and wholly inherited by the independent government. 
One major outcome of the ethnic riots of May 1969 was the re-evaluation, of 
national economic and social policies. The state believed that poverty of the rural 
Malays could be ameliorated by increasing their participation in the modem 
economic sector. Precisely because of this belief the state launched the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), embodied in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975), and 
elaborated in the Outline Perspective Plan for the period 1971-1990 in the Mid- 
Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan. Therefore the New Economic Policy 
needs to be reviewed to find whether it was likely to lead to some reduction of both 
urban-rural inequality and, more generally, poverty. 
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THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 1971-90 -ýI 
The avowed aims of the NEP are: 
"i) to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and 
increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race; - 
ii) to accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society, to correct economic 
imbalance so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with 
economic function" (2MP, p 1) 
This process involves the modemisation of rural life, a rapid and balanced growth 
of urban activities and the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial 
community, so that Malays will become full partners in all aspects of the economic 
life of the nation'. The NEP is furthered designed with certain elements thought to 
ensure the creation of "a socio-economic- environment in which individual 
Malaysians find self-fulfilment within a, system which provides for proportional 
participation, management and control in the economic life of the nation" (3MP, p 
9). For the first time, development objectives other than the growth rate of the 
economy were specified and quantified, with 1970 taken as the base year. Also for 
the first time, income inequalities were defined in terms of mean monthly household 
income and were classified further by ethnic groups and by rural and urban 
averages, as well as according to the occupational categories and educational levels 
of heads of households (3MP, pp 162; 163; 180). 
1. For a full discussion on the aims of the NEP, see Second Malaysia Plan, 1971- 
1975, pp 43-48. 
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Inherent in, the NEP is the notion of economic growth and the filter-down theory 
that was popular in the 1960s and early 1970s, and which had been proved to be a 
failure in several cases2., - Economic growth in developing economies benefit more 
prosperous areas and better-off people while the backward areas and the poorer 
sections, of the'economy are left out almost completely. Furthermore, even if 
purchasing power increases, needs and perhaps tastes -may also increase, thus 
rescinding the effects of increases in income. hI 1ý ýI. 
,f 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1971 
The state's expanded'role in the economy also resulted in a rapid growth of public 
expenditure. During, the Fourth Malaysia Plan period (1981-1985) development 
expenditure increased three times in absolute terms compared with that of the Third 
Malaysia Plan period (1976-80) and eight times compared with that of the Second 
Malaysia Plan period (1971-75) (5MP, p 13). In 1970 public investment formed 
only 5.7 percent of the GDP, but in 1980 the figure had increased to 8.8 percent 
and further increased to 14.9 percent in 1985 (4MP; p 17; 5MP, p 66). - ' 
Agricultural and rural development continue to command the highest of the 
development expenditure allocations by sectors; for example, 17 percent of the total 
allocation for the Fifth Malaysia Plan period (5MP, - p 241), in view of the necessity 
to intensify the programmes on land development, integrated agricultural 
development projects as well as drainage and irrigation. 
2. For an extended discussion on this topic refer to Haq (1976) and Dantwala 
(1973). But also see Newman and Thompson (1989), whose analysis of 46 
developing countries suggqt that the "trickle-up" hypothesis, as advanced by some 
proponents of the basic needs approach, is more consistent with the empirical data 
on the relationship between economic growth and social development. 
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Subsequent to the implementation of the NEP in 1971 structural changes occurred in 
the economy. Table 5.1 shows GDP by expenditure category. Between 1971 to 
1980 the GDP grew at a rate of 7.8 percent per annum, while between 1981 to 1985 
it grew by 5.8 percent, compared with 6.3 percent in the 1960s. Underlying the fall 
in average growth in the early 1980s was a deceleration in the expansion of the 
economy from 7.9 percent in 1980 to 5.6 percent in 1982 and a slight recovery to 
6.3 percent in 1983. Growth expanded further at 7.6 percent in 1984 but dipped to 
2.8 percent in 1985, mainly due to the decline in the manufacturing and mining 
output (5MP, p 39). Overall the Malaysian record'of growth in the last thirty years 
has been rather impressive. 
Between 1970 and 1980 real per capita income increased by 4.9 percent per annum 
(4MP, p 25). However, average increases in the Consumer Price Index were 
higher, at 5.8 percent per annum during 1971-79 (4MP, p 28) and 4.6 percent per 
annum between 1980-85 (5MP, p 51). 
The structure of exports continued to register changes. The share of exports of 
goods and services in the GNP. increased from 45 percent in 1970 to 62 percent in 
1980 (TER 1981/82, p xi) and 59 percent in 1985 (TER 1988/89, p xi). 
Agricultural exports continued to account for a large share of total commodity 
exports, but declined as a proportion of gross exports from 52 percent in 1970 to 
35.8 percent in 1980 and 19.3 percent in 1985 (2MP, p 19; 5MP, p 49). 
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Table 5.1 
QDP by exl&nditure category. 1970-1985 
Share of GNP Average annual 
Item in current prices rate of growth 
M 
1970 1980 1984 1971-80 1981-85 
Consumption 77.8 71.1 69.0 8.4 7.0 
Investment 17.3 31.0 34.2 12.2 8.1 
Exports 45.1 62.3 58.2 7.6 6.9 
Imports 40.4,, 59.2 
- 
56.0 9.8 6.0 
GDP in 
market 
Drices 103 104 107 7.8 7.9 A 
GNP in 
market 
prices 100 , 
100 100 7.8,7.1, 
Sources: Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-85, p. 1711 
Tab. 2-2; 
Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-90, 
Tab. 2-2, p. 46; 
(adapted). 
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The commodity component of merchandise exports had changed considerably since 
the 1960s. The share of rubber and tin continued to decline from 53 percent in 1970 
to 26 percent in 1980 (4MP, pp 47-48). Meanwhile, the volume of exports 
expanded rapidly so much that by 1980 it formed 25.3 percent of total value of 
commodity exports, and its share in 1985 was 23.4 percent (ibid. ). The share of 
manufactured products rose from 7 percent in 1970 to 21 percent in 1980 and 32 
percent in 1985 (2MP, p 19; 5MP, p 49). This rapid growth in manufactured 
exports is largely due to the establishment of export-processing zones in the 1970s. 
Significant structural changes also took place within the sectors in the economy 
during the period 1970 to 1985. As shown in Table 5.2, the share of agriculture in 
the GDP dropped from 31 percent in 1970 to 22 percent in 1980 and declined 
further to 20 percent in 1985; it was no longer the largest sector of the economy. 
Conversely, the manufacturing sector increased its share, in the GDP from 13 
percent in 1970 to 21 percent in 1980 and 19 percent in 1985. The, share of the 
government sector in the GDP increased slightly ftom 11 percent in 1970 to 13 
percent in 1980 and 12.3 percent in 1985. 
On the whole, the overall growth rate of the GDP (in real terms) averaged at 7 
percent per annum during the period 1971 to 1985 (5MP, p 11). For the overall 
period between 1971 and 1990 the real rate of growth of the GDP was estimated at 
6.4 percent per annum3. 
3. Personal communicaton. with an officer of the Economic Planning Unit, 1990. 
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Table 5.2 
GDP by Sector of Origin 











fishing 30.8 22.2 20.4 4.3 3.4 
Mining & ! 
quarrying 6.3 4.6 10.3 4.6 6.0 
Manufacturing 13.4 20.5 19.3 12.5 4.9 
Construction 3.9 4.5 5.3 9.6 8.1 
Electricity, gas , 
& water 1.9 2.3 1.8ý 10.0 9.1, 
Transport, storage 
& communications 4.7 6.5 6.6 11.3 8.4 
Wholesale & 
retail trade 13.3, 12.6- 12.9 7.3 7.0 
Finance services 8.4 8.2 8.9 7.6 7.2 
Government 
services 11.1 13.2 12.3 9.5 9.8 
Other services 2.5 215 2.2 7.9 5.1 
Sources: Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-85, Table. 2-1, 
p. 11 (adapted); 
Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-90 Table 2-1, 
p. 40 (adapted). -4 
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Yet, global economic cycles have a significant impact on the Malaysian domestic 
economy. - Economic - slow-down in industrial countries would resultin restrained 
external trade for Malaysia, which in turn would result in increased imbalances in 
external payments. ' The world economic recession of 1985-86 and the subsequent 
overall collapse in commodity prices resulted in a sharp decline in the actual rate of 
overall income, which in turn led to a stagnation in domestic activities (R5MP, p 
13). For example, in 1984, when the external economy was at its peak, the real rate 
of growth of the GDP was 7.8 percent (the corresponding rate for OECD countries 
was 4.9 percent); but in 1985 the rate, was -1 percent (3.2 percent for the OECD 
countries) (R5MP, Chart 2-1, p 13). Thus, because Malaysia is largely dependent 
on exports of primary commodities to the centre economies, fluctuating prices and 
therefore unstable incomes would make it'a difficult-task for the state to allocate 
funds with the objective of building up reserves for a social protection programme. , 
THE EMERGENCE OF STATE4 CAPITALISM -, - -1 ,cý", 
During the colonial period the'administration's main role was the provision of a 
stable monetary and political framework within which, firms and individuals could 
pursue their businesses, plus an adequate network of essential physical infrastructure 
to serve the economic expansion of colonial firms. Upon gaining political 
independence in 1957, the state played a more active role in the development of 
agriculture and physical infrastructure in the rural areas, as well as expanding 
social services like health and education for the whole population. 
In contrast, since 197 1, following the inception -of the NEP, the state explicitly 
sought an active role in the modem sector, with the aim of promoting the 
participation of Malays in this sector. Subsequently the state laid an increased 
4. For a definition of the "state", please refer to chapter One, footnote 1, p. 3. 
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emphasis on commerce and industry. Public development expenditure allocated to 
commerce and industry increased from $1658.6 million in the Second Malaysia Plan 
period (1971-1975) to a peak of $5433 million in the Fourth Malaysia Plan period 
(1981-1985) and $3238.7 million in the Fifth Malaysia Plan period (1986-1990) 
(4MP, Table 6-2, p 120; 4MP, App. A; 5MP, App. A). As a result, value added in 
real terms in commerce only grew from $1633 million in 1970 to $3295 million in 
1980, while employment in the same sector increased from 371,100 in 1970 to 
648,500 in 1980 (4MP, - p 303). The state itself participates more directly in the 
establishment and the operation of a wide range of productive enterprises, either 
wholly or in joint-ventures with the private sector. 
The years following, the inception of the NEP saw "a rapid expansion of 
Government-owned corporations and trust agencies set up to accelerate the process 
of the restructuring of society" (5MP, p 13). Such enterprises would be held in trust 
for Malays until such time that they are able to purchase them from the state. The 
kind of enterprises are those in the manufacturing, finance, real estate and mining 
industries. In a study on public enterprises in Malaysia, Gale (1981, chapter 2) drew 
attention to the unique place of public enterprises in the Malaysian government's 
bold attempt to restructure the economic and social patterns of the society so as to 
achieve a more equitable racial balance in the employment pattern, and --the 
ownership of wealth. What emerged out of this bold exercise is a patrimonial 
system of government, which resembles the traditional indigenous Malay political 
system. 
Tbeoretically the NEP justified state intervention in the area of capital restructuring. 
Nevertheless the manner in which the state penetrates into the capitalist economy is 
highly controversial. In order to expand its share in the economy and have virtual 
control over national production forces, the state initially acquired majority shares 
in the plantation and mining sectors, later in the financial sector; and by forcing 
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companies to restructure their equity to comply with NEP requirements. On the 
other hand, some interpret this development as favouring the larger, and 
subsequently multinational, corporations. 
The decade from 1971 to 1980 saw a rapid expansion of new state enterprises5, 
many in joint-venture with transnational corporations, especially in, the industrial 
sec I tor. Thus in the 1970s and 1980s state agencies became the leading investors in 
the private sector. At the end of 1985, for example, the state's participation in the 
various public sector companies and agencies incurred approximately $21 billion of 
which $7.8 billion was in the form of equity, $3 billion in the form of loans and the 
balance of $10.2 billion in contingent liabilities (Finance Minister's Budget Speech, 
October, 1986) - creating what Mehmet terms as "industrial restructuring by 
trusteeship" (Mehmet, 1986, -, chapter 4), through , specially-created - Bumiputra 
companies-, such as Pernas, PNB, UDA and State Economic Development 
Corporations, , often in joint-ventures with other investors, both foreign and 
domestic., 
Still, 'several questions could be posed in relation, to the performance of these 
companies. In 1988 of a total of 1133 government companies, 286 or 25 percent 
were inactive. Of the active companies, only 387 companies recorded accumulated 
profits totalling, $4,868 million while another 383 companies sustained losses 
amounting to $5,610 million (TER, 1988/89, p. 96). 
5. In 1951 there were only 10 public agencies compared with 701 state agencies in 
1979. In 1986 state agencies held equity in 822 companies, giving the state control 
of 60 percent of the tin mining sector, 77 percent of the combined capital of 21 
Malaysian banks, 60 percent of planted acreage and virtual control of the petroleum 
sector. (Halim, 1990, fn 26, p 85). 
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THE LABOUR MARKET 
So far the discussion has presented a brief documentation of the structural changes 
that took place in the economy since the inception of the NEP in 1971. In the 
following section the aim is to review whether structural changes in the economy 
have effected changes in the labour market, because any programme of income 
maintenance and social security has to consider the labour market conditions which 
exist in the economy. 
EMPLOYMENT TREND 
Structural changes in the economy were accompanied by substantial growth and 
structural changes in employment. Table 5.3 and Figure 5.1 display the trends in 
employment growth in different sectors for the period 1965 to 1985. Diversification 
in the economy has meant a decline in the role of agriculture as the major sector of 
employment. In 1965 over half the total labour force was engaged in agriculture but 
in 1985 the proportion had decreased to slightly more than a third. On the other 
hand the secondary and tertiary sectors continue to absorb increasing proportions of 
the labour force The secondary sector increased its share of the total labour force 
from 18.9 percent in 1965 to 28.7 percent in 1985; while the tertiary sector's share 
increased from 29 percent to 35.6 percent during the same period. In the decade 
1971-80 the manufacturing sector recorded the highest rate of employment growth 
of 7.6 percent per annum, compared to 6 percent per annum in the government 
sector and only 1.9 percent per annum in the agricultural sector (4MP, p 82), and 
by 1987 the manufacturing sector, with a share of 22.5 percent of the GDP became 
the leading sector of the economy (TER, 1988/89, p 57). 
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Table 5.3 
Ubour Force Estimates: 1965-1985 
Year 
percentage of labour force 
in 
Agriculture Industries Services 
1965 52.1 18.9 29.0 
1970 50.3 20.2 29.5 
1975 46.2 21.9 31.9 
1980 39.7 27.7 32.6 
1985 35.7 28.7 35.6 
Sources: Second Malaysia Plan, Tab. 7-1, p. 98; 
Third Malaysia Plan, Tab. 4-14, pp. 78-79; 


















































So far the state has depended on the private sector for the generation of 
employment. Rapid employment creation has been achieved primarily through the 
expansion of the secondary and tertiary sectors, particularly in the labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries, and the growth of ancillary linkages. For example, the 
manufacturing sector generated the largest number of jobs between 1971-80, 
totalling to 416,600 jobs, equivalent to 25 percent of the total new employment 
created during the'same period (4MP, p 82), therefore indicating the existence of a 
substantial manufacturing workforce. Besides, during 1973 to 1978 employment in 
the electrical and electronics industries increased at an average rate of 22 percent 
(4MP, p 83). Employment growth in the electrical and electronics industries is a 
direct outcome of Malaysia's open-door policy towards transnational corporations 
who locate their factories in Malaysia due to the abundance of cheap labour plus 
fiscal incentives and a good network of physical infrastructure provided by the state. 
Within the electronics industry, semi-conductor companies accounted for 82.3 
percent of the total output in 1976,82.6 percent in 1980 and 84.2 percent in, 1984; 
while between 1976 to 1980 the semi-conductor industry had grown from $518.3 
million to $1714'million, a growth of 230 percent. In 1982 there were 68450 
electronics workers in Malaysia, earning a total remuneration of $333 million 
(Rasiah, 1988, pp 28-29). 
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Additionally, the 1970s saw an increase in the employment of female workers6 
largely due to transnational. corporations locating their factories in Malaysia, and 
because these corporations were able, and wanted, to employ low-paid employees, 
as a means of enhancing profits and controlling manufacturing wage 11 earners. By 
1980, of 1.5 million experienced women workers, 49 percent were in the primary 
sector, 32 percent in the tertiary sector and 17 jiiýent in the manufacturing industry 
(Chia, 1987, p 177). 
Figure 5.2 shows the trends in absolute employment growth between 1965 and 
1985. In 1965 there were 2.7 million employed in Peninsula Malaysia. In 
subsequent years the number of jobs had increased to 3.4 million 
in 1970 and to a further 5.46 million in 1985 (2MP, p 96; 4MP, p 81; 5MP, p 
138). On the whole the period 1971-75 registered the highest rate of employment 
growth of 3.9 percent (3MP, p 140), reflecting an emphasis on the creation of new 
jobs under the NEP. Still, as shown in Figure 5.3, since 1976 the annual 
employment growth rate appears to be declining particularly for the period 1981 to 
1985, thus reflecting Malaysia's vulnerability to the world economic recession. 
Precisely because one of the aims of the NEP is to restructure society, it is 
appropriate to comment on the ethnic composition of the labour force. In chapter 
Three it was pointed out that in the colonial period there existed a systematic policy 
of discrimination against the Malay peasantry, which resulted in an economy 
segmented by ethnic groups. Hence the composition of the Malaysian labour market 
does not display an ethnically integrated characteristic. 
6. The topic of female employment in transnational firms shall be discussed further 
in Chapter 10. 
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Figure 5.2 
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year 
Sources: 2MP, p. 96; 4MP. T. 4-6, p. 81; 
51AP, T. 4-6, p. 138 (adapted). 
Figure 5.3 
Annual Peninsula Malaysia: Average 
Employment Growth Rates, 1966-1985 







1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 
perlod 
Sources: 2MP, P-96; 3MP, p. 140; 
5MP, p. 137; R5MP, T. 4-2, p. 87 
(adapted). 
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Conversely, the labour market is segmented into different parts by sectors and 
ethnic groups. Yet, structural changes in the economy and changing trends in the 
labour force since the inception of the NEP in 1971 have not altered existing 
patterns in the ethnic composition of the labour force. As shown in Table 5.4 the 
Malays distinctly form a greater proportion of the agricultural'labour force, while 
the Chinese still dominate the secondary sector. The larger proportion of Malays in 
the tertiary sector is the result of expansion in the government services and the 
absorption of the Malay labour force in the government administration. 
Tberefore, the fact that existing patterns of labour force participation are not altered 
totally reflects the somewhat limited structural changes inherent in the state's 
restructuring of employment policies. 
UNEMPLOYMENT PROM 
Unemployment in Peninsula Malaysia is basically a structural problem, caused 
partly by rapid expansion of the working age population, which results in an 
increasing unemployment rate since 1980, as illustrated in Figure 5.4. Besides, 
unemployment is also caused by rigidities in the labour market. High labour costs 
resulted in industries adopting a more capital-intensive approach to their operations 
(FER 1988/89, p 153). 
For instance the labour force increased at a rate of 3.9 percent per annum for 1971- 
80, while the growth rate for 1980-85 was only 3 percent per annum, and for 1985- 
90 it was expected to decrease further to 2.8 percent per annum (4MP, p 80; 5MP, 
pp 136,141). As is common in other developing countries the majority of 
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Table 5.4 
Ethnic Compgsition of the Labour Force. 1965-1985 
(in percentages) 
Year/sector Malay Chinese Indian Others 
1970 
Primary 67.6 21.4 10.1 0.9 
Secondary 30.8 59.5 9.2 0.5 
Tertiary 39.7 48.3 12.6 1.2 
Total % of 
labour force 51.5 36.6 11.1 0.8 
1975 
Primary 67.3 20.7 11.1 0.9 
Secondary 36.5 53.3 9.8 0.4 
Tertiary 42.3 47.3 9.5 0.9 
Total % of 
labour force 52.2 36.2 10.8 0.8 
1980 
Primary 66.3 19.9 13.0 0.9 
Secondary 39.8 51.1 8.5 0.6 
Tertiary 47.0 41.6 10.5 0.9 
Total % of 
labour force 51.9 36.5 10.8 0.8 
1985 
Primary 73.2 16.3 9.6 0.9 
Secondary 44.3 46.1 8.8 "0.8 
Tertiary 50.1 40.3 8.7 0.9 
Total % of 
labour force 57.4 32.6 9.2 0.8 
Sources: Third Malaysia Plan, Tab. 4-14, pp. 78-79; 
Fourth Malaysia Plan, Tab. 9-5, p. 174; 
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Sources: 2MP, p. 99; 3MP. Tab. 4-14, 
pp. 78-79. R5MP. Tab. 4-2, p. 87. 
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Year 
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the unemployed are within the 15 to 24 age group, thus reflecting the youthfulness 
of the unemployed; a large number of them, are new - entrants to the labour force. 
Furthermore, a greater proportion of the unemployed youth had formal education up 
to secondary school level, or equivalent to eleven years of schooling. Thus there is 
a high incidence of unemployment of 20 percent for this age group, compared to 
unemployment rates of 5 percent for those with no formal education and 9 percent 
for those who completed not more than six years of elementary schooling (4MP, p 
80). 
Overall the unemployment rate for females is one and a half times higher than that 
of males (4MP, p 78), and that the incidence of unemployment is greater amongst 
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females with some nine to eleven years of schooling (SMP, p 140). The question of 
female unemployment has serious -implications on any comprehensive income 
protection scheme, and if present trends are allowed to continue it might lead to 
problems of poverty amongst females in later years. 
The Fourth Malaysia Plan (p 78) drew attention to the fact that unemployment rates 
appear to be higher in urban'areas where labour markets are more formalised than 
in rural areas. Unfortunately the unemployment rates for both urban and rural areas 
were not specified in the document. In reality, urban unemployment is generated in 
the rural areas, where Malays predominate and whose rate of population growth is 
higher than those of Chinese and Indians, plus an increasing movement of Malays 
into the urban areas7. 
WAGES 
Precisely because the ultimate purpose of economic development is the 
improvement of the general standard of living, then an increase in real income and 
wages parallel to the increase in productivity should be regarded as a direct means 
of achieving this purpose. Accordingly, - this section will present a cursory 
discussion, cursory because of data deficiencies, -on wage trends that had occurred 
since 1963., 
In a study on wage trends in the manufacturing sector, Hassan and Jomo (1980) 
7. During the period 1981-85 the Malay population grew at an average rate of 2.9 
percent, compared to 1.7 percent for Chinese and 2.1 percent for Indians (5MP, p 
128) Due to rural-urban migration the Malay urban population of Peninsula 
Malaysia increased substantially, raising its proportion from 37.4 percent in 1980 to 
41.3 percent in 1985 (5MP, p 132). 
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distinguished two patterns of average monthly real wage trends for the period 1963 
to 1973. Between 1963 to 1968, corresponding to the mature period of the import- 
substitution programme, average real wages increased for both factory and non- 
factory employees. Average real wages for factory workers (as expressed in'1968 
prices) increased from $125 in 1963 to $132 in 1968, while wages for non-factory 
employees increased from $305 to $346 during the same period. On the contrary, 
for the period between 1968 to 1973, corresponding to the initial stage of the 
export-promotion industrialisation policy, there was a decline in average real wages. 
Average real wages for factory, workers declined'from, $132 in 1968 to $111 in 
1973 (in 1968 prices), while average wages for non-factory workers declined from 
$346 to $336 during the same period. On the whole, average real wages (in 1968 
prices) in the manufacturing sector increased from $161 in 1963 to $176 in 1968, 
but declined from $176 in 1968 to $152 in 1973. 
From 1973 to, 1975 real wages for all workers in the manufacturing sector remained 
more or less constant, after which they began to increase significantly at 5.2 percent 
between, 1978 and 4979. Overall, for the period,, 1973 -79 real-wages rose at an 
average annual rate of 2.6 percent (4MP, p 86). 
In general, there has been a tendency for real wages to keep ahead of labour 
productivity thereby causing, an increase in wage costs (TER, 1988/89, p 155). 
When increases in real wages far exceed increases in productivity, the consequences 
is an increase in labour costs, causing industries to find measures of cutting labour 
costs .- according to orthodox neo-classical theories, and therefore causing 
unemployment. 
During the period -1981 to 1985, with labour productivity at'around 3 percent per 
annum each for the agriculture and the' manufacturing sectors and 3.2 percent per 
annurn in the services sector, most sectors of the economy experienced wage 
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increases, with the exception of rubber tappers on the rubber plantations (5MP, p 
140). Monthly earnings of oil palm harvesters, for example, increased from $344 in 
1980 to $421 in 1984, due to increases in the price of palm oil. Conversely, 
monthly earnings of rubber tappers declined from $259 in 1980 to $316 in 1985, 
due largely to lower rubber prices (ibid. ). These two examples clearly illustrate how 
wages in the primary sector are affected by external factors such as world demand 
for primary produce. 
Overall wages in the primary sector have tended. to lag behind increases in the 
secondary sector and despite some government attempts to steer resources to the 
rural areas - partly accounting for deepening inequality between rural and urban 
economies and some of the problems of Malays (who are to be found 
disproportionately in these areas). 
Meanwhile, in the electronics industry monthly earnings of female production 
workers rose from $222 in 1980 to $517 in 1985 (ibid). Still, on the whole, in the 
manufacturing sector, wage differentials exist for workers who perform similar jobs 
in different industries, and between males and females in similar occupations. 
Moreover, wages tend to be higher in more developed areas where the labour 
market is more competitive compared to less developed areas. Limqueco, et. al. 
(1989, p 63) revealed that the best wages were available in Kuala Lumpur, around 
the sites with modem technology, compared with industries located in Penang. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 5.5, income differences between men and women 
are more marked in Penang compared with Kuala Lumpur. The average income of 
women in Penang was only 58 percent that of men, while in Kuala Lumpur the 
proportion was 74 percent. These wage differentials between men and women bear 
implications on the status of female employment. It implies that they are treated as 
second-class workers, an issue that will be examined further in Chapter 10. 
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Table 5.5 
Monthly Income of the Industrial Labour Force, 
in Penang and Kuala LumpUr 






0-200 17 64 
201-350 42 33 
351 and over 41 3 
Kuala Lumpur 
0-300 30 70 
It AIr A^ r 11 ON A jvI-jvv ji 
501 and over 19 
Source: Limqueco, McFarlane & Odhnoff (1989), 
Table 4.10, p. 184. 
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Viewed from an alternative angle, wage trends in Malaysia reflect the role of the 
state as mediator between labour and capital. Eversince the colonial days, Malaysia 
has a tradition of suppressing militant trade unions while the development of passive 
and officially-approved ones are nurtured by the state8. - The Industrial Relations Act 
of 1967, later amended in 1971, restricts procedures for collective bargaining and 
settlement of industrial disputes, and that management has the right not to negotiate 
on issues such as those concerning dismissals and transfers. Union officials are 
barred from being office-bearers in political parties and unions are prevented from 
maintaining political funds. Furthermore, the Act restricted the range of issues over 
which trade unions can launch a strike, while the power of management are 
strengthened - for example management need not disclose reasons for the dismissal 
of workers. At the same time the Registrar of Trade Unions are given the power to 
curb the formation of new, non-affiliated unions (hua, 1983, pp 165; 191). 
Malaysia does not have a minimum wage legislation. Besides, prospective investors 
are assured by the state against any excessive and unreasonable demands from 
unions (FIDA, 1975, pp 13-14). Clearly this is one main reason why transnational 
corporations readily locate their subsidiary factories in the country. Capital 
accumulation is closely safeguarded by the state. 
8. As an "ample , in 1948, when trade union militancy reached its peak, many unions were deregistered, resulting in a reduction of trade union membership to a 
third of what it was at the beginning of the year (Edwards, 1975, App. 4). In 1949 
the colonial administration passed the Trade Disputes Ordinance, severely 
restricting the right of workers to strike, while the subsequent Employment 
Ordinance of 1955 provided for dismissal on such subjective grounds as 
misconduct. Between 1956-57 forty five militant anti-colonial trade unions were deregistered by the departing colonial regime (Hassan & Jomo, 1980, p 6). 
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The fact that the state is partial towards capital in its role as mediator of capital- 
labour relations indirectly has an impact on both the demand as well as provision 
and delivery of occupational social services, Including Income maintenance and 
social security. Precisely because trade unions, more often than not, -are prevented 
from maldng representations on behalf of their members, - employers therefore could 
get away by providing only minimal health and welfare services, - although these 
fringe benefits are sometimes highlighted in their recruitment programmes. 
Transnational corporations,, for example, give so much emphasis to welfare services 
and benefits9 they have to offer when" recruiting new, employees. More often the 
provision of health and welfare services are seen as integral to the process of labour 
control, and that industrial firms provide these services not only as a response to the 
local structural conditions but also to strengthen capital (Lin, 1986, p 458). 'Hence 
health and welfare programmes provided are -- those which are essential in 
maintaining the labour force and minimum ill-health among the workers,, i. e. two 
conditions which are necessary for the exploitation of labour. 
OWNERRSHIPAND CONTROL OF THE CORPORATE SECTOR 
In addition to the problems of ethnic differentiation in employment patterns leading 
to an unequal distribution of income, a related problem is the distribution of wealth 
and control over the corporate sector. ' ý, -, Iiý .- o-,, -. I 
9. Transnational. companies usually , provide 
benefits like an annual bonus equivalent 
to one month's wages, health care, free transportation, subsidised accommodation, 
recreational and sports facilities and social activities, such as annual dinners and 
fashion contests (see Lin, 1986, pp 456-457). 
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Table 5.6 shows a breakdown of the corporate sector between 1971 to 1985. The 
data reveals that in 1971 a phenomenal proportion (62 percent) of the corporate 
sector was controlled by foreign interests. Likewise, non-Malay Malaysians hold 
substantial. holdings amounting to 34 percent in 1971. On the contrary, the Malays 
controlled a mere 4.3 percent of the corporate sector (valued at $6564.1 million in 
1971), which was distinctly incongruous to the proportion of Malays in the 
population. The fact that Malays do not control the corporate sector somewhat 
negates their dominance in state and political'matters. 
Under the "restructuring of society" objective of the NEP, the growth of Malay 
control in the corporate sector, at 17.8 percent in 1985, appears to be somewhat 
pedetentous, reflecting that the state is avoiding a radical change in the structure of 
corporate ownership. Although foreign corporate interests appear to have declined 
since 1980, one possible explanation is that ownership of foreign shares have been 
transferred over to other Malaysian residents, whose share of the corporate sector 
has risen from 34 percent in 1971 to 56.7 percent in 1985, rather than to the 
Malays. 
TRENDS IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION 1970 - 1987 
Given that economic development under the NEP has reduced the incidence of 
poverty from 49.3 percent in 1970 to 17.3 percent in 1987 (5MP, p 85; R5MP, p 
47), one could therefore pose the following questions: What are the distributional 
consequences of the development strategy adopted so far? To what extent has the 
NEP altered the patterns of income inequalities since 19717 Hence in this section 
the purpose is to analyse the current trends in the household distribution of income 
in Peninsula Malaysia between 1971 to 1987. It should be noted, however, that the 
analysis is limited to data obtained through secondary sources; and given that this 
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Table 5.6 
Ownership of the Corwrate Sector. - 
1971-1980 (in Rgrýentageaj 
1971 1980 1985 
Malay 4.3 12.5 17.8 
Other 
Malqsians 34.0 44.6 56.7 
Foreigner 61.7 42.9 25.5 
Total 
($ million) $6564.1 $32420.4 $761120. 
Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-85, Table 3-14, 
p. 107; ', 
Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-90, Table 3-8) 
p. 107; [adapted]. 
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6- 
study adopts a macro-economic perspective, the analysis will somewhat concise in 
nature. 
Available evidence after the year 1970 portrays a continued existence of income 
inequalities. Table 5.7 shows the skewed nature of the size distribution of household 
income according to different income groups for selected years between 1970 and 
1987. 
The Lorenz curve, which is illustrated in Figure 5.5 reveals there may have been a 
slight decrease in overall inequalities. While the shift is not significant it does 
indicate that at least the direction of change in income distribution is not towards 
increasing inequalities. Of course, this will partly depend on the extent to which the 
measure of income has remained both reliable and representative, especially of the 
extremes in the distribution, during the period in question. 
What is clear from the data, however, is that the middle 40 percent of households 
have gained relatively more than the bottom 40 percent. The income share of the 
former income group increased by 2.5 percentage points while the share of the latter 
group increased by only 2.2 percentage points. As in many other countries with 
both agricultural workers and migrants in considerable numbers in the population 




Size Distribution of Household Income. 1970-1987 
Cin pgreentagesj 
Household Groups 1970 1984 1987 
Top 20% 55.9 53.2 51.2 
Middle 40% 32.5 34.0 35.0 
Bottom 4076 12.8 13.8 
Sources: 
1. Jomo & Shari (1981) p. 215, Table 1; 
Review of Fifth Malaysia Plan, p. 38, Table 3.1; 
[adapted]. 
Figure 5.5 
Peninsula malaysla: The Lorenz Curve of 
the Size Distribution of Household 
Income, 1970,1984.1987. 
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Source: as In Table 5.7 
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Table 5.8 and the accompanying Figure 5.6 show the pattern of size income 
distribution in rural and urban areas for the period from 1970 to 1987. Although 
inequality appears to be higher in urban areas, the data, however, show a wide 
disparity between the income of rural and urban households. In 1970 the mean 
monthly household income of rural households was 46.7 percent that Of urban 
households, while the median monthly household income. in the rural areas was 
slightly over half of that of urban households. By 1987 some improvements have 
been made, the corresponding proportions were 58 percent and two-thirds 
respectively. Again, World Bank and other studies raise difficulties about the 
interpretation of such differences. The evidence suggests that while the rural/urban 
difference is real, it is smaller in extent than the cash-related measures of income 
suggest - because of the part played in household and family affairs by home 
production or income in kind. Also, differences in consumption patterns and prices 
between urban and rural areas could mean that the same level of household income 
would yield significantly different levels of living. 
Table 5.9 and the accompanying Figure 5.7 seek to show the mean and median 
monthly household income and its change over time for the major ethnic groups in 
Peninsula Malaysia for the period between 1970 to 1987. In general between 1971 
to 1979 the mean and median household incomes of all ethnic groups showed 
favourable growth rates of more than 10 percent per annurn in each case. On the 
contrary, between 1984 and 1987 the mean and median household incomes of all 
ethnic groups showed negative or negligible growth rates, clearly reflecting that the 
economy was in the slump. Compared with Chinese and Indian households, Malay 
households - being largely agricultural and rural, therefore were more easily 
affected by decreases in prices of commodities - received the lowest income. 
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Table 5.8 
Size Distribution of Household Income by Rural and Urban Stratum. 1970-1987 (in 
percentagesl 
1970 1984 1987 
Household Group Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Top 20% 51.0 55.5 49.5 52.1 48.3 50.8 
Middle 40% 35.9 32.8 36.4 34.5 36.7 35.0 
Bottom 40% 13.1 12.1 14.1 13.4 14.2 14.2 
Mean Monthly 
Household 200 428 824 1541 853 1467 
Income ($) (n. a. ) n. a. (596) (1114) (604 1039) 
Median Monthly 
Household 139 265 596 1027 629 1004 
Income (m$) (n. a. ) (n. a. ) (431) (743) (445) (711) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are in constant 1978 prices. 
Sources: Jorno & Shari (1981), Table 1, p. 215 
4MP, Table 3-9, p. 56. 
R5MP, Table 3-1 p. 38; Table 3-2, p. 39 
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Figure 5.6 
Peninsula Malaysia: Mean Household Income 
by Rural & Urban Strata, 1970-1984. 
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Sources: 4MP, Tab. 3-9, p. 56; 
5MP, Tab. 3-4, p. 99. 
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1970 1976 1979 1984 
However, inter-ethnic inequalities are not the only issues in income inequalities 
observed in Malaysia. Based on data obtained in the Household Income Surveys for 
the years 1984 and 1987, Table 5.10 shows the distribution of mean monthly 
household income within the three major ethnic groups. Intra-ethnic income 
inequalities appeared to be most evident among Malay households, followed by the 
Chinese and Indian households. In 1987, for example, the mean monthly household 
income of the bottom 40 percent of Malay households was only 14 percent of that 
of the top 20 percent of households in the same ethnic group; while the comparable 
figures for the Chinese and Indian households were 15.3 percent and 17.8 percent 
respectively. 
Available evidence suggests income imbalances in Peninsular Malaysia remained 
wide in the 1980s; although on the basis of the Gini co-efficient, the ratio had 
narrowed from 0.51 in 1970 to 0.48 in 1984 (5MP, p 100), indicating a slight 
improvement in overall income inequalities. Still, compared to patterns of income 
distribution in OECD countries for example, Malaysia shows a high degree of 
inequality. Table 5.11 displays the patterns of income distribution in selected Third 
World countries and the industrial market economies. Certainly income distribution 
is more unequal in developing countries compared with developed countries. 
rn 
This somewhat cursory discussion on the trends of the distribution of house hold 
income between 1970 and 1987 has indicated that the pattern of income inequality 
has altered only marginally during that period. There still exists a wide disparity 
between the income of rural households, where the majority of Malays are located, 
compared with the income of urban households. If left to the market the inequality 
between primary and secondary sectors would grow and therefore the inequality 
between rural and urban would also grow. While intra-ethnic income disparities are 
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but rather it is perceived in ethnic terms, perhaps because of the tolerated and 
officially-approved expressions of social inequalities along ethnic lines. At the same 
time state intervention attempts to narrow the gap between rural (Malay) and the 
urban (Chinese5 strata. Government policies since the 1970s are in fact 
compensating for the worsening of the situation of social inequalities rather than 
improving it. Much therefore depends on scientific, and popular, judgments about 
the adequacy of low income. II 'i 
Nevertheless one ought to have reservations on the definition of income used in 
household surveys, such as the ý Household Income Surveys of 1984 and 1987. 
DaVanzo and Kusnic (1983) suggest that the exact definition of the income concept 
influences the degree of income inequality one is likely to find. Using the criterion 
of cash income is not, as suggested above, adequate. Heads of households do not 
invariably state, nor are they asked to give full details about, income in kind, which 
may be of a considerable amount among farmers and smallholders. Often they are 
people with low cash incomes but possess some assets, like a house, plus income in 
kind, such as agricultural produce, that would raise their standard of living. 
Similarly in the case of households in the upper income brackets, it may be possible 
that fringe benefits from employers, such as rent-free accommodation, could, add 
substantially to their standard-of-living. 
One general point also deserves to be made about trends in the inequality of income. 
Policies which bring about modest percentage redistribution, such as the actual 
changes experienced between 1984 and 1987 (see Table 5.9) can bring substantial 
improvements to the poorest section'of the population. Thus, it is possible to 
recommend measures which might over a period of five years reduce the real 
disposable income of the richest 20 percent by a mere 5 percent, and yet such 
measures could also imply, that the incomes of the bottom 20 percent could be 
increased by 40 to 50 percent. 
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COGNISANCE OF POVERTY. 1971-1987 
In chapter Four the argument contends that economic 
development in the 1960s failed to check the problem of poverty. Although the state 
had emphasised on large-scale agricultural development, such as the resettlement of 
landless farmers in new land schemes, in actual fact vast amount of resources were 
channelled towards a slow-growth sector. On account that the NEP was drawn up 
specifically to eradicate poverty and restructure society, in this section the objective 
is to consider what has happened to poverty since 1971. 
Table 5.12 shows the progress made in the reduction of the incidence of poverty in 
the rural and urban sectors and according to various occupational categories between 
1970 to 1987. On the whole the incidence of poverty has declined from 49.3 
percent in 1970 to 17.3 percent in 1987. Nevertheless, the incidence of poverty is 
greater in the rural sector. In 1970 the incidence of rural poverty was 2.7 times that, 
of the incidence of urban poverty, but by 1987 the ratio had increased to three. 
Rubber smallholders and padi farmers continue to form the majority of the rural 
poor, with poverty rates of 40 percent and 50 percent respectively in 1987. 
In the urban sector, although the incidence of poverty, had decreased from 21 
percent in 1970 to 17.8 percent in 1976, the number of poor households had 
actually increased during the same period, reflecting the impact of rapid rural- 
urban migration during that period. In the mid-1980s the rate of urban poverty 
continued to decline and the number of urban poor households decreased, an 
indication of some progress which coincided with the period of employmen 
expansion in the secondary and tertiary sectors and the decline in employment in the 
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agricultural sector (refer to Table 5.4). Between 1984 and 1987 the incidence of 
urban poverty remained constant at around 8 percent, but the number of urban poor 
households increased by some 1.6 percent from 81,300 in 1984 to 82,600 in 1987, 
indicating that urban workers particularly in the construction, trade and, transport 
industries were badly affected by the economic recession of that period. -- 
On the whole, the analysis so far in this chapter shows that not all the actual 
outcome of development policies since 1971 is consistent with the expectations of 
the NEP. While it is true that'overall income inequality has improved slightly 
between 1971 and 1987 (refer to Figure 5.4), still, the benefits of growth have not 
been equitably shared among different classes of - the population. In general, 
development experiences since 1971 have shown that even though growth has led to 
a general reduction in the incidence of poverty, it has also widened the income 
differences between the different social and occupational groups in the country. 
While absolute poverty declines, relative or income-related poverty increases. It is 
this question of persistent poverty that Will be examined in more detail in the 
following chapters. 
a 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To recapitulate the reader's memory, in Chapter Four some questions which have 
been pertinent to the state of development were posed. In that chapter Seers (1979) 
was quoted: "What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to 
unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? " (Seers, 1979, p 12). 
Additionally Seers (ibid. ) argues that economic growth is a necessary 
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but not sufficient condition for development, in the sense of the satisfaction of 
human needs. Thus, for example, in Malaysia growth has been due to largely 
capital-intensive investments, particularly in the agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors; at the same time unemployment rates have increased, and for that reason 
the poorest class have not benefited as much as they might from the resources 
created. Furthermore, Seers (ibid. ) suggests that the relationship between growth 
and development can vary according to the time perspective adopted and depends on 
where political power lies in the country. In the case of Malaysia, the Malays are 
politically superior, whereas the Chinese are economically superior. As a 
consequent, changes in non-economic or social structures are crucial to the process 
of development in order that equitable economic changes could be effective. 
Thus far our discussion on development in Malaysia since 1971 has centred on the 
handling of the economy, the labour market, the unemployment rates, wage trends, 
patterns of household income distribution, ownership of wealth, and poverty trends 
in rural and urban areas - all of which indirectly determine the scale of demand or 
need for income maintenance and social security. Furthermore, presumably in a 
varied labour market, conditions of different groups encourages separate schemes 
for social security, and therefore a coherent national scheme appears less likely. 
Moreover, due to Malaysia's dependence on the global economy, particularly the 
centre economies, for its export of primary commodities and electronics component 
goods, the economy is affected by world economic booms and recessions - therefore 
with implications on the ability of the state to build up reserve funds for a social 
protection programme. Yet, a basic national social security scheme for the whole 
labour force is not altogether impossible provided there is a strong political 
commitment by the state. 
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Chapter Six 
CONCEPTS OF POVERTY 
INTRODUCTIO 
The economic system in Malaysia is marked by inequalities withiq'itself which 
reflect dominant social values related, to employment and, wealth ownership 
which are in turn related to ethnic enclaves. In such a situation the question of 
the distribution of income and wealth is a crucial one. Chapter Five argues that 
attempts by the state to reduce inequality and alleviate poverty have resulted in 
little vertical redistribution of income and wealth. - 
Social security has a role to play in bringing about greater equality. Since the 
question of income security is directly linked to the issue of poverty, in this 
chapter the purpose is to comprehend the various conceptions of poverty, and 
discuss. some, approaches to measuring poverty. The analysis in this chapter 
will serve as a basis towards the attempt to interpret the problem of poverty in 
Malaysia, which will be the topic of enquiry in chapter Seven. 
CONCEPTS OF POVERTY 
To many people poverty simply means not having enough money to meet their 
needs, normally due to incomes that are low. Poverty as a concept has been 
defined by - several , scholars in different ways. Poverty - has been variously 
equated with subsistence (Rowntree, 1901); inequality (Atkinson, 1975); or the 
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denial of some minimal level of health, housing, food and education 
(Harrington, 1962). Usually the poor are identified as those occupying the 
lowest level of the social pyramid. Katz (1983) refers to the poor as the 
dependent populations. 
According to Rein (1970) poverty may be regarded as subsistence, inequality 
and externality. Subsistence is concerned with the. minimum provision needed. 
to maintain individual health and working capacity, inequality is concerned 
with the relative position of income groups while externality is concemed with 
the social consequences of poverty for the rest of society rather than-with the 
needs of the poor. Thus the poverty line serves "as an index of disutility to the 
community of the persistence of poverty" (Rein, 1970, p 46). 
Atkinson (1985,, p 4) distinguishes between two rather, different conceptions of 
poverty. One is concerned with "standards of living and the other with 
minimum rights to resources". He asserts that firstly "people should attain a 
specified level of consumption" (ibid. ), and additionally "are entitled, as 
citizens, to a minimum income, the disposal of which is entirely up to them" 
(ibid. ). Atkinson's reference to citizenship is deliberate because "entitlement to 
a- minimum income is seen both as a reward for citizenship and as a pre- 
requisite for participation in society" (ibid. ). 
However, Atkinson's conceptualization of poverty poses a number of 
problems. Townsend & Gordon (1989, p 5) suggest that the emphasis upon 
consumption requirements implies the neglect of human need such as customs, 
obligations and participation; while the emphasis on rights implies political 
choice rather than scientific observation and measurement of the objective 
conditions of. social association and participation. The work briefly, reviewed 
certainly calls attention to the variable inclusion and exclusion of different 
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elements of the meaning'of poverty. It is this which will be illustrated in this 
chapter. 
NATIONAL MINIMUM 
The concept of poverty in British social legislation is often bai6d on the notion 
of a "national minimum". How did that arise? It is developed partly out of the 
principle of "less eligibility" as endorsed by the Poor Law Commission of 
1834. In their' Report, the Poor Law'Commissioner's specified that: "The first 
and most essential of all conditions, a principle which we find universally 
admitted, even by those whose practice is at variance with it, is that (the 
pauper's) situation 'on the whole shall not be made really or'apparently so 
eligible as the situation of the independent labourer of the lowest class" (Poor 
Law Report, 1834, quoted in Townsend, 1979, p 923). This is how the idea of 
the minimum" in welfare originated. This level of welfare was conditional 
however (on readiness to work, ' for example). At" this stage governments made 
a big distinction bet%ýeen deserving andundeserving poor. 
'In this'iwihtieth'cenfury the concept of "minimum rights" was the fundamental 
principle in theBeveridge Report of 1942. The notion'of a subsistence level 
was highlighted in The Plan for Social Security: "It is first and foremost a plan 
of insurance - of giving in return for contributions, benefits up to a subsistence 
level, as of right and without means test, so that individuals may build freely 
upon it" (Beveridge Report, 1942, Para 10). Beveridge was of the opinion that 
to pay more than a subsistence payment would be to discourage personal 
savings, and would deprive people of a necessary incentive to make 
appropriate provisionTor themselves; and furthermore because benefits were 
intended to be at a level sufficient to guarantee subsistence, therefore 
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additional, means-tested benefits was not necessary. In the discussion on the 
principle of social security it was -proposed that " in -establishing a national 
minimum [the State] should leave room and encouragement for voluntary 
action by each individual to provide more than that minimum for himself and 
his family" (Beveridge Report, 1942, Para 9). 
To Beveridge, poverty was a significant but not an unmanageable problem. 
Poverty, as explained by Beveridge, was the result of "the failure to ý relate 
income earning to the size of family" (Beveridge Report, 1942, Para 11). In 
other words, -it was unfortunate for some to have large families as low wages 
would deprive large families of some of the basic necessities of life. 
While it was true that the Beveridge Report was a blueprint for post-war social 
policies, it was- not primarily concerned, with bringing about a vertical 
redistribution of wealth at all (Coates & Silburn, 1970, p 173). Provided there 
was full employment, Want, (or poverty) would, be destroyed automatically. 
Thus - social, security programmes - were 1 necessary to cover predictable 
unavoidable contingencies when earnings were likely to be interrupted, while a 
modest programme of National Assistance was necessary to provide for those 
who were not in employment and who were not covered, for whatever reason, 
by national insurance, or benefits as of right. National assistance represented a 
kind of safety net. 
POVERTY DATUM Ll 
One impetus for a "national minimum" was the concept of a "poverty datum 
line" which first appeared in Charles Booth's massive work "The Life and 
Labour of the People of London (1889 - 1903)". Booth defined poverty as 
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having no surplus, which meant having a meagre income enough to live off 
most of the time but being unable to meet contingencies such as sickness or 
loss of earnings. Booth described the poor as "those who have a fairly bare 
income, such as 18 shillings or 21 shillings per week for the moderate family, 
and by the very poor as thosewho fall below this standard" (Booth, 1887, 
quoted in Simey & Simey, 1960, p 184). 
Later on, in his survey of York, Rowntree (1901) further refined the poverty 
line concept. The common methodology used for determining the poverty line 
is based upon a hypothesized food budget derived from minimum nutritional 
requirement' diets, of which the work of Seebohm Rowntree (1901) is 
considered to be the pioneer in the attempt towards an objective definition and 
measurement of poverty. Rowntree defined families whose "total earnings are 
insufficient to obtain the minimum necessities for'the maintenance of merely 
physical efficiency as being 'in -primary poverty" (Rowntree, 1901, p 86). 
Based on the previous work of an American nutritionist, W. O. Atwater, 
Rowntree calculated the minimum requirement of nutritional needs of adults 
and children in a family of five. ' These nutritional needs were then translated 
into quantities of different food items and the monetary equivalent of these 
foods. To the expenditure on food were added certain minimum amounts for 
clothing, fuel and household sundries, and thus a poverty line was estimated at 
a level of 17 shillings and 8pence per week. Rent was excluded from the 
calculation as it was assumed i that rent was beyond the control of the 
household. A family was regarded to be in poverty if its income minus rent fell 
short of the poverty line. 
Accordingly, Rowntree laid the foundation of the concept of subsistence 
poverty, a measurement which came to be used as a basis for recommending 
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minimum social benefit rates in several countries, like the United Kingdomi, 
the United States and Third World countries like India, Keny'a and Malaysia. 
In the United States the subsistence approach adopted by the United States 
Social Security Administration Poverty Index is d ue primarily to the I work of 
Molly Orshansky (1965). Her work was similar to that of Rowntree's in that 
she took as her starting Point estimates oIf minimum food expenditure, 'but her 
calculation of the total income requirement took a different form. Based on a 
basic nutritional standard, corfsistent with food p references of the poor I groups, 
recommended by the-National Researcfi Coýficil, and using data' derived'from 
consumer expenditure surveys, , Orsha I nsky used the actual 'percentage of 
income sp'ent'on food, which at the time represented thirty-three percent or 
one-third of the total spent by families -of three or more persons as the basis of 
applying a multiplier. The poverty line was derived by multiplying the cost of 
the'basic diet by a fact6i of three, or the reciprocal of the proportion of total 
income spent on food., 
PROBLEMS OF MINIMUM SUBSISTENCE 
Regardless of the scholarly efforts of'Rowntree, and ., Orshansky, the food 
budget method of determining the poverty income level poses several 
problems. " There are problems of nutrientst-'the fo6dstuffs to incorporate those 
nutrients, *and the cost of purchasing those foodstuffs. The choice of food items 
and other items of necessities cannot be independent either of personal 
judgement of the relevant social investigators or arbitrary selection of some 
other Idnd. 'The'basic aim is'to'secure 'a minimally adequate nutrition at the 
4 
1. In the United Kingdom the idea of a poverty line was particularly influential 
because it was incorporated into the social legislation; but benefits paid out 
need not conform to the recommended poverty line level, ' for example, the 
post-war legislation set the standard of national insurance benefits lower than 
Beveridge's extremely low limit. 
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lowest cost, without taldng into consideration diets which are conventional to 
local communities. Moreover, the food index is not redefined periodically, 
thereby neglecting changing customs and needs. 
By defining a minimum adequate diet it implies that families are restricted in 
the choice of food purchases, and therefore "the lower the level of cost, the 
more restricted the kinds and qualities of food must be and the more the skill 
in marketing and food preparation that is required" (Orshansky, 1965, p 5). In 
reality those living in poverty, more often than not, do not possess the 
knowledge about nutrition, or the skills in marketing and food preparation as 
demanded by the minimum adequate diet plan. Moreover, the. food budget 
method assumes food costs as a fixed percentage of total budget necessary for 
a decent living. Although nutritional requirements vary according to levels and 
patterns of living and dietary habits, the food budget method allows no 
consideration for differences of food requirements between different sizes or 
geographic locations of families. 
Ideally in the food budget method the choice of food items should be based on 
an ideal diet or_ on actual consumption behaviour. An ideal - 
diet involves 
I 
applying dietary standards for caloric and protein requirements to the locally 
available foodstuffs. Allowances are made for local family size, age 
composition, and if possible for average body weight and climatic differences. 
The representative price levels, wOuld have to be found in order to work out the 
cost in money terms. Estimates on actual consumption behaviour could be 
derived from household budget surveys that allow for measures on the caloric 
and protein content of the actual consumption baskets of different income 
groups. The family expenditure level which coincides with the recommended 
minimum dietary intake could then be singled out as the poverty income level. 
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SUBSISTENCE POVERTY `t 
Another problem in this approach is the preoccupation with physical standards. 
In Townsend's survey (1979) subsistence was described as "not having enough 
to feed children or go to work on; having nothing to wear or threadbare 
clothing; and not having the basic necessities of life" (Townsend, 1979, 'p 
238). Thus, in Townsend's opinion, "the conception of a necessary minimum 
income lurked in these accounts and the, emphasis was primarily upon the 
physical necessities of food, clothing and shelter" (ibid. ). 
The' subsistence definition of poverty derives from that formulated by 
Rowntree in his famous studies in York in the years 1899,19936 and 19502. 
The main elements in his definition were income and -food consumption. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter Rowntree assumed a family would be 
considered to be living in poverty if its total earnings were insufficient for the 
maintenance of physical efficiency. However, Rowntree recognised that the 
definition of subsistence could change over time. In his surveys of 1936 and 
1950 he provided a longer list of the "minimum necessities", thus allowing for 
cultural and historical changes. Some, but only small, concessions were made 
to the social as distinct from physical needs of individuals. He distinguished 
between primary and secondary poverty. Families with incomes below the 
poverty line would always be undernourished, but those with incomes above 
the line could 'get by if they manage their money carefully. Primary poverty, 
where minimum nutritional standards were not met because of an insufficiency 
of resources, was caused by inadequate income. On the other hand, secondary 
poverty occurred when sufficient resources were not utilised rationally in ways 
2. Poverty: A Study of Town Life, Macmillan, 1901; Poverty and Progress, 
Longmans, 1941; Poverty and the Welfare State (with G. R. Lavers), 
Longmans, 1951. 
-184 
most consistent with healthy living-dueto, the irr-atim"n"ail behaviour and unwise 
spending patterns of the poor. 
Jackson (1972) " refines the basic assumptions' of Rowntree's"ibbsistence, 
poverty. He drew*attention to tfie'importance of needs in the definition'of 
poverty. According to Jackson: ' ' "When ' important "' needs are not ' met, 
individuals and families are said to be in poverty because the condition of their 
lives is not considered iatisfactory"'(Jackson, ", 1972, 'p 13). To Jackson "(ibid. ) 
"adequate social, functioning" is essential in the fulfilment of needs. So as to 
function adequately in contemporary society, not only an individual's 
nutritional needs but also" his ' needs for education, housing, ` employment and 
seýuntý'must be fulfilled in"order for him to be able to maintain' I a1amily. If 
needs'were not adequately'met deprivation 'would arise. ' Deprivation in one 
sphere causes ý'deprivation "in another; ý for example, poor health ý causes 
unemployment and income security., Social and cultural v'ariables are therefore 
firmly recog-nised in Jackson's conception of poverty. 
As an'economist,, however, Jackson (1972) further views poverty'within the 
framework of -economic I growth' He believes that "economi& growth provides 
no guarantee'that poverty will'- disappear. ' As the economy grows, 'it grows in 
complexity and sophistication and so makes greater demands on the individual" 
(Jackson, 1972, p'18). This'-implies that the'surplus produced by'economic 
growth is not necessan used to alleviate povert "or increase the welfare of y 
the p. oor. 'Povertyis caused by society's failu , r6'to illoocate'resources equitably. 
Malaysia' is, aý case * in point. As - discussed "in the chapter' Five, social 
discrepancies still, occur, ' despite deliberate attempts by, the state in reducing 
poverty and social inequality. 
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POVERTY DATUM LINE: SOME THIRD WORLD MODELS 
Several Third World countries use the poverty datum line as' the basis of 
interpreting poverty. India is an example of a country where there has been a 
long established tradition of academic enquiries on the problem of poverty. 
Poverty in India was first discussed by Dadabhai Naoroji in, 18763, in which 
he highlighted the magnitude of poverty in the sub-continent and claimed that 
the external economic drain theory followed by the British was responsible'for 
the misery and poverty of the Indian people. 
In independent India, a Working Group on poverty line was first set up in 
1962 (Gaur, '1988,, p 3). r The Group aimed to establish a nationally desirable 
minimum level of consumption expenditure. Expenditure on health and 
education was excluded, both of which were expected to be provided by the 
state. An element of subsidy in urban housing was included after deducting 10 
percent as the rent element payable from the proposed - national minimum of 
100 Rupees per month. This figure of national minimum was calculated 
following the recommendations on a standard balanced diet devised by the 
Nutritional Advisory Committee of the Indian Council of Medical Research. 
I Nutritional needs were not distinguished between urban and rural areas. 
Also, the notion of minimum needs was incorporated in Indian Development 
Plans (Gaur, 1988, p 22). For example, the National Programme of Minimum 
Needs, initiated during the Fifth Tive Year Plan (1974 - 79) period, attempted 
to provide a minimum level of - social consumption of different areas and 
sections of the community by establishing a network of certain essential 
services. 
3. Naoroji, D. (1988), Poveny in India, London: Winchworth Foulger & Co., 
The Aldine Press. 
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In South Africa the poverty datum line was introduced during the Second 
World War as a measure of the extent of poverty in the rapidly growing slums 
of western Cape (Wilson and Ramphela, 1989, p 16). In the 1970s the poverty 
datum line was further refined and modified, due to the reemergence of trade 
unions as a force for change and therefore guide-lines were needed in the 
negotiation with management on issues of minimum wages. Subsequently 
various interpretations of what ought to be included in the definitions of 
minimum levels were developed, as shown in Table 6.1, for average 
households of five to six persons. It was found out that cash required for 
subsistence in rural areas was 83 percent of the requirement in urban areas. 
For instance, in 1983/4 in Transkei the Household Subsistence level was R296 
for urban households compared to R246 for rural households (Wilson and 
Ramphela, 1989, p 17). 1 
Kenya also has a tradition of using the poverty line as a basis for measuring the 
extent of poverty within its population. However different poverty lines are 
used for urban and rural areas. Based on 1974 prices the poverty level for a 
rural smallholder household was 2000 Kenyan shillings a year, while a higher 
poverty' line, roughly twice as much, was' applied for urban households 
(Collier and Lal, 1986, p 78). In 1974 the incidence of absolute poverty was as 
high as 22.4 percent in smallholder households'in Central province, compared 
to approximately 3 percent in Nairobi (Collier and Lal, 1986, p 80). 
Thus far, this analysis has shown that subsistence definitions of poverty are 
primarily concerned with ensuring that people have enough incomes to pay for 
basic requirements, plus some expenditure on minimum requirements for other 
basic necessities such as clothing, housing and a few sundries. Undoubtedly, as 
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Table-6d 
South Africa. Levels of Poverty: Definitions 
Coveraze 
Poverty Datum Food, clothing, 
Line (PDL) fuel/lighting, 
washing/cleaning, 
rent and transport 
Minimum Living As above + tax, medical 
Level (MLL) expenses, education, and 
household equipment 
replacement 
Supplementary MLL + more for each item + 
Living Level recreation/entertainment, 
(SLL) personal care, pension, 
medical and burial 
contributions. 
Approximately MLL + 30% 
Household As for PDL 
Subsistence 
Level (HSL) 
Household HSL + 50% 
Effective 
Level (HEL) 
Source: Wilson & Ramphela (1989, p 17) [adapted] 
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George (1988) points out, "the prevalent national economic standards affect 
notions of what s'ubsistence is, for'poverty definitions tend' to become more 
generous, though still of subsistence nature as the national economy grows" 
(George, 1988, pp 84-85). Hence poverty definitions for various countries tend 
to vary in the degree of generosity such as in' the choice of food and non-food 
items deemed necessary for health and physical survival of the populations. 
BASIC NEEDS 
An alternative way of determining, the level of poverty, which received world 
wide support at the 1976 World Employment Conference of the International 
Labour Office, is the basic needs approach. This is a modification of the food 
budget method, and as its name implies, it is concerned with. primary needs *of 
individuals and 6oni'munities. 'The ILO Conference adopted a Programme of 
Action which included a comprehensive and wide-ranging set of measures for 
the implementation of a basic needs strategy. 
The concept of basic needi includes two elements: "First, they include certain 
minimum requirements of a family for private consumption: adequate food, 
shelter and clothing, as well as certain household equipment and furniture. 
Second, they include essential services provided by and for the community at 
large, - such as safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport and health 
facilities" (ILO, 1977, p 32). Hence the ILO sees the basic needs approach as 
an ideal solution in their assault on absolute poverty. Still, the second part of 
the definition is different from the earlier definition and begs a lot of 
questions. 
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The ILO (1977) recommends several approaches in which the basic needs of 
the poor, and a redistribution of income and growth could be achieved. Key 
emphasis . 
is. ý placed on -the, combination- of reform, of price systems; 
redistribution through consumption transfers which benefit the poor, for 
instance in education and rural infrastructure; and capital., stock transfers,, like 
land reform - all of which envisages a much broader and more structured 
interpretation of the causes, and therefore the meaning of poverty. If basic 
needs of the poor are to be adequately provided, strategic changes are required 
in the content, organization and delivery of important public services such as 
education, health,. housing, water, supply and environmental sanitation. 
In exploring some transitional problems while the economy is restructured to 
meet basic needs,. the ILO (1977), mentions problems such as the temporary 
fall of production in some sectors and., rapid increase, in the demand. for 
essential goods and services. -Precisely 
because political difficulties in 
implementing the basic needs strategy could not be avoided, these constraints 
"necessitate 
'the 
adoption of a selective approach in using policy instruments" 
(ILO, 1977, -p, 66). -The importance of organizing poverty groups is 
emphasised because "agrarian reform is practicable only if political forces with 
more strength than those of the landlords can be mobilised" (ILO, 1977, p 67). 
This last, quptation contradicts, with the aim of, land reform mentioned in the 
last paragraph, which does not necessarily distribute land to the landless poor, 
but, instead perpetuates the continued existence of landlords and agricultural 
wage labour, and therefore differentiation of political power between these two 
groups. 
The basic needs approach reflects the ILO's concern for the eradication of 
absolute poverty through Ahe emphasis on redistribution and employment 
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specially because "redistribution from growth -only) yielded very meagre 
results" (Hicks & Streeten, 1979, p 568). Above all, the basic needs approach 
has more political appeal, compared with the concept of redistribution with 
growth, and therefore would be more easily endorsed by politicians. 
Besides, there is the view that the basic needs approach is "neither a coherent 
theory nor a methodologically clearly worked out development programme" 
(Hoogvelt, 1982, p 98) - instead Hoogvelt (ibid. ) believes it is a loosely knit 
set of ideas and common themes. On the other hand, Ghai (1978, p 16) 
believes-that it is the eclectic nature of the basic needs approach which have 
been an important factor in the quick and widespread acceptance of the basic 
needs approach. 
While it is true that the basic needs approach embodies a consumer-oriented 
outlook, which is synonymous with ý social welfarism in conditions of 
underdevelopment, and therefore it is biased against economic growth, Ghai 
(1978, p 17) contends that basic needs could not be met without substantial and 
sustained economic growth. What is important is not so much a given rate of 
growth as the pattern and character of that growth. 
Still, there is reason to believe the basic needs approach is subjective in nature. 
Those goods which are believed to constitute a sufficient standard of living are 
determined by. policy-makers, planners and economists, rather than justified by 
objective tests of the satisfaction of need. Besides, the poor, more often than 
not, prefer money transfers rather than transfers in-kind. 
The ILO neglects industrial development as a strategy in poverty alleviation, 
perhaps because industrialisation in most developing countries had involved 
capital intensive, foreign imported plant and machinery, thus creating little 
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employment as well as generating, income inequality. Instead, what is 
advocated is an "increased investment in the traditional -agricultural and 
informal urban sectors and the removal of obstacles to their development, 
especially by reducing inequality of access to, production services and assets" 
(ILO, 1977, p 68). This implies that a greater utilisation of local materials, 
local markets and local skills would create greater employment opportunities; 
and in the long-run the economy would benefit through the "trickle-up" effects 
of greater productivity and purchasing power of the poor. 
BASIC NEEDS APPROACH, SOME THIRD WORLD EXPERIENCES 
In contrast to the ILO's belief in industrialisation and poverty alleviation, 
Singh (1979) argues that in order to meet the basic needs of the poor in the 
Third World on a sustainable basis, it is-necessary to transform its productive 
structures. In this transformation industrial development must play a central 
role, and that a properly conceived basic needs strategy should positively aid 
Third World 4ndustrial development. He cites the case of China as a country 
which had successfully pioneered the basic needs approach in its development 
policies several years ahead of the ILO 1976 World Employment Conference - 
China had been successful in meeting the basic needs of its population and 
raising their standard of living. Of particular interest is the provision of public 
health services to the whole population. The differences between standards of 
living of various sectors of the population is likely to be smaller in China than 
anywhere else. Special attention was paid to reduce inequalities in the 
distribution of income, consumption and wealth while at the same time making 
rapid progress in the development of modern industries. Industrial 
development is closely integrated with agricultural development; therefore 
industries give priority to the needs of agriculture, like increasing the use of 
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farm machinery and chemical fertilizers, hence'rural 'electrification also 
becomes a priority. As an illustration of industrial development, the number of 
tractors produced increased from 1500 in 1959 to 33,000 in 1965,73,000 in 
1971 and 400,000 in 1978. (Singh, 1979, pp 588-593). 
The Chinese example clearly shows that political and ideological commitment 
is a priority concern in any poverty alleviation programme. Measures to reduce 
poverty are only feasible if there is a genýeral'acceptance of the aim of reducing 
income inequality and meeting the essential needs of the poorest sections. 
The Tanzanian approach to development'is another case where progress in 
meeting the basic needs of the population has been achieved, although critics 
have pointed out this may have been at the expense of long-term economic 
growth (Singh, 1979, p 601). Although there were temporary set-backs to the 
economy during the mid-1970s as a consequence of serious droughts and 
sharply adverse movements in the terms of trade, over the period from 1964 to 
1974 there was significant structural changes; industry expanded at a rate of 10 
percent a year (ibid. ). Tanzania had planned a long-term industrial strategy, 
which specified the kind of structural transformation the country aspires to 
achieve. The basic goal is to raise the contribution of industry to gross 
domestic product to 20 percent by 1995; and a further objective is that by that 
date 60 percent of industrial output should consist of intermediate and capital 
goods and only 40 percent of consumer goods (ibid. ). As a rule, in meeting the 
basic needs of the population the Tanzanian state is using the political and 
fiscal measures at its disposal to ensure that inequalities in income distribution 
do not increase (ibid. ). 
Accordingly, this study maintains that the Tanzanian approach to development, 
which was specifically mentioned in chapter Two as a model of Wallerstein's 
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(1974) development strategy of self-reliance, is in a way consistent with Seers' 
assertion that: "A country where economic growth is slow and negligible may 
be busy reshaping its political institutions so that, when growth comes, it will 
mean development" (Seers, 1979, p 13). Thus even if the rate of growth is 
slow the satisfaction of basic needs and the reorientation of social and political 
institutions are crucial prerequisites of development. I 
In contrast to China and Tanzania, Sri Lanka has not been successful in 'the 
application of a basic needs strategy, and has failed to develop production in 
line with distribution. Overall growth has been slow and insufficient jobs have 
been created. The poor had not been guaranteed access to productive assets; 
while rural policies and land reform have been relatively unsuccessful. For 
example, the distributive effects of large-scale irrigation and land-development 
projects intensified rather than mitigated income inequalities (Richards & 
Gooneratne, 1980, pp 163-164). 
From the above examples of the experiences of some Third World countries in 
implementing the basic needs approach in their develoment programmes, it is 
clear that in general the concept of basic needs should be placed within the 
context of a specific country's overall economic and social development. In the 
words of George (1988, p 156) "the calculations of basic needs satisfaction 
inevitably reflects the living standards of a country" Unlike the trickle-down 
redistribution with growth approach with its emphasis on income, which was 
popular in the 1960s and 1970s, the basic needs approach identifies those 
sectors which should receive preferential treatment in the distribution of 
essential elements in satisfying human needs which are supplied outside the 
market system. And, of course, development in some countries occurs in a 
way which is actually multiplying the basic needs for which alternative action 
is required to ameliorate. 
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RELATIVE POVERTY 
The relative approach of measuring poverty interprets poverty in relation to the 
prevailing living standards of the society, recognising explicitly the 
interdependence between the poverty line and the entire distribution of income. 
This wholly accepts the "structured" nature of poverty. We shall discuss two 
types of relative measures of poverty, namely, arbitrary percentages of 
population and relative deprivation. 
ARBITRARY PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION- 
This method of determining poverty focuses on a bottom fraction of the 
population, for example, ten, twenty, thirty or forty percent. The relative 
poverty line'is that which, identifies the poor as the lowest 'Y' percent in the 
distribution of income curve. As the percentages of the population to be 
identified as the poor are arbitrarily chosen, in developing countries the figure 
of forty percent appears to be apopular cut-off point. Anand (1983, p 113n) 
attributes the popularity of this figure as originating from Robert McNamara's 
plea, in his address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank in 1972, that 
special policies be initiated to include the growth of the lowest forty percent of 
the population in developing countries. 
There are at least three points that refute the usefulness of this method. First, it 
prejudges the extent of poverty by postulating' that it is "k percent of the 
population by definition. Second, this method implies that poverty could never 
be eradicated, there would always be the bottom'"x" percent who are invoked 
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to justify, objectively or scientifically, the selection of the percentage. Thirdly 
this approach gives no reason why the level of poverty should be presumed to 
be the same in countries which might be far more unequal or far more poorer 
than other countries. For the reason of the limitations mentioned above this 
method is not a practical approach of determining the level of poverty 
RELATIVE DEPRIVATIO 
W. G. Runciman (1966) initiated the first systematic use of the concept of 
relative deprivation in the social sciences. Runciman's (ibid. ) work applied the 
concept of relative deprivation to contemporary problems such as wage 
bargaining and thus shows the relevance of the concept in the analysis of 
political behaviour. However., this work was subjective, and derived from 
Stouffer's work on the United States Army4. 
In the literature on poverty in the United Kingdom, Professor Townsend is the 
main exponent of the gbjective concept of deprivation. In formulating an 
alternative measurement of poverty, Townsend (1979) constructs a sociological 
definition of poverty and asserts that: 
Poverty can be defined objectively and applied consistently only 
in terms of the concept of relative deprivation ............. Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to 
be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of 
diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions 
and amenities Which are customary, or are at least widely 
encouraged or approved in the societies to which they belong. 
Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the 
average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded 
from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities. 
[Townsend, 1979, p 31] 
4. Stouffer, S. A., et al (1949), 7he American Soldier, Princeton. 
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Concisely, Townsend (1979) views inadequate social functioning as a guide to 
poverty. Hence he constructs a provisional deprivation index based on a 
number of household and social characteristics reflecting social functioning, in 
which he includes some sixty indicators of the style of living of the population, 
covering diet, clothing, housing, environment, conditions of work, recreation, 
education, health and social relations. Other indicators of poverty include the 




dining out (Townsend, 1979, App. 10). The provisional deprivation index is 
then compared with household income when there is a reduction of resources 
accompanied by a disproportionate deprivation. 
A key element stressed by Townsend (1979) is participation, which is a 
psychological and social necessity (by virtue of individuals having social roles 
and obligations as well as being involved in relationship within social groups, 
including small families and large communities). This is more than previous 
"materialist" conceptions inherent in the food budget approach to poverty. Due 
to a lack of resources, individuals and groups may be deprived of the chance to 
fully participate in society and therefore are alienated from those who are not 
poor. Townsend contends that there is "a systematic relationship between 
deprivation and level of resources" (Townsend, 1979, p 915),, meaning that a 
lack of, resources leads to inability to fully participate in social life and below a 
certain level of resources people would have to contract out of ordinary forms 
of social membership. Thus Townsend's objective concept of relative 
deprivation measures not only poverty but inequality which is defined in terms 
of differences in styles of living. Clearly in Townsend's view poverty results 
from inequality in society. 
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Nevertheless, Townsend (1979, pp 50-51), reminds us that the concept of 
relativity is governed, by several factors. The first of these is custom. Certain 
food stuffs, for example, have been accepted as necessities of life. Some 
aspects of consumption are particularly. "social" in function. In the United 
Kingdom serving one's guest a cup of tea is seen as a form of binding social 
relationship; while in other societies a cup of coffee performs the same 
function. Secondly, - relativity 
is influenced by the change of need of certain 
products through advertisement and imitation by friends and neighbours. The 
current increasing popularity of items ranging from foodstuffs to cosmetics 
labelled as "organic" or "green" or "environment friendly" is an example; 
although these products may cost more, people's buying habits are influenced 
by relevant interest and consumer. groups. Finally, a change in fashion and 
social convention may determine the need for the reappraisal of the type and 
style of products needed by an individual or family, of which clothing is a 
well-known example. 
Furthermore, the construction of a relative deprivation index explicitly relates 
poverty to multiple deprivation. People are not only poor but they live in poor 
neighbourhoods that do not, have adequate schools and therefore children of 
poor families suffer from educational deprivation... Coates and Silburn (1970) 
remind us that "these different types of deprivation mesh into one another, to 
create for those who must endure them a total social situation shot through and 
through by one level of want after another" (Coates and Silburn, 1970, p 38). 
In their study of St. Ann's in Nottingham, Coates and Silburn show different 
forms of deprivation that "relate to one another; feed off one another, sustain 
and help to perpetuate one another" (ibid. ). 
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One problem of applying the relative deprivation index is that it is not easy to 
quantify a poverty line. Townsend (1979, p 271) himself identifies four 
measurement problems on the relationship between income and deprivation. 
Problems arise in the attempt to define the income unit and the unit of 
deprivation; to measure the level and the type of resources; and to measure the 
level and type of deprivation. 'Obviously, no matter how equal the distribution 
becomes, people are not always satisfied and would desire something another 
person has and 'are thus relatively deprived. Thus although a -direct and 
-1, significa nt correlation between income and deprivation, people on the same 
income continue to display variations in both kind and degree of deprivation 
and there is no clear delineation between the'deprived and the non-deprived. 
Townsend (1979) has attempted to show that there is in fact a "threshold" of 
income below which people are disproportionately deprived, that is, relative to 
their income, and that this can be designated a "poverty line". But becauSe'of 
the problems of measuring both "income"' and' "multiple deprivation" in 
sufficiently exact ways, the outcome remains a subject of scientific 
controversy. 
In measuring multiple deprivation problems may arise when we try to apply 
operationally the concept of "style of living". What actually constitutes the 
style of living customary to the average family might be subjectively decided 
by the social investigator rather than devised from hundreds of "objective" 
observations - so that we can count forms and levels of deprivation. In relation 
to this, Townsend's provisional index of deprivation is difficult to interpret. It 
reflects not only the absence of opportunity for efficient social functioning, but 
also reflects different preferences for'the form of social functioning adopted by 
different families. One critic alleges that Townsend's findings "have no 
relevance for policy" (Hemming, 1984, p 44). Unquestionably, the setting of a 
relative standard is operationally difficult. 
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Sen, a neo'-classical economist, is critical of Townsend's) con'cept of relative 
deprivatidri. He argues that poverty must be seen't6 be primarily in an absolute 
notion, and that the contrast bet, ýie6n absolute and relaitiviTeatures of poverty 
has often been -confused (Sen, '1983)ý. To Sen ' p&erty' wis'the `failure ý fo have 
certain minimum capabilities and claimýd thitt "absolute deprivation in"terms of 
a person's capabilities relates to relative deprivation in teims'of commodities, 
incomes and resources" (Sen, 1983, p 153). He contends the problem could be 
overcome "by using efficiency-income units' reflecting 'ýommand "over 
capabilities -rather than command over goods and services"' (Sen, 1983, P 168). 
Implicit in 'Sen's definition of poverty is the'concept of minimal'income- at 
subsistence levels. - 
In "a' reply to I Se I n's (1983) criticism, Townsend (1985) argued that Sen's 
conception of poverty is "an underestimation of the importance of needs other 
than'for food" ( Townsend, '1985,664). ' This has serious implications for 
sociil"policy as'it fails to distinguish between social, ' including State', - 'and 
scientific or objective definitions of poverty. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS ',;, 1-1 
Seýeril coficeptions of poverij'have been discussed in this chapter. On the 
whole, the concept of absolute poverty appears to hiýe considerable influence 
on official definitions of poverty in several countries. Furthermore this concept 
seems more relevant for developing countries, where absolute poverty self- 
evid6ntly abounds. On the other hand, the"relative deprivation concept of 
poverty, , identified with the inequality approach to the problem Of poverty, 
calls" attention to major differences in living standards and implies that the 
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transfer of resources from the rich to the poor can alleviate poverty in most 
societies, appears to be more relevant for developed countries. But with the 
development of international agencies and markets, and - the growth in 
prosperity of elites in poor societies as well as the development of marginalised 
poor in rich societies, the distinction is becoming less appropriate,, and 
scientists are beginning to recognise the need for a common international 
definition - so that appropriate quantitative comparisons can be made. - 
Still, in drawing up the poverty line policy-makers and planners should 
consider the inter-dependence between the standard of living and resources. 
Hence the use of a combination of relative and absolute measures of poverty 
may be used in determining the poverty line. The following paragraph gives a 
I 
summary of suggestions by some scholars of poverty on how the poverty line 
should be measured. 
AtIcinson (1975) suggests we define the poverty line as half the average 
income, and based on this suggestion Anand (1983) uses half the average 
household per capita income. Fuchs (1967) suggests it should be half the 
median income. Townsend (1979) suggests the mean is more appropriate than 
the median income because it takes account of the aggregate resources 
available in a society and not merely the "middle" income in ranking rich and 
poor. These income-related measures are now used extensively by international 
agencies like the European Community and the Organization for Economic and 
Cultural Development (OECD). Conversely, the World Bank (Hasan, 1978), 
in its work in Third World countries, uses national household expenditure 
surveys as basic information sources, and poverty lines are determined by per 
capita income. In developing countries consumption expenditure, which 
determines the standard of living of an individual, is not always met out of 
current income as it may also come from assets, debts and savings. 
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In summary this chapter concludes that practical measures of poverty fall into 
three categories: i) income-related relative poverty, ii) subsistence commodities 
(food, fuel, clothing) poverty, and iii), material and social needs poverty or 
relative deprivation. In conclusion, whatever measure we use in determining 
poverty, we should take cognisant that poverty is not merely a question of 
money, food, housing and clothing. It is also a question of human dignity and 
social as well as cultural fulfilment. 
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Chapter Seven 
THEORIES OF POVERTY IN MALAYSIA 
INTRODUCTIO 
In Chapter Six we focused our discussion on the various conceptions of 
poverty as advanced /y several scholars at 
the international level. In this 
chapter our main aim is to comprehend the various conceptions of poverty 
specific to the situation in Malaysia. We shall limit our discussion within two 
broad theoretical framework, namely the structural and generic theories of 
poverty. - 
CONCEPTIONS OF POVERTY IN MALAYSIA 
The first recorded conceptualisation of poverty in Malaysia may be that 
developed by a well-known literary figure, Za'ba, whose article entitled "The 
Poverty of the Malays" in the Malay Mail of December lst, 1923. He wrote: 
"The Malays as whole, are a particularly poor people Poverty is their most 
outstanding characteristic and their greatest handicap" (Malay Mail, 
1.12.1923; cited in Aziz, 1975, p. 3). Although Za'ba made no attempts at 
measuring or defining poverty, his conception of poverty embodied a 
distinction between economic and non-economic poverty of the Malays. 
According to Za'ba: "The word poverty as applied to them [the Malays] does 
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not merely mean destitution of ývealth or riches ..... They are also poor in all 
other equipment which can lead to success and greatness" (ibid. ). 
Recognizing that underdevelopment -and poverty are relative concepts, Za'ba 
further asserted: "Potentially, 'they possess sucli qualities as much as do any 
other people. But the actualised part of this potentiality is still too poor to bear 
comparison with what we find in other progressive peoples in the country ..... 
Their country is rich and abundantly supplied with natural resources - but it 
not they who benefit thereby" (ibid. ). Za'ba emphasised that although the 
country had prospered 'greatly under the British, it was "not'the Malays who 
have profited there from" (ibid. ). He believed that the lack of cooperative 
organizations was a cause of economic 6ackwardness of the Malays. 
While other statements might have been traced, these remarks by a well-known 
Malay intellectual raise three issues which have continued to be prominent in 
Malaysian accounts of social conditions, namely, (i) exploitation, or 
impoverishment caused by colonisation; (ii) lack of cooperative economic 
institutions; and (iii) lack of opportunities (especially educational opportunities) 
institutionalised for the young, particularly those of the'lower income group 1- 
1. As an illustration, in 1974 the share of higher education subsidies received 
by different income groups in Malaysia was as follows: 
Income Gr= % of Share 
Lowest 40 % 10 
Middle 40% 38 
Highest 20 % 52 
Source: World Bank, 1988, Tab. 6.2, p. 136 (adapted) 
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STRUCTURAL-INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF POVERTY -ý- -'i, 
Subsequent to Za'ba's exposition of Malay poverty,, three decades were to pass 
by before a systematic analysis of poverty in Malaysia was initiated by Ungku 
Aziz. Aziz (1956) analysed occupational structure and income levels of the 
Malay community and concluded that Malays were-largely employed in low- 
paying occupations like farming and fishing. Hence their mean income was far 
below the average of other ethnic groups. -ý-I1 11 1 ''1 
In, his subsequent writings (1964,1965), Aziz essentially discussed absolute 
and relative poverty within the Malaysian context. His analyses were based on 
a structural-institutional perspective: 
2. Also, he discussed three main socio- 
economic indicators of poverty, namely, (i) level of nutrition and protein 
intake; (ii) infant mortality and life expectancy; (iii) the sa I rong index3. 
2. The structural-institutional analysis of poverty was first posited by Fei and 
Ranis (1967) and refined by Paauw and Fei (1973). Based on the notion of 
economic' dualism, this approach views poverty as essentially the problem of 
the traditional and backward agricultural sector which had been consistently 
neglected asý a result of discriminatory resource allocation policies during 
colonial times (which, in the context of Malaysia, has already been discussed 
in Chapter 3). On the one hand, there existed a triangular colonial pattern of 
import-export flows of the modýrý sector and a small urban industrial sector 
linked with the international economy; while on the other hand, the traditional 
sector, due to its largely subsistence nature, was presumed to be detached from 
the modem sector. As a result of the existence of considerable foreign control 
in the economy, especially in the production of raw materials for export, what 
occurred was a net outflow of surplus to the colonial government. 
3. Aziz believed that the extent of poverty among Malays in any kamj2onR can 
be measured by the sarong index. This was a rough rule-of-thumb which gave 
practical means of distinguishing how poor some- communities were., This 
index is derived by talcing the number of sarongs in a household and dividing 
this bX ýhe number of persons above the age of one living in the household, 
thus giving the ratio of sarongs per capita. Any figure below one sarong per 
capita would indicate a condition of extreme poverty (Aziz, 1964, pp. 79-80). 
205 
Aziz, however, made no attempt to define a poverty line income objectively or 
subjectively. His main concern was not to measure -or quantify poverty but to 
explain the likely factors contributing to rural deprivation of poverty and the 
policies needed to redress them. 
Aziz asserts there are three basic causes of poverty, namely, "neglect, low 
productivity and exploitation" (Aziz, 1964, p. 80). - He claims that the roots of 
rural poverty lay in the colonial heritage, when colonial administrators passed 
various laws for the benefit of European firms engaged in the primary 
production sector, thus promoting the modem capitalist enclave4. 'Aziz blames 
the urban bias in the development process deprived the rural population of the 
modem socio-economic facilities. He writes: 
"One of the most notable features of the colonial administration 
was its neglect of the rural areas. Whether by intention or 
otherwise, the main effect of this neglect was the fossilisation of 
the rural people, most of whom were Malays. They were left in 
the Malay Reservations. They were encouraged to cultivate the 
crop that gave the lowest income: padi. And they were given an 
education that qualified them for no particular occupation since 
it was confined solely to primary education in the Malay 
language. " 
[Aziz, 1964, p. 81] 
Thus Malays were left out of the colonial economic development. As we have 
mentioned in Chapter Three the colonial administration deliberately followed 
an economic system which segregated the native Malays from the capitalist 
mode of production which was dominated by European firms. The production 
of raw materials for export at least cost was sustained largely by immigrant 
labour from China and South India. 
Aziz (1956) alleges that low productivity is linked to several interrelated 
4. Please refer to Chapter 3 for an account of colonial I economic history in 
Peninsula Malaysia. 
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factors such as lacking modem agricultural tools,, and under-utilization of 
labour due to uneconomic-sized holdings. Furthermore, the low productivity is 
also linked to poor health due to inadequate intake of proteins (Aziz, 1965). 
Above all,, Aziz (1964) believes that it is the institutional factor,, exploitation, 
which plays a central role in the problem of rural poverty. The exploitation of 
the Malay peasants by non-Malay capitalists is explained by his "Monopoly- 
Monopsony" (M-M) system. With the absence of banking and other financial 
facilities in the rural areas, it was difficult for the rural people to obtain credits 
in order to improve production and marketing. Aziz (1964) illustrates the 
exploitation of the peasants by middlemen in several forms such as: 
"Liquid capital in the form of money is used for money-lending 
which not only earns high rates of interest but also creates 
obligations on the part of rural workers to deliver their produce 
to the trader. It may even be used to oblige the worker to 
provide cheap labour. 
Intermediate capital in the form of advances of seed, fertilisers, 
livestock or fuel is used to create obligations which strongly 
reinforce the M-M system. 
Permanent capital items like processing facilities, storage 
buildings and transport facilities discourage outsiders from 
attempting to break into the market. " 
[Aziz, 1964, p. 84). 
Consequently, rural poverty manifests itself in extremely high rural 
indebtedness, fragmentation and chronic tenancy which reinforces the low 
nutrition, low education, low productivity and low income of rural people in a 
vicious circle of poverty (Aziz, 1964). 
Aziz (1975) further asserts "poverty has no racial barriers although rural 
poverty was mainly a Malay problem because the Malays made up the majority 
of the rural people and 90 percent of the Malays were rural people" (Aziz, 
1975, p. 23). However, Aziz recognised that, through the various five-year 
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development programmes "neglect has been well taken care of by objectives to 
provide electric power, transportation facilities, communication services, etc. " 
(Aziz, 1975, p. 28) in the rural areas. 
Aziz postulates that the key to the"e'radication of i6ial Malay poverty lies in the 
elimination of exploitation by middlemen, whose function, essential though to 
the rural people as a source of credit marketing, need to be replaced by 
appropriate rural development agencies. Aziz - also suggests the need for 
changes in attitude among Malays themselves (Aziz, 1964; 1965; ý 1975). 
From our foregoiýý discussion it is clear that Aziz'z theory of poverty focus'es 9 
mainly on the notion of "economic dualism and the neglect of the traditional 
rural sector. Such focus was motivated partly by the need to redress the bias in 
colonial resource allocation policy, and partly by the serious magnitude of the 
problem of rural poverty5. However, there was no analysis of the relationship 
between the traditional 1. and the modem 'sectors and the link between the 
domestic and the external economies. Stillo' the structural-institutional approach 
to the analysis of rural poverty has made a 'Valuable contribution in the 
identification of the poor and in tracing the basic causes of rural poverty, 
thereby highlighting the possible areas where state efforts could be intensified 
so as to alleviate poverty. 
5. As a case in point, in 1970 the incidence of poverty in rural areas was 59% 
compared with 21% for urban areas and 49% for the whole of Peninsula 
Malaysia (5MP, Table 3-1., p. 86). 
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GENERIC THEORY OF POVERTY 
A generic theory of poverty specific to the situation in Malaysia_ was first 
expounded by Kamal Salih (1977), which locuses on-the explanation of 
"persistent poverty and the processes which perpetuate-it" (1977, p. 23). Salih 
further demonstrates the need for an expanded theory or, generic. theory of 
poverty, 
'which 
is germane to both rural and urban areas, and argues that "we 
must try to establish new categories and coceptualizations, or at least to 
rearrange old ones into new configurations which may provide insight into. the 
real structure of contemporary poverty in Malaysia" (ibid. ). 
Salih further drew attention to the fact that Azizs (1956; 1964; 1965) 
explanation of poverty was restricted to the rural dimensions of poverty and 
confined by a narrow focus on exploitation of Malay farmers, fishermen and 
rubber smallholders by non-Malay middlemen. Thus Salih contends that Aziz's 
theory "tended to overlook wider processes involved in , the creation and 
distribution (in political economy terms, the expropriation) of economic 
surplus, ignoring, the role of the foreign sector.... as well as that of elites and 
other dominant peasants in Malay rural society itself" (Salih, 1977, p. 27). 
The wider processes referred to by Salih (1977) are the structure of the rural 
economy and its socio-political. correlates and the relationship between the 
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external economy and the rural economy, and cites Syed, Husin Ali's thesis 
(1972)6 which links rural poverty to the process of land concentration., 
While agreeing with Aziz on the existence of the M-M system of exploitation, 
Salih (1977) suggests that the forces underlying the landlord-peasant 
relationship is more crucial to the explanation of persistent poverty. Arguingý 
on the interaction between the traditional rural sector and the modem sector, 
which is linked to the international economy, he asserts that poverty within 
sub-groups in the economy "is the result of the general impoverishment of the 
entire economy due to its role in, the international division of labour and the 
impact of accumulation -on a world scale" (Salih, 1977, p. 29). This view is 
analogous to Frank's theory of underdevelopMent , which we ý 
discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
Salih (1977,, p. 32) argues against the notion of a dualistic model of, high,. and 
low productivity sectors. Instead, he, postulates a five-sector economy 
according to their involvement in the international economy. The rural sector 
is divided into three s4b-sectors, namely, the primary export, peasant export 
and peasant food or subsistence sub-sectors; while the urban sector is divided 
into two subsectors, namely, the urban formal and the urban informal sub- 
sectors. Within, each sector there exist two classes of actors, namely, 
landlord/capitalist and peasants in the rural sector, and capitalist/landlords and 
workers,, in the urban. sector. Thus one may develop a simple model of the 
6. S. H. Ali's thesis is that with the supply of land remaining constant, and 
land and technological development lagging way behind rapid population 
increases, a process of accumulation and dispossession are linked in a zero-sum 
situation which results in a high rate of landlessness and poverty. He further 
postulates that the process of accumulation and dispossession are embedded in 
the feudal structure of the rural economy, a vertical system of patron-client 
structures in which peasants are linked to a more powerful member of the 
communiýy, such as landlord, money-lender, a local political figure, a member 
of the aristocracy or government functionary, for their security (S. H. Ali, 
1972). 
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extraction of surplus in an underdeveloped' country. - This finer 
conceptualization allows us to treat fishermen, rubber smallholders/plantation 
workers, padi farmers and urban informal sector workers as the main poverty 
groups, regardless of race, and the foreign/local industrialists, ' merchants and 
the professions as the richer class. On the whole, therefore, Salih's approach 
represents a more sophisticated "structural" approach - expressed -in terms of 
the determining elements of the economy. 
Poverty is also caused by "inequality of opportunities" (Snodgrass, 1980, 
p. 126),! which is the consequence of unequal treatment originating in-'the 
official discriminatory policies of the'British colonial administration. Rural 
Malays who were'left out of the development process,, unlike the urban 
Chinese, did not have the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of economic 
development, or gain access to education, health and other social services. As 
Ahluwalia (1974) alleges, the limitations of access "impose constraints on the 
ability to raise production in the poorer groups" (op. cit., 'p. 26). This emphasis 
on . "opportunities" shifts the emphasis of causal analysis from the exploitative 
and discriminatory effects of market institutions to uneven means of access 
(and inadequate skills) of individuals to the system. 
While it is true that after Malaysia gained its independence there has been 
substantial expansion in the social sector programmes, particularly in 
education, health, housing, employment and social services, the structure of 
these services (which are mainly based on models imported from the West) has 
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not changed considerably since colonial days. The structure of service delivery 
and access tend to be urban -biased7. 
Thus to Salih the question of equitable access and opportunities is crucial, in 
the reduction of poverty. Hence Salih (1977) further incorporates the "service- 
access" approach 8 in his analysis of the causes of poverty. He draws attention 
to the. "oft-bemoaned, criticism of government agencies that opportunities 
offered by. them fall in the wrong hands ....... those to whom public allocations 
should be addressed are in fact not benefiting from these allocations at all" 
(Salih, 1977, p. 37). Using Aziz's terminology, Salih argues that "neglect can. 
be seen as a -lack of access to facilities provided by the government, , 
low 
productivity is caused by a lack of access Ito resources which 
increase 
production, and exploitation is through a lack of access to those institutions 
which prevent exploitation of poor-groups" (ibid. ). 
Therefore access is crucial in poverty reduction programmes; access to jobs, 
education, public housing, credit, agricultural development, health and social 
services. Nevertheless, the problem of access on the part of the poor may 
occur due to the lack of information on the kinds of resources available for 
7. For example, in 1985 the ratio of doctors per 10,000 population was higher 
in urban areas. Kuala Lumpur had a ratio of 11.4 while Penang had a ratio of 
4.6, compared with a ratio of 1.6 for Kelantan, 1.7 for Trengganu and 1.9 for 
Kedah - the last three. states have a high percentage of, Malay population, 
mainly engaged in padi farming and fishing. 
8. This approach was. first suggested by B. Schaffer and H. B. Hsien (1975). 
According to the service-access approach the phenomenon of access between 
the administrative allocation of goods and services and the people who need 
them and for whom they are intended. Unequal access as a result of defaults 
and weaknesses in the resource-allocating system may lead to persistence of 
poverty in certain groups or communities or regions. 
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them, or they have been denied access as a consequence of discriminatory 
attitudes and practices of the officials responsible for the allocation of the 
resources. Normally the poor are given what Schaffer terms as "institutionally 
determined services: services suit institutions, but not them" (Schaffer, 1973, 
p. 5). For access to be equitable, it is desirable that structural barriers which 
hinder equitable distribution of resources be removed first, as equitable access 
by itself cannot reduce the maldistribution of resources that has been seen as 
the root of poverty. 
To recapitulate the discussion so far, the structural-institutional analysts blame 
economic dualism, neglect and exploitation -of the traditional sector as the 
cause of rural poverty. The, theories mainly implied that if rural productivity 
and income could be increased through state intervention and the overhaul of 
rural development institutions, then the problem of poverty could be 
minimised, especially after the implementation of the New Economic Policy in 
1971. If this were the case, then why does the problem of poverty still persist, 
especially rural poverty? 
Accordingly, the problem of poverty has to be perceived in a wider context. 
Hence Salih (1977) relates the problem of poverty to the wider processes of the 
rural, domestic and external economies. Within the context of rural poverty he 
suggests that policy-makers focus on the concentration of landholdings and 
landlessness in the analysis of poverty and inequality. Since domestic and 
international economic factors are interlinked through international economic 
dependence, the focus should also stress on the role of commodity prices, like 
rubber and palm oil. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our review on various theories 'of 'poverty' in' Malay sia 'clearly points to the fact 
that policies for the alleviation of poverty should not concentrate on internal 
economic factors only but also on attempts to (a) widen opportunities of access 
to various economic and social institutions, and (b) re-structure institutions and 
their facilities so that certain social institutions (education, training, health, 
social security) are given a higher percentage of resources. 
Still, we cannot totally depend I on the provision of welfare servicesand income 
transfers because they do not remove the underlying causes of poverty. On the 
other hand, efforts aimed at expanding the output of key commodities such as 
food production would be inadequate if they do not effect any changes in the 
purchasing power of the poor. What is desired is a structural change in the 
distribution of productive wealth and 'therefore economic power and in 
increasing the participation of the poor in decision-making, thus enabling them 




MEASUREMENTS OF POVERTY IN MALAYSIA 
INTRODUCTION 
The review of the theories of poverty in Malaysia would not be complete 
without an appraisal of the conceptions of poverty in the various Five Year 
Development Plans. Accordingly, in this chapter the objective is to attempt an 
appreciation -, of the state's conception of poverty; and to review the various 
methods of estimating the poverty datum line in Peninsula Malaysia. 
THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND ANTI-POVERTY PARADIGMS 
In the following section the discussion will examine the theoretical orientation 
adopted by the state in its anti-poverty programmes. In the Five Year 
Development Plans, the anti-poverty programme was first initiated with the 
inception of the New Economic Policy in 1971, corresponding to the 
commencement of the Second Malaysia Plan. Prior to the inception of the New 
Economic Policy, the criterion for development was the Gross Domestic 
Product, 
, with 
the emphasis upon economic growth and agricultural 
diversification. As was mentioned in chapter Four, social development was not 
II 
a priority, instead it was circumscribed within the parameters of economic 
growth. The First Malaysia Plan (1965-1970), for example, states its objective 
in terms of increasing "the well being of Malaysia's 
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rural inhabitants and the low-income groups" (lMP, p 2). Presumably, the 
planners believed the problem of poverty could be tackled through rural 
development. 
With the inception of the NEP in - 197 1, the eradication of poverty, being one 
of the two objectives of the NEP (the second of which is the restructuring of 
society and economic balance) (2MP, pp'4-6) becomes a prominent feature in 
subsequent five-year development plans. ' However, in the Second Malaysia 
Plan the state stressed the restructuring of society, while poverty reduction 
strategies were not specified explicitly and no attempt was made to define 
poverty. Statements made in connection to poverty alleviation were rather 
general, using terms such as "modernizing the rural areas" (2MP, p 7) and 
"help create a Malay commercial and industrial community" (ibid. ). 
In line with the above statements, the state advocates a policy of alleviating 
rural poverty by injecting new technology into the rural environment; 
extensive? land development and agricultural modernization, carried out 
through the'application of modem technology; and wider credit and marketing 
facilities. Modernization of the rural areas - also meant the adoption of new 
cultural values such as individual achievement and self reliafice - implying that 
the rural population has to be socialised to the values of the modern sector. 
Although the government does'not state'explicitly the theoretical orientation of 
its development plans, Shamsul. (1976b, p 6) contends that the, Second 
Malaysia Plan (1971-75) was based on an "Integration-Equilibrium- 
Diffusionist Model", which assumes that within the framework of economic 
dualism, development depends on the degree of use of modem technology and 
that development occurs through new capital, institutions and technological 
inputs. This model maintains that within a national framework the growth of 
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the traditional sector is dependent on the modem sector. Thus, in its anti- 
poverty programmes, the Malaysian state deliberately integrates the traditional 
sector into the modem capitalist sector, by means of the introduction"of 
modem inputs, technology, the creation of new institutions and the transfer of 
values from the modem sector into the traditional sector. 
On that account, the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-75) clearly delineates, the 
existence of two separate but interlinked sectors of the economy., The Plan 
identifies four economic sub-sectors, namely, the modem urban, and rural 
sectors, the traditional urban and rural sectors and the government sector 
(2MP, pp 36-37). The Plan asserts that poverty could be reduced by raising the 
income levels and increasing the productivity of labour, through modern 
techniques; provision of education and training, opportunities, and providing a 
wide range of free or subsidised social services (2MP, pp 4-5). 
By comparison, the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80) contains specific poverty 
alleviation "strategies, as by then the extent of poverty had been amply 
comprehended by state , planners. The Plan includes statistics on the 
quantification of poverty, specifying the targets for its reduction as well setting 
out anti-poverty policy measures. The Plan states that: "A key element in the 
attack on poverty will be to enlarge the access of the poor to productive assets, 
I essential production inputs, training, credit, processing and marketing facilities 
and basic social services" (3MP, p 162). The same document recognises that 
the problem of low productivity is linked to various factors, which include 
inadequate-sized holdings, prevalence of tenancy, and lack of drainage and 
irrigation facilities QMP, p 164). 
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Statements in the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80) explicitly show that state 
planners recogni'se the importance of "access" for the'poor. The Plan claims 
that "economic growth can significantly improve the economic position of the 
poor only if it concomitantly provides them with access to and benefits from 
productive assets, training and basic services" (3MP, 'p 169). Furthermore, the 
Plan states that poverty redressal policies embodied in the New Economic 
Policy aim at "ensuring that such access is provided in the shortest time 
possible, on the basis of the resources generated by economic growth (ibid. ). 
There was, however, no explicit explanation' of how such access could be 
provided. 
By'stressing the'concept of access state planners were implicitly accepting the 
Liberal-Pluralist reasons for reform without accepting whole-sale re-casting of 
economic , institutions and social services. Growth that creates opportunities for 
the poor will have greater impact on the poor if they have access to land, 
credit, public infrastructure and services. One may reflect upon the fact that in 
many societies political leaders have found easier to satisfy aspirations for 
equality of opportunity than equality. 
Policies to redistribute land can create opportunitie's for many of the landless 
rural I poor'. However, in Malaysia, in the absence of a major social and 
1 For example, in a study of West Godavari district in India, Parthasarathy and 
Rama Rao (1974, p 85) observe that among the rural labour households 
possessing land, however small the area of such holdings, the proportion of 
households falling below subsistence is lower, and that those who own more 
than 0.4 hectares do not enter the rural wage-labour market at all. 
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political upheaval such as a revolution , political realities forbid land reform. 
Policies aimed at increasing access to land include new land development 
schemes, the provision of more secure tenancies and protection of rights in the 
transfer of ownership. 
Increasing credit to the poor would be achieved through large-scale subsidized 
credit programmes because the poor cannot afford market interest rates. This is 
needed also because. formal lenders are too cautious and informal lenders too 
exploitative. Still, as a disincentive to the non-poor, loans had to be small and 
loan terms had to be strict, or else cheap credit could end up as a transfer 
programme for the non-poor. 
Improving access to infrastructure and technology would be realised through 
public investment in these two areas. This is critical in raising incomes and 
I 
reducing, poverty. Policies also included adapting technologies for small 
farmers and providing rural infrastructure. 
Efforts to reduce poverty in the long-run also require greater investment in 
human capital. Investing in human capital, especially in education2, health and 
nutrition also attacks some of the most important causes of poverty. Thus 
social services are an essential part of any long-term strategy for reducing 
poverty. 
,I 
Nevertheless, we ought to recognize , 
the enormous difference between 
conceding the need for better access, compared with structural change to 
2. As an illustration, Visaria (1991) states that the incidence of poverty 
declines with an increase in the educational level of the head of household. It is 
interesting to note that compared to the poor in the Indian sub-continent, the 
educational attainment of poor heads of households in Peninsula Malaysia 
appears to be better, and communications with them should be easier than in 
the subcontinent (Visaria, 1981, pp 46-47). 
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equalise conditions and incomes. It is like the difference between equality of 
opportunity and equality. From the'statements regarding "access" which were 
quoted from the Third Malaysia'Plan it is'clear that Malaysian state planners 
have an orientation * towards traditional neo-classical - economics, which is 
acceptable to the World Bank - perhaps 'e, to the presence of World Bank du 
advisers in'the Economic Planning 'Unit. ' In fact this substantiates the gues -s 
3 Yetý it is structural 'change 'which might produce made in chapter Seven 
greater -impact on" the poor, but would certainly ý arouse' violent opposition 
intemally and extemally. 
OFFICIAL DEFINITIONS OF POVERTY 
This section presents a critical review of the official definitions of poverty 
which are applied in, the five-year development plan documents. The earliest 
definition of poverty, in the sequence of Five-Year Planning documents, is 
found in the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80). -Using an absolute approach 
in 
defining poverty, the Plan states that "poverty in the country has been 
measured by comparing absolute levels of household income with the income 
required for minimum subsistence ...... takes account of other non-food 
requirements of each household to sustain a decent standard of living" (3MP, p 
160). However, there was no further elaboration of the food and non-food 
requirements needed by individuals and households; and the income level 
required for minimum subsistence was not specified anywhere in the 
document. Even so, by using the above-mentioned definition of poverty, the 
Plan estimates that in 1970 49.3 percent of all households in Peninsula 
Malaysia lived in poverty (ibid. ). 
3. Refer to "Summary and Concluding Remarks" in Chapter Seven. 
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In contrast, the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85) adopts the relative approach to 
poverty. Poor households are defined as the lowest - four deciles in the size 
distribution of income (4MP, p 36). Table 8.1 shows income gains accruing to 
poor households as a result of the economic progress in the country between 
1971 to 1979, in current prices. During this period the mean income of poor 
households as a whole increased at the rate of 10.5 percent per annum. - Yet, as 
was discussed in chapter Six, the relative approach is not an accurate means of 
measuring poverty inasmuch that this approach is "insensitive to the rate of 
movement out of poverty if more than 40 percent of the people are poor. It 
measures only those left behind" (Fields, 1980, p 29). 
Table 8.1 





1970 1976 1979 1971-79 
M 
Malay 56.76 101.95 140.35 10.6 
Chinese 135.93 247.27 280.11 8.4 
Indian 112.48 197.21 263.43 9.9 
Total 75.90 142.19 186.19 10.5 
Source: Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-85, Table 3-3, 
p. 37; (adapted). 
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In the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-90) the state reverts back to the absolute 
definition of poverty ,. This document states that: "Poverty has been 
conceptualised in terms of the ability of the average Malaysian household to 
consume sufficient goods and services. The poverty line income is defined as 
an income sufficient to purchase a minimum -food basket to maintain a 
household in good nutritional health and the conventional needs in respect of 
clothing and footwear, rent, fuel and power, transport and communications, 
health, education; and recreation" (5MP,, p 83). Although the definition does 
not list the food items or the nutritional value contained in the "minimum food 
basket" it did specify, albeit in broad terms, the non-food items which ought to 
be accounted for in measuring the poverty line income. 
The publication of the Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1989) signifies a 
marked departure from the past. For the first time the govemment has revealed 
the official poverty line income, a measurement which not only reflects the 
absolute poverty level but acknowledges the need to maintain its value relative 
to change in the cost of the standard of living. The Review states that "the 
poverty line income essentially consists of three major components that include 
food, clothing and footwear, and the non-food items such as rent, fuel and 
power, transport and communications, health, education, and recreation 
i [and] is updated annually using the Consumer Price Index to reflect changes in 
price levels" (R5MP, p 45). For the year 1987 the poverty line income is 
about $350 per month for a household of 5.14 persons (ibid. ). Based on this 
poverty line income, for 1987 the incidence of poverty in Peninsula Malaysia 
was 17.3 percent (R5MP, p 47). 
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Even so, we have to be cautious in accepting the official poverty line income. 
In 1984 the Economic Planning Unit set the poverty line income at $349 for a 
family of 5.14 persons4. It is clear that the poverty line income has not been 
adjusted between 1984 and 1987. 
Furthermore, no differentiations, particularly in the cost of living, are made 
between urban and rural areas. There are no specifications of the differences in 
the age and sex requirements of a family. Different dietary or nutritional 
requirements between rural - and urban families or between different, 
occupational groups are not given any consideration at all. We oughtAo be 
aware that in rural areas certain basic necessities are obtained through minimal 
or no cost at all. One example is rent for accomodation, which may form a 
substantial proportion of the income of the urban poor; whereas there is a 
greater possibility for the rural poor to live in houses which they own, and 
which are therefore rent-free. 
11 1 
Another salient point concerns the accuracy of the Consumer Price Index 
(CBI). The state itself doubts the accuracy of the CBI figures, having admitted 
that: "No revision has been made to, the weights in the present index since 
1980" (Finance Minister's Budget Speech, 14.12.1990). For that reason, the 
rate of inflation, estimated at 3.2 percent in 1990 (FEER, 27.12.1990, p 35) is 
not accurately reflected by the CBI, and this has serious implications on the 
cogency of the poverty line income. If the state's effort to reduce poverty is to 
be effective, information is needed on how the poor derive'and spend their 
incomes so that policymakers are able to assess how changes in relative prices 
will affect real incomes. 
4. Personal communication with the Poverty Division, Economic Planning 
Unit, 1985. 
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Accordingly, it ought to be recognized that the poverty line income has a 
number of inherent limitations. An income based approach towards measuring 
poverty necessarily needs to be supplemented by other dimensions that affect 
household living standards, such as accessibility to basic needs and the quality 
of life, particularly accessibility to services like education, health and physical 
infrastructure. 
However, from the official definitions of poverty that have been discussed in 
the preceding paragraphs, it could be safely argue that Malaysian state planners 
accept that the absolute -measure, of poverty reflecting individual material 
needs, compared with a relative or more social measure which reflects citizens' 
need to participate in an evolving social structure, is more relevant for 
Malaysia. 
MEASUREMENTS OF POVERTY IN MALAYSIA 
In Malaysia both the absolute and the relative approaches in defining the levels 
of poverty have' been applied at one time or the other. Both these methods of 
measurement shall be discussed below. 
RELATIVE APPROACH 
In applying the relative approach to Malaysia, Anand (1977) defines a poor 
household as one with a total, income that falls below the bottom 40 percent in 
the national income distribution. . Based on 1970 income and 
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prices and using data obtained in the Post Enumeration Survey of the 1970 
Population Census5, Anand (1977, p 3) estimates that the lowest 40 percent of 
households in Malaysia earned an average income of about $150 per month. 
TaIdng an average size of six persons per household each individual should 
have an income of $25- per month, below which the individual would be 
considered to be living in poverty. However, there was no explanation of what 
the sum of $25 was intended to purchase. The cut-off point was defined for 
computational convenience more than anything' else. The proportion of 
individuals, who fall below this level of percapita household - income was 
estimated at 40.2 percent, while the proportion of households living below this 
poverty line was 36.5 percent, largely due to the fact that the poor have larger- 
sized households on average than the non-poor (Anand, 1977, pp 3-4). 
The figure of $25 monthly percapita, poverty line income was adopted by the 
state. This point was expressed in the Treasury Economic Report of 1974/75, 
which t states that - "one could simply define the bottom 40 percent, of the 
population in ý the national percapita household income as being poor" (TER, 
1974/75, pp 84-85). However, there was no justification of the choice of 40 
percent as mentioned above. In this instance, again it could be assumed that 
the figure was chosen for computational convenience. 
In chapter Six it was'argued that there are several disadvantages in using the 
relative approach in defining the poverty line income. It does -not measure 
adequately the population who are in poverty because it is assumed at all times 
relatively 40 percent of the whole population are living below the poverty line. 
For that reason, perhaps, the relative approach was applied in the country for a 
5. 'In the Post Enumeration Survey the concept of individual and household 
income includes wages and salaries; business, property and interestl income; 
and transfers, both in cash and kind (Anand, 1977, p 2). 
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short period only until the formulation of an absolute measurement of poverty 
in 1975. 
ABSOLUTE APPROACH 
Attempts to define an absolute poverty line for Malaysia were first initiated by 
the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW) in 1975. In this instance the poverty 
line income has been identified as an index that separates the poor ftom the 
non-poor. The major objective of this exercise was to institute "a scheme of 
social assistance based on the principles of social justice Whereby all those in 
poverty through circumstances beyond their control should be 'eligible for 
assistance in the quantum related to their needs" (MSW, 1975, p 105). Thus 
the poverty line was identified in terms of the income required "to maintain a 
family in good nutritional health plus an additional figure for the minimum 
conventional needs in respect of'cloihinj, household management, transport 
and communication" (MSW, 1975, p 106). Certainly this was very close to 
formulations of a "subsistence" basis for the definition of poverty. 
Basically, the computation of an absolute poverty line devised by the Ministry 
of Social Welfare was somewhat similar to the foodbasket method devised by 
Mollie Orshansky' for the United States Social Security Administration 
(Orshansky, 1965)'. In the Malaysian case, data on food consumption and other 
expenditures were based on data available in the 1973 Household Expenditure 
Survey. The food budget, on a low scale diet required to Maintain good 
nutritional health, was devised with the assistance of the Institute of Medical 
Research. In choosing items for the food basket, the Ministry allowed'for the 
different dietary habits and conventions of the three major ethnic communities 
i 
in 'the ý country. As far as possible, the cheapest food items, particularly 
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vegetables, were chosen. Two varieties of fish, ikan cincaru and ikan 
kembong, from the mackerel family, were chosen; however these were not 
necessarily the cheapest but they formed the two most common types of fish 
consumed by the low income group. Sweetened condensed'milk for adults and 
powdered milk for children were recommended by the nutritionist. The choice 
for meat was a combination of beef and chicken for the Malays, pork and 
chicken for the Chinese, and mutton and chicken for the Indians (MSW, 1975p 
pp 118-19). 
Calculations of the minimum food budget was computed separately for adult 
males and females by ethnic groups and for children, both according to rural 
and urban locations. However, there were little variations between rural and 
urban prices for the items considered in the food basket. Also, there was little 
difference in the cost of different food baskets for the three ethnic groups. The 
minimum food budget, as calculated by the Institute of Medical Research, for 
a family of five was $160.82 per month (MSW, 1975, p 119). 
With the food budget established at the rate mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph, the poverty line was then estimated by using three different 
formulae, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
In Method 1 the proportion of total expenditure on food was estimated for 
families with monthly incomes of less than $200. The 1973 Household 
Expenditure Survey shows, on average, this income group spends 50.1 percent 
of their total household expenditure on food and the remaining of their 
expenditure on all non-food items, as listed in Table 8.2. The poverty line was 
then calculated as a sum of the food budget plus an aggregate estimate for all 
the non-food expenditure. Based on this method, the poverty line income was 
calculated as follows: 
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Table 8.2 
Peninsular Malaysia: Monthly ExWnditure of all 
Households and Households with monthly Incomes 
of less than $200 in 1973 








Items % % 
Food 36.2 50.1 
Beverage & Tobacco 3.8 4.8 
Clothing & Footwear 5.6 4.1 
Gross rent, fuel & power 14.9 17.4 
Furniture, furnishing 
" household equipment 
" operation 4. 2.5 
Medical care 
& health expenses 1.7 1.0 
Transport 
& communication 12.2 5. 
Recreation, entertainment, 
education & 
cultural services 6.7 2.7 
Miscellaneous goods 
& services 14.8 12.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Malaysia, Department of Statistics Household Expenditure 
Survey 1973, Report No. 1, Table 4.7, p. 84. 
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Poverty Line =A+ (x/y x A) 
where: A= Food Budget 
x=% of the total expenditure on all non-food 
items 
y=% of total expenditure on food 
Poverty Line = $160.82 + (49.9/50.1 x $160.82) 
$320.99 
In Method, 2, in contrast to Method 1, the non-food budget was restricted to 
only four essential items; namely, (i) clothing and footwear, (ii) rent, fuel and 
power, (iii) household equipment and operation, (iv) transport and 
communications. Therefore all non-food items other than those listed above 
were excluded from the poverty line budget. The poverty line is obtained as 
sum of the food budget and the calculated minimum requirement for each of 
the four non-food items mentioned above. Therefore, compared to Method 1, a 
lower poverty line would be expected. By using Method 2 the poverty line for 
a family of five persons was calculated as follows: 
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Poverty Line =A+B+C+D+ E' 
wh6ie'A = Food Budget 
B '= calculated minimum requirement' for* 
clothing and footwear 
C calculated minimum requirement for rent, 
fuel and power based on proportional 
expenditure . .1 ill, - 
D calculated minimum requirement for 
household equipment and operation based on 
proportional expenditure 
E= calculated minimum requirement for 
transport and communications 
Poverty Line $160.82 + ($160.82 x 4.4/50.1) 
+ ($160.82 x'16.5/50. I)' 
+ ($160.82 x 2.4/50.1) 
+ ($160.82 x 5.2/50.1) 
$160.82 + $91.47 
$252.29 
In Method 3 the poverty line was'arriv6d at by adding the value'ýd the 
minimum food budget to the actual expenditure incurred on non-food items, as 
classified in Method 2, but with adjustments for price increases between July 
1973 to August 1974. The relevant percentages increases in prices are: 1) 
clothing 'and fb6twear 9 percent; 2) rent,, 'fuel and power 9.6 percent; 3) 
household , equipment and operation 18.4 percent; transport and 
communications 18.4 percent. By using this method the poverty line for a 
household of five persons was calculated as follows: 
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Poverty Line =A+ [(b +c+d+ e) x 5], 
where A= Food Budget (as in Methods I& 2) 
actual expenditure on clothing and footwear 
c= actual expenditure on rent, fuel and power 
d= actual expenditure on household equipment and 
operation 
e actual expenditure on transport and 
communications I 
Poverty Line = $160.82 + [(1.40 + 5.35 + 0.85 
1.70) x 5] 
= $160.82 + 46.54 
= $207.36 
The poverty line incomes derived at by using all three methods were readjusted 
according to 1970 prices. Subsequently, the poverty line in 1970, by applying 
Methods 1,2 and 3, was estimated as $207.70, $163.24 and $142.80 per 
month per household of five members respectively. By adopting Methods 1,2 
and 3 the proportion of households living in poverty in 1970 were estimated at 
60 percent, 48.5 percent and 42.3 percent respectively (MSW, 1975, p 130). 
Further calculations by Anand (1983) shows that the absolute percapita poverty 
line income under Method 2 in 1970 was $32.60 per month, while under 
Method 3 it was $28.60 (Anand, 1983, p 118). To Anand these estimates "turn 
out to be fairly close to the $25 percapita poverty line income of the relative 
approach" (Anand, 1983, p 118), a figure which have been mentioned in the 
previous sub-section (in the discussion of the relative approach in measuring 
poverty). 
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Yet, there are several flaws in the computation of the poverty line income 
derived by using each of the Methods 1,2 and 3. Anand (1977, pp 6-7), for 
instance draws attention to the fact that the non-food budgei 'in Method 1 
includes many items which are inessential for subsistence living. Methods 2 
and 3 appear to be closer to the notion of subsistence for the reason that these 
two methods specify only certain non-food items as essential to the "minimum" 
diet. Still, in all these methods the food basket chosen is not a "nutritional 
minimum" because it is drawn "basically from the diet provided in 
Government Hospitals for a normal average a dult" while for children it is 
based on the "diet required for normal growth and maintenance of good 
nutritional health" (MSW, 1975, p 118). 
Essentially in drawing- a poverty line based on a minimum diet plan, it is 
necessary in principle to have nutritional data in detail by age and sex and by 
type of activity, as these may vary considerably and therefore affect the 
estimates. Furthermore by assuming a unified-sized family across-the-board 
with equal nutritional requirements, the Ministry ignored important differences 
in consumption between different sexes and age groups. On account of this, it 
would be more relevant I to speak in terms of consumption units rather than 
family members. Also there is the problem of updating the food and household 
budget in accordance with changes in the consumption norms of the public. 
Therefore the food budget used I as a, basis for defining the absolute . subsistence 
poverty level "appears to be based more on general consumption patterns than 
on the absolute minimum required for subsistence" (Anand, 1977, p 6). For 
this reason the Ministry's minimum food budget is likely to be higher than one 
which is based strictly on a subsistence definition. Precisely because the 
poverty line drawn up by Methods 2 and 3 are in fact a consumption 
expenditure rather than an income poverty line, no account was taken of the 
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saving behaviour of the various income groups. The poverty line based on the 
calculations by the Ministry of Social Welfare therefore represents the level of 
expenditure and not of income which is necessary to ensure a minimum 
standard of living. 
As an alternative to the poverty line drawn, up by the Ministry of Social 
Welfare this study will now consider two measures of poverty line devised by 
Shari (1979, pp 422-425). In his Poverty Measure I Shari calculates the 
minimum total income requirements for a household by using the Engel 
coefficient; i. e. the proportion of income spent on food. The poverty line, is 
derived by using the following formula: 
Poverty Line = FB x I/EF 
where FB = Food Budget 
EF = Engel Coefficient 
Thus by using the actual consumption pattern on food and non-food items as 
obtained in the 1973 Household Expenditure Survey, Shari arrived at a poverty 
line of $47.88 -for urban areas and $42.27 for rural areas (in terms of a 
monthly percapita income) for the year 1973. 
Shari's Poverty Measure II follows the method suggested by Oshima (1977). 
Unlike Orshanky's (1956) food basket, this method is based on actual 
consumption patterns, because the proportion of income allocated to basic 
necessities, - such as food, is an indicator of the economic well-being of an 
individual, household or society. 
The poverty line is determined by first grouping the households according to 
percapita income into ten equal deciles arranged in descending order, and then 
the Engel coefficient is calculated for each decile. The percapita expenditure 
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corresponding to the income decile in which the Engel coefficient begins to fall 
may be interpreted as the income level pertaining to households which have 
met most of their very urgent food needs. Thus those households with incomes 
below this income level are considered poor. In principle this reference to 
criteria by which an income "t4reshold" can be decided was also adopted by 
Townsend in the "relative deprivation" standard of poverty (Townsend, 1979, 
especially Chapter 6). By using this method Shari estimated the percapita 
expenditure of $38.33 as the poverty line for 1973. '- 
On the whole, the crucial difference between Shari's poverty measures and the 
calculations by the Ministry of Social- Welfare is the way in which Shari and 
the Ministry'viewed the degree of Comparative essentials included in their 
formulae. Shari's measures were based on actual consumption patterns of food 
and nofi-food items as obtained in the Household Expenditure Survey 1973. 
All three methods devised by the Ministry, on the other hand, were based on a 
food basket consisting of a low scale diet drawn up by the Institute of Medical 
Research, plus minimum requirements for the non-food items in Methods 1 
and 2, and actual expenditure on non-food items were used in Method 3. 
On a'more salient point, Shari's measures appear to have a higher degree of 
generosity built into each of his formula. His food basket was not based on any 
recommended minimum subsistence diet; instead it was based on actual 
consumption patterns. By using the actual consumption patterns in all his 
measures, Shari had attempted to overcome the problem of arbitrariness in 
determining the needs of the poor, However, as shown in Table 8.3, this 
means that Shari's poverty threshold is higher than those based on the 
calculations by either the Ministry of Social Welfare or the Economic Planning 
Unit. Thus this study contends that Shari's poverty measures are more 
preferable than those of the Ministry of Social Welfare. 
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Table 8.3 








Rural' Ur6ýn` Total 
1. Shan 
i Poverty Measure I J973 30 59 49.7 
$42.27 (rural) ' _ 
$47.88, (urban) 
.... ... 
ii Poverty Measure 11 1973 51.5 18.7 40.9 
$38.33 (peninsula) 
2. Economic Planning-. 
Unit 46.5 18.6 37.5 
$34.58 (rural) 
$38.33 (urban) 
3. Ministry of Social 
Welfare 
Method 3 
$28.60 (peninsula) 1970 42.3 
Sources: Shari (1979), pp. 425; 434; Table 4, p. 427; Table 5, p 431; 
Ministry of Social Welfare (1975), p. 130. 
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A REVIEW OF POVERTY LINES III 
The amount of monthly income required by a family in order to remain above 
the poverty line obviously changes over time'according to the general -price 
level in the country. The amount further changes in keeping with variations in 
the quantities of non-food items which are considered essential for each family 
member. Prior to the year' 1989, for reasons known to itself only, the 
government did not disclose the poverty datum line for any income group or 
community in the country. Details of the computation of the poverty datum 
line are not available outside the appropriate government circles. With the 
exception of the Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1989), - what, is made 
known, in the Five Year Development Plans is merely the extent of the 
incidence of poverty in the country. 
Nevertheless, several attempts to define the absolute poverty line have been 
carried out'by individual researchers, such as Shari (1979), and also by 
researchers working for the World Bank. For example,, for the year 1970, 
judging from the detailed poverty incidence figures quoted in the Third 
Malaysia 'Plan (1976-80),, Anand (1983) suspects the government used a 
percapita poverty-line income of $33 per month (Anand, 1983, p 133). This 
figure is similar ý to the poverty line income obtained by computations under 
Method 2 of the Ministry of Social Welfare. 
Hasan (1980, fn 13, p 43) believes that in 1975 Malaysian officials appeared to 
consider all households with a monthly income of $180 per household in, 1970 
prices as living below the minimum standard or below the poverty line. Taking 
into account the average household size of 5.5 persons as reported by the 1970 
Population, Census or 5.4 persons as estimated by the 1973 Household 
Expenditure Survey, the percapita poverty line income in 1970 prices would be 
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$33, which again is similar to calculations under Method 2 of the Ministry of 
Social Welfare. 
Visaria (1981,. p 41) states that in 1977 the World Bank specified separate 
poverty lines for, urban and rural areas, at a level of a monthly household 
expenditure of $246.1, for rural households and $272.6 or 11 percent higher 
for urban households or $252.4 for the peninsula as a whole, all at current 
prices. Different standards for, urban and rural areas were adopted due to 
lifestyle and cost of living, differentials found in these two sectors. Having 
made adjustments for the rise in the consumer price index between 1973 and 
1977, -for the year 1973 Visaria (ibid. ) obtained a poverty line in terms of a 
monthly percapita expenditure of $38.33 for urban areas, $34.58 for rural 
areas and $35.67 for the peninsula as a whole. 
For comparative purposes, Visaria (1981, p 52) confirms that in some of its 
work the World Bank uses a poverty line in terms of a monthly income of 
$187.80 for Peninsula Malaysia, or $202.08 for urban areas and $183.10 for 
rural areas, all at 1973 prices. In terms of a monthly percapita income the 
poverty line incomes are equivalent to $34,78 for Peninsula Malaysia, $37.56 
for urban areas and $33.91 for rural areas. Visaria (ibid. ) contends that these 
poverty lines are only slightly lower than those of his estimates which are 
based, on the monthly percapita expenditure. 
Similarly, Shari (1979, p 425) refers to the Economic Planning Unit estimates 
of the official poverty line for 1973, in terms of monthly percapita incomes of 
$34.58 in rural areas and $38.33 in the urban areas, or $35.67 for the 
peninsula as a whole - all these figures are comparable to the Visaria's (1981) 
computations. Clearly this is an indication that the poverty line figures used by 
Economic Planning Unit were calculated by World Bank advisers. 
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For the year 1978, Bussink (1980,116)'reports that the Economid Planning 
unit had lowered the poverty line income for Peninsula'Malaysia from $33 to 
$29 percapita per month, or equivalent to approximatelyl 160 per'month for 
an average household of 5.5 persons, in 1970 prices. Bussink (ibid. )'attributes 
this revision to the use of a less generous diet than was used in the earlier 
estimates. By using the revised poverty line income, about 43 percent of the 
population was in poverty in 1975'and about 38 percent in 1976 (Bussink, 
ibid. ). These figures are comparable to the estimates of the incidence of 
poverty presented in the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-85), which was 43.9 
percent in 1975 and 35.1 percent in 1976 (4MP, pp 33; 43). 
POVERTY PROFILE 
The preceding section reviewed the various statistical estimates of the poverty 
line income for Peninsula Malaysia. Thus it is appropriate that this section 
presents a profile of poverty'' in'Peninsula Malaysia, using data obtained from 
the Development Plan documents and bearing in mind that data limitations 
6 
might impose constraints on the details of poverty in the country. 
INCIDENCE OF POVERTY 
Measured on the basis of the poverty line income the incidence of poverty in 
Peninsula Malaysia declined from 49.3 percent in 1970 to 47.6 percent in 1976 
(4MP, p 85), and the figure declined further from 18.4 percent in 1984 to 17.3 
percent in 1987 (R5MP, p 47). These figures show a reduction of 
6. Presumably for political and economic reasons, "the Malaysian government 
is very sensitive about the release of its data" (Mangahas, 1979, p 12). 
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approximately 65 percent in the incidence of poverty between 1970 and 1987, 
which is certainly a substantial reduction. Yet the substantial reduction of 
poverty was not accompanied by a corresponding substantial reduction in 
income inequalities. In chapter Five it was noted that between 1970 to 1987 
the trends in the distribution of household income indicate that the pattern of 
inequalities has altered only marginally during that period. In other words, had 
a more generous poverty line been used, the conclusion concerning the 
reduction of poverty during the period mentioned above might have been 
different. Still, it is quite possible for a country to reduce the extent of absolute 
poverty without a substantial reduction in the extent of income inequalities. In 
Malaysia the gini coefficients narrowed from 0.51 in 1970 to 0.48 in 1984 
(5MP, p 100), which means there has been a slight improvement in the 
distribution of household income during the period in discussion. 
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF POVERTY 
Poverty in the peninsula is a rural phenomenon7. Table 8.4 shows that in 1984 
the incidence of poverty in the rural ares was 24.7 percent, while in the urban 
areas it was only 8.2 percent; As many as 83.2 percent of the total poor 
households are located in the rural areas (5MP, p 86). By 1987 the situation 
has not changed significantly. Although the incidence of rural poverty 
decreased slightly to 22.4 percent in 1987, the incidence of urban poverty 
remained at 8 percent, while the proportion of rural households in the rural 
7. This study has pointed out in chapters 3,4 and 7 that the causes of rural 
poverty could be traced back to the underdevelopment of the Malay peasantry 
which took place during the colonial regime and was not properly rectified by 
the independent government. 
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areas also remained constant at 83 percent (R5MP, p 56), thus showing that 
the effects of a depressed world economy plus inflation are some of the reasons 
which prohibited a significant reduction of the rate of poverty during the 
period in discussion. 
If we look closely at the breakdown of the figures of the incidence of poverty, 
it is interesting to note that there are remarkable differences in the incidence of 
poverty within the rural sector, in particular amongst the "target groups" - 
from 15 percent for estate workers to 50.2 percent for padi farmers. It may be 
possible that the incomes of padi farmers, for example, were probably 
underestimated. Goods and services produced for their own consumption were 
not accounted for in the calculations of income - perhaps only monetary 
income was taken into account. 
Table 8.5 shows that poverty tends to be concentrated in a few states. Four 
states, namely, Trengganu, Kelantan, Kedah and Perlis (all these states have a 
predominantly Malay population and a high concentration of rubber 
smallholders, padi farmers and fishermen) accounted for as much as 44 percent 
of the total poor households in 1987. Trengganu appeared to have been 
affected gravely by the economic recession of the mid-1980s, which is 
reflected by its high incidence of poverty of 36 percent, an increase of 24 
percent between 1984 and 1987. The incidence of poverty in the states which 
depend less on agriculture due to their substantial secondary sector, namely, 
the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, Negri Sembilan and Selangor also 
registered increases due to the sluggish growth in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors, thereby retarding the growth of sufficient employment to'absorb the 
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POPULATION GROUPS IN POVERTY 
In terms of poverty target groups, the incidence of poverty is highest within 
three target groups comprising rubber smallholders, padi farmers and coconut 
smallholders, followed by fishermen and estate workers (Refer to Table 8.4). 
The first three groups together accounted for 29 percent of the total poor 
households in 1987 (R5MP, p 52). 
Another group that deserves special attention in anti-poverty programmes 
comprise what are called the "hard-core" poor. The state defines this group as 
those households with incomes less than half of the poverty line income 
(RSMP, p 58), meaning that in 1987 the average household consisting of 5.14 
persons earned incomes of $125 or less. By using this definition, the incidence 
of poverty among the hard-core poor decreased from 6.3 percent in 1984 to 
4.8 percent in 1987 (R5MP, p 58). 
While it is true that poverty cuts across racial lines, undeniably, for reasons 
that were discussed in chapter Three (i. e. the underdevelopment of the Malay 
peasantry), the problem of poverty is largely a Malay one. From Table 8.6 it 
can be deduced that in 1987 Malay households accounted for almost three- 
quarter of the total poor households in the peninsula; compared with 12.7 
percent for Chinese households and 5.5 percent for Indian households (R5MP, 
p 55). Although the incidence of Malay poverty declined from 25.8 percent in 
1984 to 23.8 percent in 1987, the number of poor Malay households increased 
by 1.2 percent, from 388,800 to 393,000, during the same period. In 
comparison, in 1987 the incidence of poverty within Chinese and Indian 
households are 7 percent and 9.7 percent respectively. It is worth mentioning 
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that all ethnic groups except the Chinese experienced increases in absolute 
numbers of poor households during the period 1984 to 1987. 
POVERTY AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUP 
Poor households, " ý by reason of their location in the rural areas, tend to 
disproportionately engaged in the agricultural sector. Table 8.7 shows that in 
1976 almost 69 percent of the heads of poor households were engaged in the 
agriculture, forestry and fishing sub-sector. In chapter Five it was mentioned 
that employment in the agricultural sector as a proportion of total employment 
decreased from 50.3 percent in 1970 to 36 percent in 1985 (refer, to Table 
5.3). However, structural changes in the labour force and employment did not 
have significant effects on the incidence of poverty in, the rural sector. As a 
case in point, in 1984 over 67 percent of the total poor households were 
engaged in the rural sector (R5MP, p 96), which means that between 1976 and 
1987 the percentage of heads of poor households engaged in the rural sector 
did not decline significantly., Accordingly, it can be deduced that although 





Industry Rural Urban Total 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Hunting-& fishing 75.4- 14.6 68.8 
Mining & Quarrying 1.3 1.0 1.3 
Manufacturing 4.7 11.9 5.5 
Electricity, gas & water 0.3 1.7 0.5 
Construction 3.2 10.9 4.0 
Wholesale & retail trade, 
restaurants & hotels 5.5 19.3 7.0 
Transpoýt, storage & 
communication 3.2 13.8 4.3 
Finance, insurance, real 
estate & business services 0.3 1.6 0'. 4 
Community, ýocial & 
personal services 5.4 22.4 7.2 
Activities not defined or 
defined inadequately 0.7 2.8 1.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Fourth Malaysia Plan, Table 3.6, p., 50 
(adapted). 
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In terms of the employment status of heads of poor households, due to the 
absence of current data, this analysis has to depend on data for 1976, which is 
presented in Table 8.8. In 1976 a total of 45 percent of poor households were 
headed by self-employed persons, especially in the rural areas, followed by 
wage-earners who accounted for 41 percent of the total heads of poor 
households (4MP, p5 1). Presumably the wage-earners included estate workers 
and industrial production workers in the secondary sector. Data for 1987, 
although limited in scope, reveals that in the urban areas where poor 
households, I particularly'-in the construction, trade and transport sub-sectors, 
were distinctly affected by-unemployment and retrenchment, about 40 percent 
of these households were headed by unemployed persons and a further 23 
percent were headed by production workers in the manufacturing sub-sector 
(R5MP, p 57). 
POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL STATUS 
There is a positive coffeletation between poverty and the level of education, as 
statistics reveal that heads of poor households tend to be less educated. Data 
for the year 1976, which is presented in Table 8.9, shows that persons with no 
formal education forms 35.4 percent of all heads of poor households, while 
another 60 percent had some form of formal elementary education of not more 
than six years. 
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Table 8.8 
Peninsular Malaysia* PercenLaZe among Heads of poor Households 
Employment Status. 1976 
Activity status Rural Urban, Totat, 
Self employed 47.9 25.4 45.2 
Working for wages 39.4 53.1 41.0 
Family worker 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Looking after home 5.7 9.4 6.2 
Others 6.7 11.9 7.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: 'Fourth Malaysia Plan, Table 3.7, p. 5 1, 
(adapted). 
Table 8.9 
Peninsula Malaysia: Education Level 
of Heads of Roor Households. 1976 
(in Pgrcenta es) gm 
Educational Level Rural Urban Total 
No formal education 36.1 30.8 35.4 
0-6 years (elementary) 60.2 59.1 60.0 
7-9 years 
(lower secondary) 2.6 6.9 3.2 
10- 11 years (upper 
secondary) 0.5 2.4 0.9 
Tertiary education 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Others 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Fourth Malaysia Plan, Tab. 3-8, p. 52, 
(adapted). 
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POVERTY AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE'ý 
Besides data on the incidence of povertyl: planners often gauge the- success, of 
poverty alleviation policies on the progress that has been made in, enhancing 
the quality of life of the citizens. In general; significant progress has been 
made in the provision of basic services like education, health, communications 
and public utilities. 
Life expectancy for Malaysians has increased from 66.7 years in 1980 to 67.6 
years in 19844or males, and from 71.6 years, to 72.7 years during the same 
period for females (R5MP, p 58). By the year 1987 up to 73 percent of the 
rural households are, supplied with potable and 'piped water, while some - 88 
percent of the rural areas 'are, supplied with electricity (R5MP, p 59). 
Ostensibly, it may be concluded that at least some of the fruits of economic 
growth have trickled down to the lowest socio-economic groups in the society. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS' i 
From the preceding analysis of the various levels of poverty line income for 
Peninsula Malaysia, 'which is summarised in Table 8.3, the reader will be 
aware by now, there is no agreement on what the poverty line ought to be. 
Nevertheless, it can be deduced that the poverty line incomes (for 1970 
mainly) quoted in this chapter, on - the whole, do not vary widely from the 
figure of $33 monthly percapita income, obtained under Method 2 of the 
Ministry of Social Welfare. Yet, for financial reasons the Ministry uses the 
poverty line obtained by Method 3 (which is $142.80 for a family of five in 
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1970 prices). For convenience of computation the cut-off point was set at 
$150, and for that reason only families with a total income below $150 per 
month could qualify for public assistance- (MSW, 1975, pI 11). 
In the final analysis, as Anand (1977, p 7) suggests: "The choice of a poverty 
line must to some extent remain arbitrary". The appropriate choice of a 
poverty, datum line should consider the sensitivity of both the absolute and 
relative approach of defining poverty. Furthermore, as George points out 
"Government policies on poverty are influenced not so, much. by findings of 
research studies and the arguments of academics but, by wider political, 
ideological and economic considerations" (George, 1988, p 87). It is the values 
and the interests of the dominant groups in society that shape the official 
poverty line, which affects the daily lives of millions of poor people. A higher 
poverty line inevitably means substantial vertical redistribution while a low 
poverty, line may involve very little redistribution. 
Most important,. as a rule, the subsistence level or poverty line announced by 
the state sets a floor to urban wages as much as trade unionism or political 
interference. Any move to raise or lower the poverty datum line therefore 
should take into consideration the benefits and disadvantages that might accrue 
to the society. A lower poverty', datum line which is intended to reduce the 
number of people living in poverty might have serious consequences if thereby 
the state fails to take the problem seriously and inflation prevails at a high rate. 
One possible outcome of this would be to have done too little to prevent 
poverty arising (say by structural action) and as a result having a large section 




PROSPECTS FOR EGALITARIAN GROWTH? 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Eight it was pointed out that the incidence of poverty in Peninsula 
Malaysia, as measured by the Malaysian Government, had declined from 49.3 
percent in 1970 to 17.3 percent in 1987 (R5MP, p 47). Paradoxically, the 
macro-distributional picture, as revealed by available data on the size 
distribution of household incomes, shows that although the overall relative 
inequalities have not increased, and according to data for 1984-87 may have 
decreased in that period, severe income disparities still persist. 
Despite a drop of 65 percent in the incidence of poverty between 1970-87, the 
degree of inequality in Malaysia, as manifested in the pattern of income 
distribution has not undergone any major structural change. In the light of the 
trends of income distribution discussed in Chapter Five, Malaysia could not be 
considered to be among the more egalitarian countries. In 1987 the richest 20 
percent of the population had a mean monthly household income of $2752, 
seven and a half times that of the sum of $370 for the poorer 40 percent 
(R5MP, Table, 3-3, p 42). It may safely be assumed that the performance of 
the Malaysian anti-poverty policies in narrowing income disparities between 
the rich and the poor could be described as "very small" rather than as 
"substantial" or "impressive". 
251 
Based on the discussion, in chapter Five, on development trends since 1970, 
this study contends is that while the state may be concerned with the reduction 
of absolute poverty, it is not totally committed to reducing social inequalities 
or relative poverty - significantly. , The - discussion , in - this 1 chapter will 
demonstrate further the failure of state policies in effecting a more equitable 
distribution of income and resources. 
The analysis focuses on policies designed to alleviate poverty and increase the 
income of the poor, particularly those in the poverty target groups. Broadly, 
the analysis will concentrate on three areas of anti-poverty policies; namely, 
rural development, poverty reduction 'measures in the urban areas, and the 
effects of public expenditure on the redistribution of income and resources. " 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTIO 
Considering that the rural sector traditionally contains a-, higher incidence of 
poverty, with the inception of the New Economic Policy in 1971 an explicit 
objective of rural development is the eradication of rural poverty. Through the 
appraisal of the post-NEP Five, Year Development Plans, it may be concluded 
that the basic rural poverty -alleviation strategy is made up of several major 
components, which could be grouped as i) land development;! ii) policies 
designed to increase productivity of poverty target groups, through such 
measures as the replanting of rubber and the double-cropping of rice and in 
situ development programmes; and iii) general social, and physical 
infrastructure. The following sections will discuss the nature of these poverty 
eradication measures, with the aim of analysing the effects of state intervention 
on the various income groups. The focus, however, will be limited to a 
discussim. on land development, and measures aimed at increasing the 
productivity and income of rubber smallholders and padi farmers. 
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LAND DEVELOPMENT 
Although several types of land development schemes are implemented by 
agencies of the statel; this'study proposes to examine the role of Felda, the 
model agency for land development, and the resettlement of rural' landless 
population. Considering, that land development is a major instrument of anti- 
poverty policy, therefore Felda plays a leading role in the Malaysian 
agricultural and rural development strategy. 
I 
Felda was- created on I July, 19562, 'ýthus fulfilling the newly elected (in the 
1955 general election) government's promise to provide land for the landless, 
through the development of new agriculture areas. Ness (1967, p 123) states 
that in the original recommendation it was envisaged that Felda, would foster a 
value of'self-help by giving priority to those people who had already shown a 
desire, to -help themselves. Settlers were required to, demonstrate I their 
commitment to the value of self-help by clearing their own land, building their 
own houses and planting their own crops. However, pressures on Felda to 
speed up its operations forced the organization to abandon the original 
intentions and instead use contractors to clear the land; build the houses, plant 
the crops and provide'labour to maintain the crops during the first' three 
m onths. 
1. Examples of land development schemes, apart from those administered by 
Felda, are Felcra's fringe alienation schemes, providing additional plots to 
uneconomic-sized holdings; Risda's block replanting programmes; land 
development administered by regional development authorities such as 
Ketengah, Kejora and Dara; and some youth schemes which are financed by 
state governments. 
2. The Federal Land Development Authority (Felda) came into being under the 
Federation of Malaya Legislative Council, Principal Ordinance Number 20 of 
1956, July Ist, 1956. Felda is headed by a full-time Executive Chairman. Two 
other important posts are those of the Deputy Chairman and the Planting 
Director. For a detailed study of Felda and its operations, see Ness, 1967. 
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Although created as an ý autonomous. authority by British expatriate civil 
servants, Felda soon lost its functional autonomy not long after Malaya gained 
its independence in 1957. A new Ministry for Rural Development, formed in 
1959. assumed responsibility for Felda, and thus Felda 'became another 
apparatus in the state bureaucracy. One reason for the Ministry's direct control 
over Felda could be justified by the fact that Felda's large projects are financed 
by Federal loans. -- ,'-ýI. 'ý, , ': 
By, 1981 Felda had developed 564,910 hectares of forest land into plantations, 
settling a total of 70,563 families, with holdings of 3.2 to 4 hectares for, rubber- 
and 4 to 4.8 hectares each-in the case of oil palm (Felda, 1981). Between 
1981-85 Felda developed a further 202,470 hectares and by 1990 it is expected, 
to develop another 175,500 hectares (4MP, Table 10-3, p, 306). By.. 1985 a- 
total of 94,000 families have been resettled in Felda schemes (4MP, p 306), 
while up to 1988 another 18,500 families have joined the schemes (R5MP, p 
139), thus making a total of 112,500 families resettled in Felda land schemes 
between 1956 to'1988. 
Felda settlers receive a package deal - Felda develops the land, constructs the 
physical infrastructure and crops are planted before the settlers move into the 
schemes. Each family is allocated a basic house, to which extensions can be 
added later on. 
The state claims that between 1980 and 1985 Felda settlers received annual 
incomes ranging from $6000 in rubber schemes to $14,700 in oil palm 
schemes (5MP, p 306), but whether these were gross or net incomes were not 
indicated in the Plan document. Considering that prices of commodities 
fluctuate according to demand, we would expect similar fluctuations in the 
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earnings of Felda settlers. For example, - between - 1986-88 the average net 
monthly earnings of settlers averaged at $493 for oil ý palm, schemes and $545 
for, rubber schemes (R5MP, p 139). -Due to further uneven increases in the 
prices of commodities, by the end of 1988 settlers in oil palm schemes 
received a higher net monthly income of $871, compared with $721 for settlers 
in rubber schemes (ibid. ). it .3 
The figures of settlers' average earnings presented in the preceding paragraph 
portrayed that the economic position of Felda settlers looks impressive and 
well above the poverty income level' of $350 per month. In reality, ' figures on 
"the earnings of settlers are quite misleading. ý Part of the costs incurred by Felda 
are passed on, to, the settlers and are charged to the Settlers' Loan Account. It 
has been estimated that on average a settler would have to repay Felda a sum 
of not less than $17,000 over a fifteen year period at 6.25 percent interest per 
annum (Toh, 19 82 9p 70). e Moreover, in instances of price stability Felda has a 
credit system which supplements fluctuations in settlers' income. Settlers in 
rubber schemes are guaranteed a minimum income of $250 per month,, while 
for'those on oil palm schemes the minimum guaranteed income, is $350 per 
month. ýThese credits are offered in the form of cashJoans or credit purchases 
at Felda general stores. Settlers are thus burdened with these repayment 
deductions, which in the long term promotes settler indebtedness3. 
As an instrument of poverty, reduction, Felda schemes are extremely costly. 
Costs incurred per settler family increased from $37,500 in 1980 to $53,000 in 
3. In the four years between 1980 to 1983, in the Bukit Rokan Utara scheme 
credit supplements amounted to $28,158 per settler, while on the Pasoh 4 
scheme the sum was $10,092 per settler. Loans and credit supplements must be 
-fully discharged before settlers can qualify for land titles. Although the 
magnitude of indebtedness may vary from one scheme to another, the problem 
begs concern - out of a total of more than 300 schemes developed by Felda up 
to the end of 1993, only six schemes have qualified for entitlement (Mehmet, 
1986, p 69). 
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19 85 (5MP, p 306) - due - to rising costs of, material inputs' and, . labour. 
Accordingly, in order to resettle only the poverty target-groups in the rural 
areas, comprising of 164,800 households in - 1987 (R5MP, Table 3-6, -p- 52), 
would require an amount of not less than $8734 million, or roughly equivalent 
to 42 percent of the sum of'$20,521 million (5MP,, Table 7-10, p 244) of 
development expenditure allocated for poverty eradication and the restructuring 
of society for 1986-90. 
At the current rate of resettlement of around 33,000 families for the 1986-90 
five-ýyear development plan period (R5MP, p 32), it would take roughly twenty 
five years , to ý resettle the ý existing hard-core poor 'rural households, while 
resettling, the entire rural poor -households would take something like sixty 
years. 
However, from, the perspective of social 'protection, Felda do not provide 
settlers protection against disability or old age. Provisions for such 
contingencies is something settlers have to arrange on their own initiative. 
Furthermore, there is the question of second and perhaps third generation of 
the original settlers who -have to face- the problem of landlessness and 
unemployment in the settlements, and would have to, migrate elsewhere in 
search of employment4. On that account, Felda's expensive resettlement 
programme is inherently more of a social policy exercise, with a high degree 
of built-in immediate political gain. 
For that reason, Felda's land development programme could be seen as an 
approach which fails to combine welfare with growth, due to the negative 
4. A survey of Felda land development schemes found that more than 86 
percent of settlers preferred their children not to remain on the schemes - this 
is an indication of settler dissatisfaction (Chan and Lim, 1981). 
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linkage between welfare and growth. It is apparent that Felda's pronounced 
policies actively work against the creation of a climate of self-reliance and 
instead intensifies dependency, an attitude which is inimical to development. 
In general, the impact of Telda's costly land development programme on 
income redistribution is marginal5, as it affects only a small proportion of the 
poor. -During the Fifth Malaysia Plan period 1986-90, for example, only 
33,800 out of the 403,200 poor rural households (R5MP, pp 32; 52) or 
approximately 8.4 percent of the rural poor benefit from Felda's investments. 
And, as was argued above, the "benefits" is open to interpretation, because 
even in hard times the protective provisions of the scheme involve loans which 
have to be paid back at high rates of interest and result in heavy indebtedness. 
POVERTY ERADICATION AND AGRICULTURAL TARGET GROUPS 
In the appraisal of the effects of policies designed to improve the incomes of 
agricultural target groups, the discussion will be limited to anti-poverty 
measures that aim to augment the incomes of rubber smallholders and rice 
farmers, chiefly because, as shown in Table 9.1, these two groups form 83 
percent of the total poor households within the target groups in the rural sector 
5. Felda's annual budget allocation for 1981 was $538 million, derived 
primýrily from the World Bank. At the end of 1981 Felda's cumulative 
drawings from the government totalled $3.0 billion (Felda, 1981, p 12; Table 
8, p 13). 
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RUBBER SMALLHOLDERS 
Rubber smallholders play a significant role in the production of rubber in 
Malaysia6. In 1987 there were some 207,7507 households engaged in the 
rubber smallholding sector, producing 68 percent of the country's total rubber 
production of 15.8 million tonnes (R5MP, p 134). In terms of hectares, the 
rubber smallholder sector constituted about 80 percent of the total 1.89 million 
hectares under rubber cultivation R5MP, pp 134; 135). 
Nevertheless, rubber smallholders form the largest single poor group in the 
country. Table 9.1 shows that, while all other poverty target groups in the 
rural areas registered declines in their absolute numbers, the number of poor 
households among rubber smallholders increased by 21 percent from 68,500 
households in 1984 to 83,100 households in 1987. 
Agriculture in the smallholding sector is primarily subsistence in nature. 
Approximately 80 percent of the farms are below 4 hectares in size, and of 
these 50 percent are below 2 hectares and 30 percent below 1.5 hectares in 
size. In order to maintain a minimum standard of living, a smallholder family 
would require not less than $500 real income per month. Current trends in 
rubber prices show that only holdings of not less than 3 hectares in size can 
provide the desired level of income, and even that only after about twelve 
years from the time of planting (Ali, 1984, p 173). 
6. The first ever rubber smallholding in Malaysia was established by Mohamed 
Isa bin Pandak Aris in 1887. In 1987, at the age of 124 years old, Mohamed 
Isa was conferred the distinguished Ridley Centennial Award (Ahmad, 1984, p 
162). 
7. This figure was derived at by calculations based on the 40 percent incidence 
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In contrast, rubber holdings in Felda schemes are 3.2 to 4 hectares each in 
size. Unlike settlers in Felda schemes, rubber smallholders do not have, a 
guaranteed minimum income8. Thus in times of hardship caused by 
fluctuations in commodity prices rubber smallholders have to rely on personal 
savings or seek credit arrangements elsewhere at high rates of interest. 
Table 9.2 compares the incidence of poverty and the mean monthly income of 
rubber smallholder households between 1984 to 1987. With an increase of only 
$18 in their mean monthly income between 1984 to 1987, plus the fact that 
figures shown are in current prices, rubber smallholders; are actually not 
anymore better-off in 1987 than in 1984. Furthermore, in 1987 the mean 
monthly income of $238 of poor households in this sector was only 44.5 
percent of the overall mean monthly household income of $535 in the same 
sector. 
There are no specific programmes for rubber smallholders. Apart from the 
efforts to improve the processing and marketing of smallholders' rubber, other 
measures -aimed to'improve the rubber industry, " especially through generating 
new techniques and replanting schemes, are directed both at the estate and the 
smallholder sectors. Likewise, the -state's in situ development programmes9 , 
which encourages farmers to cultivate cash crops (rubber, oil palm and cocoa) 
and food crops such as vegetables and fruits and rear livestock such as sheep 
are meant for farmers in general. 
8. $250 per month for settlers in rubber schemes and $350 a month for those 
in oil palm schemes. 
9. For the Fifth Malaysia Plan period (1986-90) the allocation for in situ 
development programmes totalled $5094.44 million, equivalent to 43 percent 
of the total allocation of $11,799.95 million for agriculture and regional 
development (5MP, Table 10-5, p 329). 
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Table 9.2 
Incidence of Poverty and Mean Monthly 
Household Income of Rubber Smallholdýrs. 
1984 & 1987 
Incidence No. of Mean Overall 
of Poor Income ý', Mean 
poverty households the poor Income M 
Rubber 
smallholders 
1984 42.7 68,500 $220 $520 





402,000 $208 $524 
403,200 $224 $853 
Source: Review of Fifth Malaysia Plan 1989, 
Table 3-6, pp. 52-53 (adapted). 
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Replanting' schemes, in particular; are biased towards 'the esitate sector. Due to 
their large hectares, estates are 616 to replant gradually, whereas smallholders 
incur a'higher'opportunity'cost during the seven-year gestation period. In order 
t6 increase 'replanting bý'smallholders, the state provided larger replanting 
grants to smallholders than to estates. During the Third Malaysia Plan (1976- 
80) the replanting grant was increasýd from $2223 to $2964 per hectare for 
holdings of 4.1 hectares and below; nevertheless, replanting w'a's carried out by 
holdings instead of smaller holýinjs. ' Despite the increase I in replanting larger 
grant, the rate of replanting decreased from 34,500 hectares per annum during 
the Second Malaysia Plan period' (1971-75) to 2 1,500' hectares -per annum 
during the Third Malaysia Plan period (1976-80). In a further effort to 
encourage replanting by smaller holdings, the replanting grant was further 
increased to $5434 pýi'hectare for holdings of -4 hectares and below I and . $3705 
for holdings of more than 4 hectares (4MP, p 266). Still, the rate of rubber 
replanting further decreased to 18520 hectares per annum during the Fourth 
Malaysia Plan I period (1981-85), benefiting something'like 35 percent of 
smallholders (5MP, p 308). 
Smallholders' incomes are affected by methods used in the production of latex. 
Smallholders are discouraged from using chemical yield stimulants 
(purportedly the stimulant will shorten the life span of the rýubber trees) 
whereas estates are allowed to do so (Snodgrass, 1980, p 174). Furthermore, 
estates are able'to use new 'tapping techniques which" gives a higher yield with 
less fre quent tappings. Besides, smallholders' output is normally sold as 
unsmoked sheet, usually as a lower grade product, thus resulting in a lower 
price. 
Above all, it is the structure of the export tax that has an extremely regressive 
impact on the income of rubber smallholders. Khoo (1978) reveals that the 
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income-tax equivalent of the direct tax burden on the average rubber 
smallholder was 27 percent, or the equivalent of the tax rate of those earning a 
gross income of $25,000 a year, which is roughly about eight times the income 
of a rubber smallholder with holding of two hectares in size. 
Part ofthe export tax is channelled-into what is called "Fund B"Y which is a 
fund for replanting grants. It was pointed out above that these grants benefit 
smallholders with larger holdings, rather than those -with smaller t holdings. 
Also, the award of larger replanting grants to smallholders has resulted in the 
sub-division of estates into holdings of not more than 40 hectares each, so as to 
qualify for those grants. .I 
In-1977 the total -replanting taxes (also known as cess) collected from 
smallholders was estimated at $1214.05, million, which was almost nine times 
the amount of $137.05 paid out in replanting subsidy (Khoo, 1978). For that 
reason, it is the smallholders who are subsidising the state in its effort to 
distribute replanting grants. Certainly smallholders contribute a far greater sum 
towards a subsidy system which they should contribute much less and receive 
greater benefits. 
From the above discussion, this study believes that the government's effort in 
increasing the production of rubber smallholders has resulted in differential 
benefits accruing to smallholders and the estates. Estates and smallholders with 
large holdings have gained more from replanting policies. But by far the most 
inequitable measure affecting rubber smallholders is the export-tax system, and 
that far from being subsidised, smallholders are actually paying more in the 




Padi farmers form the second largest concentration of the population who live 
in poverty in Peninsula - Malaysia. ý From the data presented in Table 9.3,, it is 
estimated that in 1987, there were 108,800 households engaged in padi farming 
compared to around 123,680 households in,, 1984; thus denoting a decrease of 
around 12 percent of padi farmers between - 1984 and 1987. Despite'almost 
twen ty years - after the New -Economic Policy -was first implemented,, the 
incidence of poverty amongst padi farmers have not decreased below, 50 
percent. -, Furthermore, the mean monthly household income of poor farmers, at 
68 percent of the official poverty line income of $350 per month, was less than 
half of the overall mean monthly household income in the padi sector. On the 
whole, padi farmers appear to be less well-off than rubber smallholders. 
Table 9.3 
Incid ence of Po verty and Mea n Mo nthly 
Househol d Inc ome of Padi Farme rs. 1 970-1987 
Incidence No. of Mean - Overall 
of Poor Monthly Mean 
poverty house- Income of Monthly 
M holds the poor Income 
1970 88.1 123,400, n/a n/a 
1976 80.3 150,900 n/a n/a 
1984 57.7 70,500 . 196 406 
1987 50.2 54,400 222 462 
Sources: Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-90, Table 3-1, 
p. 86; 
Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1989, 
Table 306, p. 52; [adapted]. 
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Geographically, the major padi farms of Malaysia are situated in the "rice 
bowl"'or granary areas of the Muda plain in Kedah - managed by 1 the Muda 
Agricultural Development Authority (MADA), ' and -the Kemubu basin in 
Kelantan - managed' by the Kemubu Agricultural Development Authority 
(KADA). Other rice growing areas are found in Province Wellesley, the Krian 
District in North Perak, and the Tanjung Karang area in Selangor. From Table 
9.4 it canýbe deduced that the two major rice producing areas of MADA and 
KADA produced 'roughly 47 percent of the country's total rice production in 
1987. The states where the major "rice bowls" are located are predominantly 
populated by Malays, thus meaning that padi farming is primarily a Malay 
activity. 
Table 9.4 
Peninsular Malaysia: Padi Areas and Production. 
1986 and 1987. 
1986 1987 
Planted Area 
(000 hectares) 711.1 609.6 
Total Production 
(000 tonnes) 1721.6 1662.9 
MADA Production 
(000 tonnes) 803.1 644.7 
KADA Production 
(000 tonnes) 142.9 127.2 
Source: Treasury Economic Report 1988/89, Table 3.4, 
p. 66. 
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Major. improvements, in the rice sector involved investments primarily in 
drainage and irrigation facilities, to enable double-cropping in the existing 
"rice bowls", the provision of input subsidies, and improved marketing and 
credit facilities. As shown in Table 9.5,, public expenditure on drainage and 
irrigation facilities has been at, most times a'major, component of the total 
public expenditure on agricultural development., For example ýý during the First 
Malaysia Plan'period (1965-70) 36 percent of ýthe total public expenditure 
allocated for the agricultural sector* was allocated for drainage and irrigation; 
which was mainly-for the construction of World Bank-financed irrigation 
schemes in the Muda and Kemubu regions. From the perspective of welfare, 
the large-scale irrigation systems contain an element of subsidy. 
Table 9.5 ',; -ý Iý I'' 
Public Development ExMnditure for Drainage and Irrigation. 1966-1990 
Expenditure as 
Five. Actual, % of 
Year Expenditure Total for 
Development million) Agricultural 
Plan Period Development 
1966-70 328.5 36.0 
1971-75 257.43 11.3 
1976-80 778.61 12.0 
1981-85 1451.26 19.7 
1986-90 337.44 2.9 
Sources: Second Malaysia Plan, Table 9.4, p. 146; ,. ýIT 
Fourth Malaysia Plan, Table 15-3, pp, 290-91; 
Fifth Malaysia Plan, Table 10-5 p. 329; 
(adapted). 
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As a result of improved drainage and irrigation facilities double-cropping of 
padi increased from 115,744 hectares in., 1970 (Selvadurai, ý 1972, p 59) to 
216,514 hectares or 33 percent of the total area under padi in 1979 (TER, 
1980/81, p 105). Despite the vast amount of public expenditure allocated for 
drainage and irrigation, Huang (1972) reveals that the more well-off farmers, 
who depend entirely on padi farming as their source of income, are the ones 
who quickly took advantage of padi double-cropping. Subsequently, they 
produced a significant amount for the market due to their above-avera e farm 9 
sizes,, ranging from 1.2, hectaresito 3.6 hectares, and fertile soil. On, the 
contrary, double-cropping was less successful with Armers who cultivated 
smaller-sized farms, ranging between 0.4 hectares to 0.8 hectares, and where 
. 
the soil is lessIertile; as a result, these farmers produce, mainly for their own 
consumption (Huang, 1972, p 123). 
Precisely because the subsidy element contained in the -large-scale irrigation 
systems is biased towards the well-off farmers, the impact ý of drainage and 
irrigation facilities on poverty redressal. , amongst padi farmers is not 
impressive. By the late 1970s as many as three out of four padi households 
were still in poverty, unable to earn an income above the poverty line income 
level of $1300 in 1978 prices (Kassim et al, 1983, p v). Similarly, a World 
Bank evaluation study of the rice growing areas of Kemubu and Muda presents 
dismal conclusions on , the equity and income distribution effects of rice 
schemes. It is the owners and tenants of larger-sized farms who have achieved 
major income improvements. In 1979 owners and tenants of small farms had 
incomes which were 57 percent and 72 percent -of the official poverty line 
income; compared with 54 percent and 57 percent respectively in 1966 (World 
Bank, 1981, pp 17; 26). The position of poor padi, farmers does not appear to 
have - changed greatly almost a decade later - earlier on in this 
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section it was pointed out that in - 1987 poor padi households had incomes 
amounting to only 68 percent of the official household poverty line income of 
$350 per month. 
Two basic factors that'contribute to the poverty of padi farmers'are the land 
tenure system and the size of the plots that they cultivate. Gibbons et al (1980, 
p: 20) cite that the'average size of padi plots are 1.78 hectares. . Tenancy is 
common, with 36 percent of padi farmers who are'pure tenants, another 22 
percent who are owner-tenants, while 42 percent cultivate land'belonging to 
household members. 'Of these three major tenure categories of padi farmers, on 
average'it was, the owner-tenants who cultivate the 'larger farms, '- averaging 
3.82 hectares in size (Gibbons et al, 1980, p 19, Table 1.5). 
Studies carried out by the World Bank (1981) and Gibbons et al (1980) 
conclude that land reform'is essential in order to correct the maldistribution of 
padi land ownership, and therefore eradicate poverty and ameliorate income 
inequalities'amongst, padi farmers. Malaysia's agricultural policy emphasise 
more on the cultivation of cash crops like rubber, oil palm-and cocoa-. New 
land development schemes are designed primarily for the cultivation of rubber 
and oil palm. What is more critical is the country's ability to produce sufficient 
f6od to feed its population. Malaysia has not achieved its target in rice self- 
sufficiency. ' In 1983' the self-sufficiency ratio "was ý77.3 'percent (TER, 
1983/84, ', p 105). By 1988, due to the decrease in padi farins, the ratio' had 
decreased to about 59 percent' (TER, 1988/89; p 67); thus the domestic 
consumption requirements had to be supplemented - by rice ý imported mainly 
from Thailand. Therefore, what is urgently needed are programmes of land 
development and land redistribution, designed to give padi farmers access to 
larger plots, ý so as to enable them to produce enough rice, not only to 
I 
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increase their income, but also With the objective of achieving self-sufficiency 
in rice production. 
Unlike some other Asian countries, political and economic circumstances in 
Malaysia are not conducive to a radical land reform programme that seeks to 
transfer tenants into owner operators. In Taiwan, and, Japan, for, example, 
landowners were compensated with bonds and former tenants were'deemed 
owners. In China and Myanmar land has been expropriated, by'governments 
and held, in public ownership; farmers do not pay rent but are forced to sell 
their output to the state at fixed prices-farm income may be low but not as 
low as might have been true with high rents (Barker, Herdt and Rose, 1985, p 
35). 
In Malaysia, what might be a possible alternative to land reform would be'the 
development, of additional areas for rice cultivation. For instance, cropping 
systems based on rice could be introduced in suitable medium lowlands regions 
and gentle sloping terraces, where rainfall is -not adequate for a second rice 
crop in a year., Crops such as sweet potato, maize, legumes and vegetables 
could be planted in rotation with rice. 
The experiences, of other Asian countries could be taken as examples. Low 
yield should not be a major issue if the commitment to self-sufficiency in rice 
production is taken seriously by the statelO. In the Khorat Plateau in 
northeastern Thailand, more than - 3.5 million hectares are under, rice 
cultivation (equivalent, to over-40 percent of Thailand's total rice area), but 
only 100,000 hectares are irrigated. The soils of the plateau are infertile and 
10. In 1980, Malaysia implemented a policy of providing enough fertilizer free 
to padi farmers to cultivate up to 6 acres or 2.5 hectares of land -a policy 
which is justified on welfare grounds rather than on its expected effect on 
production. 
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average rice yield is less than 1.5 metric tons per hectare comparo with about 
2 metric tons per hectare for the rest of Thailand. Farmers inTaiwan and the 
Guandong Province in South China practice -highly intensive rice-based 
cropping systems. In Indonesia, where pressures for the intensive use of land 
are very high, particularly in Java, and where the quality of irrigation. varies 
considerably,. appropriate rice cropping techniques have been developed; these 
techniques allow more intensive cropping pattems, -under variable water 
conditions. In rainfed and poorly irrigated areas rice is directly., seeded before 
there is sufficient rainfall to flood the field (Barker, Herdt and, Rose, pp, 22; 
24-26). These are some of the examples that Malaysian rice policy makers 
could examine in greater detail. 
Another. important element of the anti-poverty measure in the rice sector is the 
rice support scheme". Rice farmers are guaranteed a minimum price for their 
marketed produce, and apparently this ensures a higher and stable income. 
This subsidy scheme is financed through a government direction by which rice 
importers are required to purchase locally-grown rice in return for permits to 
import cheaper rice from abroad. The cost of purchasing locally-grown rice at 
the government-approved price are then passed on to the consumers, who bear 
the real cost of the subsidyl2. My assumption is that for the price of rice paid 
by consumers something like 1.5 to 2 percent contributes to the subsidy 
component. Rice is the staple food item in the Malaysian diet.. Thus all. rice 
buyers, including the low income people in the rural areas who do not produce 
rice or do not produce enough rice for their own consumption, are burdened in 
favour of farmers of larger padi farms who produce surpluses for sale in the 
11. Rice price control measures were introduced in May 1974 (TER, 1974/75, 
p 62). 
12. In September 1990, as a pre-general election pledge, the state announced 
its intention to increase the rice subsidy by 50 percent, from $16.54 to $24.81 
per 100 kilograms of rice (FEER, 27.9.1990). 
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market. In summaiy'it could be deduced that, rather than being consu I mer- 
biased, ' the Malaysiafi rice policY is producer-Oriented, Often with ihe-'welfare 
of producers with larger farms as the main concern. 
Evidence shows that agricultural purchase price policies do not always produce 
gains for consumers. Paukert (1988b) cites several examples where price 
support for rice growers in Japan result in gains for producers and losses for 
consumers; while' in Thailand sugar and maize' price policies redistribute 
income from consumers to producers. In Africa agricultural purchase price 
policies are the'major factor in maintaining and increasing disparity in favour 
of producers as compared to consumers (Paukert, 1988b, pp 304; 312). 
Generally speaking,, ''measures' aimed at' increasing' the productivity Of 
Malaysian padi farmers benefit'farmers who cultivate larger farms within the 
major irrigation schemes of Muda and Kemubu regions. Farmers and policy 
makers too' frequently associate capital intensity "with modernization. 
Agricultural innovation, for example the introduction of combine-harvesters in 
the Muda region, had caused big reductions in agricultural labour requirements 
and displaced landless workers, previously employed as padi harvesters (Hart, 
41989, p 816). For households with tiny holdings of less than 1.1 hectares 
mechanisation was accompanied by the diversification of income sources - it 
meant the feminisation of agriC-Ultural activities because the men had to shift 
into low-paid n6n-airicultural jobs as lorry'dri'vers or workers on construction 
sites, while the women had'to take over most of the'agricultural Work on their 
own tiny farms in addition to working 'as agricultural wage-labour in the 
transplanting job (Hart, 1989, p 827). Besides', the construction of rural roads 
in the Muda and Kemubu *regions brought about higher land prices, which 
further , encouraged the consolidation of land into larger holdings, thus forcing 
out poorer farmers - even though in economic terms the Muda irrigation 
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project, with an internal rate of return of 18 percent, is considered as one of 
the most, successful rural, development project financed by the World Bank 
(World Bank, 1987, pp 33-35). At the same time, higher incomes that accrue 
to farmers of larger-sized farms are partly the consequence ofýthe rice support 
policy which heavily burdens the poor. 
RURAL ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAMMES -A SUMMARY 
In summary, from the discussion on poverty redressal programmes in the rural 
areas, it may be concluded that the state's development strategy paradoxically 
reinforces some aspects of poverty while appearing to relieve at least some of 
it in the rural sector. In the case of land development only a small proportion 
of landless farmers are absorbed -into new development schemes. Technical 
innovations and subsidies in the rubber sector are to the advantage of estates 
and owners or operators of larger holdings rather than smallholders who own 
or work on small plots. 
Thus in the absence of any major structural changes 
'in the existing land 
ownership and tenure system (where there is a higher concentration of land in 
the commercial cash crop plantation sector), within a context of agricultural 
modernization and economic growth, it would be expected that poverty and 
persistent income inequalities would continue to prevail amidst poverty target 
groups in the rural sector. As Ghai and Radwan (1983, p 20) point out, public 
expenditure helps to increase income inequalities in rural areas. Poorer 
households appear to be at a disadvantage when it comes to the indirect effects 
of projects; the net impact primarily have been on the lesser poor, particularly 
by raising land values and increasing the concentration of land ownership. 
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Malaysia has abundant land resources and with a large proportion of the 
population living in the rural areas, and in order to increase the country's self- 
reliance on food production it would be sensible for policy makers to alter 
some of the priorities accorded to the cultivation of rubber-and oil palm. The 
cultivation of food crops such as, vegetables13 and tropical fruits for, domestic 
consumption must be expanded. The rearing of livestock such as cattle, sheep 
and goats in old rubber holdings is another way of improving the incomes of 
farmers as well as increasing the country's food self-reliance. 
To ensure that projects are beneficial to the poorest in areas of high inequality 
is a difficult task, - as this is not always politically feasible. Planners and policy 
makers should negotiate with local power groups before the implementation of 
anti-poverty'projects, - so -as to guarantee the appropriate involvement of the 
poorest groups. Still, commitment on the part of the state is a crucial factor so 
that the poorest groups are not displaced in the political bargaining. ý 
13. There are several reasons why smallholders should be given the incentive 
to cultivate vegetables. During 1973-82' vegetable imports formed about 7 
percent of the total annual food imports. Vegetable imports had increased by 
2.75 times in current values from $72 million in 1973 to $156 million in 1982 
(Dagap, 1987, p 4). Furthermore, vegetable cultivation is a productive 
industry. As illustrated below, the net returns per hectare for vegetable crops 
are higher than those of traditional export crops (Dagap, 1987, p 19). 





Cabbage 100 7.4 
Chillies 80-150 16.1 
Long beans 50-120 2.7 
Okra 60-120 1.9 
Sweet potato 120 4.9 
Rubber 1.3 
oil palm 1.7 
Cocoa 1.8 
Source: Dagap, 1987, Table 1.8, p 20 (adapted) 
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POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMMES IN THE URBAN SECTOR 
In this section the focus is on poverty redressal programmes in the urban 
sector. Some'Of the measures aimed at ameliorating'urban poverty include the 
cre'ation'of employment opportunities for new entrants to the labour market, 
the unemployed and the migrants, from the rural areas; aid for those in-the 
informal sector; the provision of low-cost housing and other. social services for 
improving the quality of life of the urban poor. 
Although there are several anti-poverty redressal programmes as mentioned in 
the above paragraph, it is the creation of employment through industrialization 
that represents the main component of -the urban anti-ýoverty programmes. 
Thus it is proposed that this section examines the state's industrialization policy 
since 1958, and then attempt to, evaluate its performance in termi of 
employment creation. - Basically, Malaysia had undergone two'distinct phases 
of industrialization expansion; namely the import substitution phase from 1958 
to 1968, and the export-orientation phase beginning in 1968. - 
IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION POLICY 
Recommendations for industrial expansion, as a means of'reducing the 
country's dependence on the two commodities of tin and rubber, 'Was first, 
for-Warded by, a World Bank mission in - 1955. Subsequently, an Industrial 
Working Party was appointed in 1957. By 1958 the Pioneer Industrial 
Ordinance was made a legislation, which granted tax concessions to firms in 
pioneer industries in the form of relief from 40 percent profit tax for a period 
of two to eight years depending on the size of the investments. In order to 
protect local infant industries the state levied tariffs and quotas on imports. In 
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addition, the state provided the infrastructure, subsidized industrial sites and 
utilities and made provisions for cheap and improved credit. facilities. These 
inducements were aimed at attracting capital, particularly foreign capital., 
A number of factors facilitated the establishment of foreign firms, such as the 
relatively stable political climate, and the state's promise that foreign firms 
will not be nationalised, rather they were given the freedom to repatriate their 
profits. A number of foreign firms were established in the 1960s. Jomo and 
Shari (1981, p 244) cite that in 1968 these firms accounted for 28 percent of 
value added in the manufacturing and for nearly half of the manufacturing 
sector's - growth in the preceding eight years. These pioneer firms were 
predominantly foreign-owned and heavily oriented towards import-substitution, 
producing non-durable consumer', goods such as toiletries and household 
equipment. In 1968, for example, 70 -percent of value-added in all pioneer 
establishments came from foreign-owned firms (Jomo and Shari, 1981; p 245), 
thus increasing the proportion of the already-high share of foreign ownership 
in -the -Malaysian economy. Geographically; these pioneer industries were 
located in the urban centres of the west coast of the peninsula, particularly in 
Petaling Jaya and Johor Bahru. 
The results, z of the - industrialization process were quite impressive. 
Manufacturing output grew at a fairly rapid rate of 17.4 percent between 1959 
and 1968, which increased the manufacturing sector's share in the GDP from 
8.5 percent in 1960 to 12.7 percent-in 1968; while employment in this sector 
increased from' 6.1 percent of the labour force in 1957 to 9.1 percent in 
1967/68, equivalent to an increase in absolute numbers from 126,200 to 
214,800 (Lim, 1973, pp 109; 112). t 
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While it true that import-substitution firms helped to reduce unemployment, it- 
also had some off-setting, effects on poorer groups, - which ý were not always 
helpful. Firstly, because the state introduced tax-holiday schemes and other 
incentives,, in -reality the tax-payers , were , subsidising the industrial 
programmes., Secondly, the restriction against cheap: imports also meant that 
consumers including the poor, had to pay higher prices for locally-produced 
goods. 
EXPORT-ORIENTED INDUSTRIALIZATION POLICY 
By the mid-1960s, however, the import-substitution strategy appeared not to be 
able to absorb the-majority of the urban unemployed labour force. Growth of 
this sector, was limited partly by the small consumer base, and the relatively 
low income of the consumers. Thus a new industrialization strategy that could 
generate more employment ý had to be pursued by the state., The Investment 
Incentives Act was introduced in 1968, in order to attract multinational firms. 
At the same. time multinational firms in the West and Japan had begun 
relocating their subsidiaries in developing countries for the purpose, of 
manufacturing finished products for sale by the parent company to, consumers 
in the home country or to provide components and sub-assemblies to parent 
company plants (Lim, 1978, p 7). The motivating factor for this new global 
redivision of labour, as opposed to primary-resource processing and import 
substituting industries, was initiated by the cheap and abundant supply of 
labour in developing countries. Export-oriented multinational firms are labour 
intensive,. thus labour forms a large proportion while capital forms a smaller 
proportion of the total manufacturing costs. 
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By the mid-1970s Malaysia had attracted a considerable number of 
multinational firms, the most prominent of these are the electronics industry, 
like Japan's Matsushita, which employs mainly women. These foreign-owned 
industries are few and large-scale and they vary according to the amount of 
paid-up capital and the number of employees for each industry. For example, 
the Japanese Pen group of companies in the textile industry operate two 
companies in the Prai Free Trade Zone. Penfabric, which employs 1200 
employees, is a textile industry with a large paid-up capital of M$80 million; 
while Pentex, with almost 2700 employees, is a labour-intensive textile 
products factory running on only a quarter of the paid-up capital of Penfabric 
(Limqueco, et al, 1989, p 56). In recent years Taiwan has become the largest 
source of foreign investment in Malaysia. In 1990 investments from Taiwan 
tripled to $6.34 billion from $2.69 billion in 1989. During the same period 
investments'from Japan increased by 56.5 percent, from $2.69 billion in 1989 
I I to $4.21 billion in 1990. The total foreign investment in 1990 amounted to 
$17.63 billion, as compared to $10.54 billion for domestic investment (FEER, 
24.1.199 1, p5 1). 
Malaysia is effectively subsidising the establishment of these firms in the 
specially-created Export Processing Zones, where they enjoy minimum custom 
formalities and duty-free import of raw materials. Industrial land close to good 
infrastructure is cheap at $6 per square foot, equivalent to $64.58 per square 
metre (FEER, 7.9.1991, p 97). 
Undeniably, these export-oriented firms are considerably successful in terms of 
employment creation. Table 9.6 shows that between 1970 to 1980 the average 
annual rate of growth in employment in the manufacturing sector was 7.6 
percent, which was the highest among all sectors. The number of employees in 
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the manufacturing sector, as a proportion of the total employed in the country, 
increased from 11.4 percent in 1970 to 15.7 percent in 1980. Subsequently the 
rate of unemployment registered a substantial reduction from'7.8 percent of the 
labour force in 1970 to 5.7 percent in 1980. 
Although the economic recession in the mid-1980s resulted in redundancies, 
particularly in the electronics industry, by 1988 the performance of the 
manufacturing sector improved largely due to a growth in external demand and 
recovery in domestic sales. Between 1986 to 1988 a further 157,000 jobs were 
created, mainly in the export industries such as electronics and electrical 
products, clothing, plastic products and plywood. During the same period the 
manufacturing sector grew rapidly at 12.7 percent per annum, increasing its 
share of the GDP from 20.9 percent in 1986 to 24.4 percent in 1988 
(Malaysia, 1989, pp 86; 180). 
Industrial expansion is also used 'as a tool in the -state's effort 
to reduce 
occupational differentials between the major ethnic communities. As shown in 
Table 9.7, industrial expansion has led to a striking increase in the proportion 
of Malays in the industrial labour force, from 19.6 percent in 1970 to 53.5 
percent in 1980; compared with a decline in the number of Chinese workers, 
from 72 percent to 45 percent respectively. Between 1973 to 1978 employment 
in the labour-intensive industries of electrical and electronics, and textiles and 
clothing, increased at average rates of 22 percent 
-and 
13 percent respectively 
(4MP, p 85). McGee et al (1989, p 268) mention that much of the new 
employment creation in, industries occurred in the five major urbanised regions 
of Johor Bahru, Melaka, Kuala Lumpur, Kelang and Penang; thus contributing 
to overall urban growth, and that in 1980 these urban centres contained 56 
percent of those employed in the manufacturing sector. 
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Table 9.7 
Proligrtion bf Malays'aýd Chinese in the Manufacturing Labour Force. 
Year Malay Workers Chinese Workers 
MM 
1957 19.6 72.0 
1970 28.9 65.2 
1980 53.5 45.4 
Source: McGee et al (1989), Table 14.1, p. 268. 
URBAN ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAMMES -A SUMMARY 
It is true that export-oriented multinational industries have played a role in the 
creation of employment in Malaysia, but on the other hand, in its effort to 
reduce unemployment, Malaysia has incurred high costs. The granting of tax 
reliefs to multinational firms has meant substantial losses of revenue. like the 
repatriation of profits by foreign investors, estimated at $1.8 billion in 1980 
(Hua, 1983, p 186). Earnings of production workers in the manufacturing 
sector are low; in 1988 they formed 23 percent of the total urban poor 
households (Malaysia, 1989, p 57). Unlike the rural farmers, where additional 
efforts in generating income, like the rearing of livestock and poultry, is 
available, the urban poor do not have such alternatives. 
Furthermore, the notion that multinational firms exploit women workers is a 
well-known fact. In its eagerness to attract foreign firms, particularly the 
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multinationals that were seeldng for cheap wage rates in order to increase' 
profits, the state impenitently promoted the qualities- of women workersl4. 
Lim (1978, ý p, 7) cites that Malaysian investment- brochures explicitly promote 
the manual dexterity of female workers. ,I", . .-ýIýý, ýý '11.1 
For many years the electronics industry has been the driving force behind 
Malaysia's switch from a commodity producer to a manufacturing power. The 
country is now the world's biggest exporter of semiconductor devices and the 
third largest producer, after Japan and the United States (FEER, 7.9.1989, p 
98). Women production workers make up 90 percent of the total assembly 
workforce in the electronics factories (Hua, 1983, p 188). Production workers 
in the textile and electronic industries, where the labour force are mainly 
women, earn monthly wages of $277 and $317 respectively, compared to $570 
and $425 for those in 'the male-dominated machinery and motor vehicle 
industries (Ministry of Labour, 1986, Table 9-3, p 153) 
Malaysia is devoid of any minimum wage legislation. State trade missions 
openly advertise that workers in the electronic industry are not permitted to 
join trade unions (Hua, 1983, p 191). Furthermore, the Industrial Relations, 
Act (Amendment), of 1971 safeguards the interests of the employers. Under 
this Act, in industries where the formation of unions'are allowed, union 
officials are prohibited from holding posts in political parties, and union funds 
are prohibited from being used for political purposes. Meanwhile, the Act 
strengthened, the power of management, for example, employers could sack 
workers without having to state the reason. 
Furthermore, multinational firms are . "foot-loose" in character, meaning that 
they can easily locate their establishments elsewhere particularly in countries 
14. The economic role of women will be discussed further in Chapter 10. 
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which offer greater incentives, or even close down altogether in the event of 
economic depression in the industrial economies. - Thus in an effort to maintain 
the continued existence of multinational firms in the countryp the state always 
has to ensure political stability and industrial peace and legislate strict labour 
laws which effectively produce a passive workforce. 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION, : -, 
Apart from the need to accelerate economic growth, the poverty alleviation 
strategy also calls for changes in the delivery system of services in the social 
sector, such as education, health, housing and welfare services, so as to benefit 
the rural population., In particular education is known to be the key variable in 
explaining poverty in MalaysialS. 
The purpose of this section is to analyse the redistributive effects, of public 
expenditure and assess to what extent it has contributed towards, narrowing 
disparities between the rural and urban areas. Snodgrass (1975, p 283) asserts 
that in, Malaysia public expenditure is not used as a tool for redistributing 
income per se-but rather the redistributive benefits, accruing from-public 
expenditure is a by-product of the programmes to redistribute income from the 
non-Malays to the Malays. 
In general public expenditure have frequently been found to be urban-biased, 
while those that reached the traditional sector often are proved to be inadequate 
15. Mazumdar (1981) asserts that low educational attainment systematically 
contributes to poverty. Labour earnings are a significant determinant of 
poverty; lower educational levels result in low earnings, and that "education 
remains important in accountin for different proportions of Malay and 9 
Chinese who are low earners" (Mazumdar, 1981, p 364). 
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and confined to the relatively more progressive areas (Lipton, 1977). As an 
example, in Malaysia, around 1970, the domestic output per person outside 
agriculture was 3.8 times greater than that in agriculture (Lipton, 1977, Table 
5.4, pp 435-37). 
A study by Meerman (1979) analysed the effects of public expenditure in 
Malaysia He calculated the costs of government outputs in each of the major 
programmes and took into account the actual utilization of these outputs by 
households. Using these two sets of information Meerman estimated 
government spending according to per capita and per household. The study 
was confined to public expenditure allocated to four major government 
programmes, namely, education, medical services, public utilities and 
agriculture, 
_ 
for the year 1974. 
Major findings of the Meerman study was that per capita expenditure on the 
public programmes covered by the study was greatest for the highest income 
quintile and lowest for the lowest quintile. The poorest quintile is at a 
disadvantaged position in respect of every service except the medical service. 
As shown in Table 9.8, the distribution of public expenditures on the services 
included in the study tended to benefit those in the upper quintiles, more than 
poor households, which Meerman attributed was largely explained by the 
extremely high share of higher education enjoyed by those in the wealthiest 
quintile. Overall per capita expenditure for the lowest quintile was $109, or 23 
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To illustrate further the biased effects of Malaysian public expenditure, this 
discussion will analyse, albeit briefly, the redistributive benefits of education, 
particularly higher education, and the health services. These two social 
services have been chosen for inclusion in this discussion because, as shown in 
Table 9.9, between 1971-90 development expenditure on, these two, social 
services formed a major proportion of the total development, expenditure 
allocated for the social sector. 
Table 9.9 .II; - 
Public Devel"ment Expgnditur 
for Education and Health Services. 1971-90. 
Actual Expenditure % of 
($) Allocation on 
Development Education Health Social Sector 
Plan Period 
1971-75 881.43 218.82 70.85 
1976-80 2152.79 529.42' 49.0-' 
1'981-85 4840.09 762.74 54.2 
1986-90 5582.78 714.98 70.0 
Sources: Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-85, Table 6-2, 
pp. 118-125; ýj. I Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986-90, Table 7-2, 
pp. 226-227, Table 7-9, p. 242; [adapted]. 
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EDUCATIO 
One of the key' concept' in'the restructuring of society- in Malaysia has I been 
identified as the redistribution of high* income occupations to reflect ethnic 
balances in the population. One of the primary agents selected to achieve this 
goal is the educational system. In Malaysia it is widely assumed that increased 
educational opportunities for the low income groups, especially Malays, Will 
permit 'them -access' to better employment. Thus public expenditure on 
education"' is' commonly believed to be- the'primary social investment in 
achieving progressively redistributive results. 
However, the expansion of education, may'-equally lead to the 'Opposite of the 
effect' intended, resulting rather in greater inequality in incomes and'overall 
well being. For example, Boudon (1974) found thar in Western societies 
"educational growth as such has the effect of increasing rather than decreasing 
social and economic inequality, even in the case of an educational system that 
becomes more egalitarian" (Boudon, 1974, p 187). 
In Malaysia, the emphasis on education, particularly higher education, as a 
mean's of achieving social and upward mobility has resulted in education being 
valued as an investment good (Tham, 1979). Consequently, educational 
performance'and certificate qualifications are regarded by students and parents, 
while prospective , employers place an excessive emphasis on paper 
qualifications. In an appraisal of, the economic evaluations of' public 
expenditures in Malaysia, Hoeff (1973) concluded that Malaysia is or soon will 
be over-investing in education. 
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A study by Mehmet and Yip (1985) on access to university education reveals 
that Malaysian public expenditure on higher education is heavily regressive in 
nature., In their survey it was found that poor households attained only 12.3 
percent of state scholarships, while the richest- 10 percent of households 
accounted for about 25 percent of the scholarship awards. 
Meerman (1979) discloses the unequal accessibility and regressive distribution 
of public expenditure on higher education, and that the distribution of public 
outlay on -education was'especially pro-rich. Column 2 of Table 9.8 presents 
statistics on enrollment for each educational level, partitioned by quintiles of 
household per capita income for assisted schools. The wealthiest quintile, with 
an annual, household'per 'capita income of not less than, $2620, enjoyed an 
extremely high ratio of 5.5 percent, as compared to only 0.7 percent for the 
lowest'quintile. in post-secondary'education enrollment rate. Thus Meerman 
(1979) concludes that "effective demand at each educational level is a positive 
function of income" (Meerman, 1979, p 108). 
HEATLH SERVIC 
Public expenditure allocated for the health service is a clear example which 
indicates uneven development of a social service that is urban-biased in its 
delivery system. Meerman (1979) analysed data for the consumption of each 
type of medical service by income quintiles and race, and concluded that the 
government had achieved the goal of providing medical care to Malaysians 
irrespective of income. However, Meerman (1979) pointed out that the quality 
of medical treatment received by patients varied between income 
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classes. People of the lower income group usually seek medical care at 
government out-patient clinics, which are manned by relatively less 
inexperienced doctors. On the other hand, the rich in the urban areas are able 
to attend private clinics or hospitals, usually manned by more experienced and 
highly qualified health personnel. 
The urban bias in health service delivery is also evident from selected health 
indicators. For example, Table 9.10 shows that for 1985 Kelantan had the 
highest toddler mortality rate at 3.0 per 1000 population, followed by 
Trengganu at 2.7 per 1000 population. In the same year the doctor-patient ratio 
is also lowest in Kelantan and Trengganu, at 1.6 and 1.7 doctors per 10,000 
population respectively. These two states, Trengganu and Kelantan also happen 
to be the states with high incidences of poverty, 36 percent and 31.6 percent 
respectively. On the contrary, in the same year in the city of Kuala Lumpur 
has a ratio of 11.4 doctors per 10,000 population. 
On the whole, it is safe to conclude that health services are by far more 
advanced in the urban areas such as Kuala Lumpur and Penang, than in states 
like Kelantan and Trengganu, where there is high incidence of poverty and the 
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PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
- SOME COMMENTS 
Generally, the provision of social services like health and education are seen as 
meeting the basic needs of the community. Although the poor are able to have 
better access to these services, nevertheless it is the upper strata that enjoy 
more benefits from these services. The standard'of health care is more superior 
in the urban centres as compared to rural areas; while the poor households are 
heavily represented in the primary and secondary schools but the rich are over- 
represented in post-secondary education. 
As Meerman (1979) pointed out, Malaysia's publicly supported redistributive 
programmes have an investment aspect; household welfare transfers funded out 
of federal budget are minute and consist almost entirely of federal government 
pensions (Meerman, 1979, p 325). Furthermore, as presented in Table 9.11, 
allocations for the development of social welfare services are small in 
proportion to the total expenditure allocated for social development. 
Malaysia does not have substantial systems of large welfare transfers with little 
investment impact and possibly negative effects on production incentives. For 
instance, there is no programme of food subsidies; unlike in several where 
food subsidy elements exceed several percentages of the Gross National 
Product. Under such schemes the government distributes food coupons or food 




Public Development Exl2gnditure 
for Social Wclfare Services. 1971-90 
Development Actual Expenditure Expenditure as 
Plan percentage 




1970-75 12.75 5.5 
1976-80 28.47 5.0 
1981-85 9.29 3.7 
1986-90 34.0 10.6 
Sources: Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-85, Table 23-2, 
p. 382; 
Fifth Malaysia Plan 19 86-90, Table 22- 1, 
p 541; [adapted]. 
in the United States, for example, the food subsidies scheme plays an 
important role in the overall anti-poverty programme. Based on a criteria of 
low income . in relation to family size, the government provides free food for 
the economically weakest ten percent or so of the population. In 1985 nearly 
US$11 billion worth of stamps were distributed to households'with a total of 
19 million members, a sum of almost US$560 per person (Paukert, 1988a, p 
147). 
Sri Lanka too has a food subsidy programme for lower income families. Sri 
Lanka's'food subsidy policy was originally instituted in 1942, but the scheme 
was costly as it meant providing basic rations of subsidized rice to all 
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inhabitants while at the same time, offered rice farmers inducement prices in 
order to reduce the country's dependence on rice imports. A radical reform of 
the food subsidy programme was effected in 1979. Food stamps are distributed 
to poor household members according to age and nutritional requirements of 
household members. Families can spend their food stamps on rice, flour, 
bread, sugar, locally produced pulses, condensed milk, dried fish and 
kerosene. In 1981 in Colombo between 70 to. 90 percent of food stamps were 
spent on rice, followed by sugar and milk foods (Mateus, 1983, pp 34-36). 
Selowsky (1980) cites that under the old food subsidy system, food subsidies 
amounted to 14 percent of total government expenditure or 3 percent of the 
Gross National Product. After the introduction of food stamps the cost of 
subsidies decreased to 7, percent of total government expenditure or 3 percent 
of the Gross National Product. Furthermore, the food stamps system plays a 
very important role in the income structure of the poorer segment of society - 
increasing the incomes of poor households by about 55 percent. These are 
some of the examples. which could serve, as models for Malaysian welfare 
planners. 
t 
In contrast to countries like the United States and Sri Unka, Malaysia does not 
emphasise welfare transfer programmes. The country's social security 
organizations, such as the Employees' Provident - Fund, registered rapid 
actuarial growth, but their cash surpluses has been used as the major source of 
funds for the, state's development budget. In 1988 the Fund was the largest 
holder of government securities, holding 58 percent of all outstanding 
government securities (TER 1988/89, p 93). 
in general, Malaysia appears to give priority to the development of public 
programmes with an investment aspect. Thus pure welfare transfer 
programmes are not given priority in the allocation of public 
292 
expenditure. Welfare transfer programmes, therefore, are not used as a device 
for the redistribution of income from the rich to the poor. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS, 
While it is true that the Malaysian poverty eradication programmes have been 
successful in raising the absolute levels of income of poor households and 
subsequently in reducing the incidence of poverty, income disparities between 
rural and urban sectors and within ethnic groups still persist. One reason for 
the persistent inequalities is that benefits derived from policies aimed at 
alleviating poverty, among specific target groups have different impact on 
different social strata. 
Despite the state's claim that the quality of life of the poor has improved, this 
study believes that several weaknesses exist in the policies designed to 
eradicate poverty and redistribute income. The nature and effectiveness of 
policies aimed at redistributing income depends crucially on the existing 
political, social, and economic structures. If the state is committed to a 
redistribution of income in favour of the poor, then the pre-requisites to 
achieving this, target includes fundamental policy interventions, for example 
substantial land reforms such as in Korea and Taiwan, would abolish existing 
structural inequalities particularly in rural areas and therefore spread land 
ownership. Under the circumstances existing in Malaysia, however, policy 
interventions are marginal and incremental in nature. Land reform and the sub- 
division of commercial rubber and oil-palm plantations into family holdings 
are not feasible. As opposed to direct radical measures, indirect mild reforms, 
as practised in Malaysia, generate little significance in reducing inequality. 
During the Fifth Malaysia Plan period (1986-1990) the costly Felda land 
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development schemes benefit only a small proportion of 8.4 percentl6 of the 
poor in the rural areas, and thus the programme has a'marginal impact on 
income redistribution. Meanwhile, in 1987, mainly due to the uneconomic size 
of padi farms, the incidence of poverty among padi -farmers at 50.2 percenV 
(R5MP, Table, 3-6, p 52), was more than double the overall incidence'of 
poverty of 22.4 percent for the rural areas (R5MP, Table 3-6, pp 52-53). 
Within the current framework of ý growth in Malaysia two trends are clear. 
Firstly, the economy is based increasingly on a firm capitalist ground, ' 
operating on the principle of, private property ownership, ' wage labour and 
commodity production17. Secondly, the adopted patterns of development have 
failed to alter significantly the unequal patterns of income distribution. It 
appears that the Malaysian experience does-, not support the'hypothesis of 
growing inequality in rapidly developing countries, but neither does the 
Malaysian-case disprove it. The Malaysian case also indicates that an all-out 
drive for growth need not necessarily result in greater income dispersion. 
Indeed, Malaysia's development policies have, in some instances, neglected 
-the question of income inequality. A case in point is the' industrialization 
programme but with the absence of a minimum wage legislation, particularly 
for lower * grade production workers. Moreover, public expenditure 
programmes in'Malaysia tend to neglect pure welfare transfer programmes, 
like food subsidies for the poor, which may have a positive impact on the 
redistribution'of income in favour of the poor. 
16. For the period 1986-1990 some 33,800 poor families were settled in Felda 
schemes, compared with a total of 402,300 poor households in the rural areas 
in 1987 (R5MP, pp 32; 52). 
17. In Malaysia, poverty alleviation has been carried out within the existing 
capitalist framework, and therefore poverty alleviation policies must not 
threaten the interests of the dominant capitalist class. For instance, raising the 
income levels of poorer households will lead to an expansion of the internal 
market, which is a necessary pre-requisite for the expansion of capitalist 
manufacturing enterprises producing consumption goods (Toh, 1982, p 41). 
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If poverty is to be eradicated by state intervention within - the framework of 
existing democratic politics and a largely. capitalist, economy, - this study 
contends that this could be accomplished by a government led by a coherent 
leadership giving higher priority to the interests of the lower classes. The state 
must be able to translate. this commitment into a framework capable of 
penetrating the lower classes with benefits without being intercepted by the 
upper stratum of society. Thus, in essence, a reformed social order, which in 
reality is not totally, impossible, is essential, wherein the state is controlled by 
strong leaders with a clear-cut ideological commitment that, incorporates, or is 
reasonably accountable to, the interests of the lower classes. 
Perhaps Malaysia could learn a few lessons from Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean 
experience shows how. the power of the state in a capitalistic society could be 
used to create an egalitarian and democratic pattern of development. A study 
by Bratton (1981) shows how Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwean African National 
Union (Patriotic Front) or ZANU(PF) has sought to restructure the economy. 
The state's explicit aim of development strategy is to build a socialist, 
democratic and egalitarian society. However, it ought to be recognised, of 
course, that comparisons often lead to less than clear-cut conclusions, and 
detailed studies are bound to produce some reservations. 
While foreign and domestic private capital formation in Zimbabwe is not 
discouraged at the same time the state introduces progressive social legislation 
. 
"which has put concrete benefits in the hands of the majority of the 
population" (Bratton, 1981, p 462). Minimum wages have been set for the first 
time in sectors where the majority of the blacks are employed, namely in 
agriculture, industry, and domestic service. Free health care for those earning 
low income was introduced at the end of 1980. Bratton (1981) comments that 
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the real test of reformist capacities will emerge only when land reform is 
attempted, but the fact that Zimbabwe has made a Promising beginning should 
be recognized by other Third World countries that are attempting to reduce 
inequality. 
Conceivably, in Malaysia it is time for those who have access to power to 
reassess the constraints of the capitalist mode of development. Ultimately, if 
development with distribution is the preferred goal of the anti-poverty strategy 
in Malaysia, there is a need for a consolidated and committed state apparatus. 
Until such a commitment is demonstrated by those in power, this chapter 
reluctantly concludes that poverty eradication measures in Malaysia are 
intended to legitimise the capitalist nature of the state, while at the same time 
perpetuating socio-economic conditions that result in inequitable patterns in the 
redistribution of income and resources. 
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ý, Chapter Ten 
WOMIEN AND DEVELOPNIENT: 
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the impact of economic development on the patterns of 
female employment in Malaysia. The analysis shall focus on two important 
areas where the majority of women are employed, that is, in the rural 
agricultural sector and the urban industrial wage market. 
This chapter argues that it is the political economy of the country that has a 
profound effect on the levels of women's participation in the country's 
development process. The discussion will demonstrate first how colonialism 
and capitalism have contributed towards the marginalization of women in the 
rural sector. The argument will show that it is the state's industrialisation 
policies, particularly the inducements for multinationals to set up factories in 
Malaysia, that dramatically promotes the integration of women in the urban 
wage labour market, while at the same time marginalizes the position of those 
who are in that market. 
THE MARGINALIZATION OF RURAL WOMEN 
The work of rural women is an integral part of the rural economy. Thus, in a 
predominantly agricultural economy, women's contribution forms an important 
part of the national economy. Women's work relate to food production, 
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household manufacture, household maintenance and child-raising; ý in short, the 
reproduction and maintenance of Aabour. Female labour, however, is 
associated with non-monetary production of goods and services for family use, 
that is, the subsistence sector of the economy. II 
Rural women start their day at around four o'clock in the morning, when they 
get up to prepare the morning and mid-day meals for their families. By five or 
six o'clock they set out to work in the fields, either tapping rubber, or working 
in the rice fields or tending to other crops. At mid-day they take a short rest. 
Then they continue to work until around four o'clock in the afternoon. When 
they return home more work have to -be done, like cooking the family's 
evening meal, sewing and mending clothes, washing clothes and child-care. In 
all they perform about 16 to 17 hours of productive work daily. 
Generally, in many Third World countries the marginalization of female labour 
could be traced to colonial rule. Boserup's (1970) classic study on the role of 
women in economic development illustrates the negative effects that 
colonialism and the penetration of capitalism into subsistence economies have 
often had on women. She points out that European colonial rule contributed to 
the loss of status of women and that "Europeans showed little sympathy for the 
female farming systems which they found in many of their colonies" (Boserup, 
1970, p 54). An example ý is the case of Uganda, where women began, the 
cultivation of. cotton. In 1923 the European administration changed the pattern 
of cotton cultivation. However, they neglected to instruct female cultivators 
when they introduced new agricultural methods, teaching only the men in an 
agricultural setting of traditional female farming. In Senegal Chinese 
instructors from Taiwan failed in their efforts to introduce better techniques in 
rice production because - they taught only the men, who took no notice since 
their wives were the cultivators, and the wives being untaught, continued in 
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the old way, subdividing the carefully improved fields into small traditional 
plots (Boserup, 1970, pp'54-55). Dixon (1978, p 19) cites the example in 
tribal areas of India, where new crops, new farming techniques, and the biases 
of extension workers were pushing women out of their traditional agricultural 
roles in the transition from shifting cultivation to orchards and terraces. 
The loss of women's rights to land is often the result of land reforms 
introduced by colonial administrators. For instance, Swift (1963, pp 276-67) 
points out that in the state of Negri Sembilan in Malaysia, where the, land- 
holding culture was directly attributable to matrilineal as opposed to patrilineal 
family descent systems, land was traditionally held by women cultivators. Both 
padi land and land on which women had their homesteads was traditionally 
passed on from mother to daughter, or from sister to sister. The British 
administration took the first step in transferring the rights of land from women 
to men, when it decided that only land which was under actual cultivation by 
the women would continue to pass in the female line, whereas the areas 
serving as fallow land in shifting agriculture had to be registered to ensure the 
continuance of female inheritancel. Hence the women lost their rights to forest 
land, and later this proved to be a significant loss when the men began to plant 
rubber trees in the forest clearings. 
Studies on the socio-economic impact of specific, development programmes 
tend to show proof that it is usual for agricultural technical advisers to promote 
the productivity of male labour, as opposed to female labour, due to the fact 
that women are rarely members of project planning groups. In Gujerat, India, 
irrigation and multiple cropping have adverse effects upon female labour force 
1. In 1891 the British introduced a newform of land administration, known as 
the Torren System, in which land titles are based on cadastral land surveys, 
and recorded in the Mukim Register. The Register contains columns which 
described the nature of cultivation of each land holdings, and the records are 
registered with the district land office (Lim, 1977, p 76). 
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participation. In northeastern Thailand there has been almost no effect upon 
women's work roles 'of a'rainfed agricultural -development project. In 
Peninsula Malaysia'it was reported that women's wage rates were negatively 
affected by an irrigation-resettlement project (Stoeckel, and Sirisena, 1988, 'p 
31). 
in Sri Lanka, national development programmes such as the Guaranteed Price 
Scheme for rice-producing farmers, ' land settlement and rural electrification 
make a 'greater contribution to increasing male income 'than they! do 'to 
increasing female income. The income benefits of development programmes 
received by women is further constrained by existing inequality of wage rates 
between the sexes within the same occupation in the agricultural sector. For 
example, women workers earn from 19 percent to 39 percent less than males 
in rice-farming occupations; and 23 percent to 38 percent less in'tea cultivation 
(Stoeckel and Sirisena, 1988, p 40). 
in Malaysia women are estimated to comprise about one-third of the total 
labour force in the country. Some 56 percent of the'female labour force are 
concentrated in the rubber production and padi cultivation; and a third of these 
women who work in the agricultural sector are unpaid family workers (Hua, 
1983; p 188). Precisely because these workers are unwaged family labour, 
their productivity is omitted from the statistics of production and income, 
although they may work some 14 to 16 hours daily, ranging from work in the 
fields to producing food, for the family's consumption, child care and'home 
maintenance. '- 
p- 
Malaysian women take part equally with men in basic agricultural production. 
Kusnic and DaVanzo (1980, p. 58) observe that in Malaysia rural women in 
general, and rural female heads of households in particular, work longer 
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hours, and forgo much leisure than their urban counterparts. Despite this fact, 
development projects designed to improve the ý socio-economic status of rural 
people seldom incorporate women as, principal participants. For example, as 
discussed in chapter 9, applicants for the Felda land development schemes are 
admitted on the grounds of need for land. However, it is the husband's 
situation which is considered of interest. Men are conceived of being heads of 
households, and the normal household is assumed to be a nuclear family. 
Although admission is subject to the condition that husband and wife co- 
operate as team, it also implies a certain marginalization and subordination of 
women. 
The labour-power, of women employed in the capitalist agricultural sector is 
equally exploited and underestimated. Heyzer's (1986) investigation on women 
estate workers in Peninsula Malaysia illustrates this point. In the 1920s 
colonial administration encouraged an ethnic family formation on the rubber 
estates. Male labourers, who were largely Tamils from South India, were 
granted company housing and encouraged to bring their wives to, live with 
them. Work contracts were generally signed with the male head of family, who 
was frequently required to provide the labour of his wife and children. 
Women provide more than 50 percent of the labour force on rubber estates, 
and worked as tappers and weeders, sometimes with the help of their children. 
Their wages, which were calculated as part of a "family wage", fluctuate with 
the weather. Rubber-tapping is impossible on rainy days. Furthermore, 
women's employment on rubber plantations is being adversely affected by the 
declining international demand for rubber, and the resulting trend towards the 
conversion of rubber estates into oil-palm holdings, where labour requirements 
are much lower. 
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Women plantation workers begin a typical day at around four in the morning., 
when'she prepares the moming, m6al and lunch for her family. Plantations 
usually provide basic day-care for pre-school children of women tappers. At 
half-past five in the morning she sets out to tap the rubber trees. She finishes 
her rounds at nine o'clock. ' After a short break she begins to collect the latex, 
and finishes work by about two o'clock in the afternoon. In order to 
supplement their'incomes, - women plantation workers often take a second job 
in the afternoon, working as domestic helpers in homes outside the plantation. 
It could be nine o'clock in'the evening by the time they return home to prepare 
the'evening Meal. 
Although during the colonial period women rubber plantation workers were 
paid less than men, conditions have changed. Women now have equal pay for 
equal work agreements. Equal wages for a fixed level of productivity for men 
and women tappers were1ntroduced in 1953 (Ariffin, 1989, p 87). Under the 
equal pay condition all tappers have to tap 700 trees a day. It is the men, 
however, who dominate the top positions in the plantation hierarchy. In 
addition to their work as rubber tappers, estate women are also responsible for 
feeding the labour force. Food items bought from the market are frequently 
supplemented by vegetables and fruits grown on small plots, and it is the 
women who tend to these plots. 
Under equal pay conditions women are not allowed time off for reproductive 
activities such as visiting or feeding their children in the estate creche. Heyzer 
(1986) remarked that one of the most insidious features in the plantation 
system is its cyclical nature. Schooling for estate children is minimal; families 
are trapped in the plantation network from generation to generation and have 
little chances of entering other more remunerative wage-earning sectors. The 
plantation is a total institution which reproduces labour for its sustenance. Kids 
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are ensured of jobs and go to work as soon as they come of age. Families are 
therefore tied to the plantations and this allows the persistence of exploitative 
and discriminatory practices. 
WOMEN AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
The discussion, in chapter Two analysed how Third World countries,, like 
Malaysia, were incorporated into the capitalist economic system. Dependency 
theorists stress on the role of international factors, specifically the capitalist 
system which directly or indirectly controls the world's markets. Changes in 
the patterns of female employment seem to vary according to the particular 
conditions of development process in a given country and the role that country 
plays in the international division of labour. 
For instance, Stolz-Chinchilla's (1977) research in Guatemala shows that the 
mode of production and the function of the economy in an international 
economic system affects Third World women. Unlike industrial growth in 
Argentina and Mexico, where large numbers of women workers were drawn 
into industrial factories, industrial growth in Guatemala becomes linked to 
increased poverty and feudal patriarchy and that most female workers remain 
locked into subsistence agriculture and domestic work. I 
In several other Third World countries the patterns of foreign investment and 
dependence brought about by the international division of labour have had a 
dramatic effect on the integration as well as the marginalization of women in 
the labour market. On the one hand, it is true that the internationalization of 
industrial production on a world scale has resulted in an increase in women's 
employment relative to men, because women constitute the preferred source of 
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labour for multinational factories2. On the, other hand, Safflotti (1975) argues 
that it is the world capitalist system that is largely responsible for the 
"backwardness" of the household, because the household functions to maintain 
women as a reserve labour force, available to join the labour market when 
necessary. Thus women are seen as victims of capitalism, confined to the less 
valued sector of the economy, and held within the households as passive labour 
reserves, to be released or withdrawn from the market in response to the 
cyclical nature of capitalist economy. 
Multinational companies are attracted to Third World countries basically 
because labour there is excessively cheap, and labour costs differentials, 
inclusive of overhead costs, between traditional and. newly industrialised 
countries are between 80 to 90 percent (Frobel,, et al, 1978, p 846). 
Furthermore, labour in Third World countries are readily available, equally 
productive, more easily subjected to discipline, hard work and longer worldng 
hours. Southall (1988, pp 10; 12) asserts that wages in Third World countries 
are so much cheaper for two reasons. Through the struggle of labour 
organization, labour in industrialised countries has been able to extract a 
relatively high real rate of return. Secondly, the expansion of global capitalist 
production processes has resulted in the disintegration or subordination of non- 
capitalist forms of production. The capitalist transformation of agriculture 
2. Ghertman and Allen (1984, p 2) define multinational companies an "any 
company originating in one country and having continuous activities under its 
control in at least two other countries, that is, foreign countries, which provide 
more than 10 percent of total group turnover". The company in the country of 
origin is known as the "parent company" and the extensions into the fiost 
countries are known as "foreign subsidiaries"; the latter may be under the 
former's financial control (majority shareownership), or managerial control 
(management control), or technological control (transfer of technology). 
Examples of multinationals (also known, as transnationals) are the European 
companies such as Triumph International Group, Unilever, Robert Bosch, 
Siemens, Phillips; American companies such as Union Carbide, General 
Electric, RCA, Motorola, Texas Instruments; and Japanese companies such as 
Seiko Electronics, Matsushita and Hitachi. 
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deprives an increasing proportion of rural inhabitants of access to land. 
Subsequently, the capitalist mode of production subsidises capital by enablingý 
it to employ the displaced rural population and pay wages below the cost of the 
social reproduction of labour. As a result of the global expansion'of capital, ' 
Third World states are required to develop and'maintain repressive political 
institutions by exerting authoritative controls over labour, thus increasing their 
attractiveness as sites for'multinational investment. ' 
THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
As" explained in'chapter Nine, the expansion of industries in Malaysia began 
with the legislation of the Pioneer Industrial Ordinance in 1958 and the 
subsequent establishment of import-substitution industries. Industrial expansion 
was further encouraged by the state ýwith the declaration'of the Investment 
Incentives Act of 1968 and the subsequent establishment of the export- 
orientation phase. The expansion of this later phase of industrialisation has 
been strongly supported by the state, with its central concern of restructuring 
society in the context of an'expanding economy. 
Southall (1988, pp 12-13) distinguishes four different types of regimes within 
the new international division of labour. These regimes are: (1) colonial and 
settler-colonial' regimes; for example, Hong Kong and South Africa; (2) 
dependent development regimes, where industrial strategy is geared to the 
global market, for example, Taiwan, Singapore and Sri Lanka; (3) state 
capitalist regimes, where state intervention andheavy industrial development 
have enabled world competitiveness in certain spheres, for example, India; and 
(4) revolutionary regimes, which are seeking to increase participation in the 
world market, for example, China. 
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Within Southall's typology Malaysia is a clear model of both the dependent 
development and state capitalist regime. The state has promoted industrial 
development in a number of ways. Public expenditure on industrial 
development increased rapidly from 1.2 percent of the development 
expenditure in the First Malaya Plan 1956-60 (IMP, Table 2-6, p 29) to 3.6 
percent in the Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-85 and 7.8 percent in the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan 1986-90 (5MP, pp 227; 242; 360). 
A fundamental investment-encouragement scheme adopted by the state was the 
creation'of industrial estates. McGee et al (1989, p 267) observes that between 
1962 to 1984 some 86 industrial estates were established, mainly concentrated 
in the urban zones of Kuala Lumpur - Kelang, Penang, Johor Bahru, Seremban 
and Melaka. An important variant in these industrial estates were the free-trade 
zones or export-processing zones, which in 1984 consisted of nine zones 
located in Selangor, Penang and Melaka' 
In its promotion and coordination of industrial development, the state puts 
stress on "labour-intensive , resource-based, ' including agro-based export- 
oriented and high technology industries" (3MP, p 317). However,, Malaysia 
lacks the necessary capital and technology which is vital, for its industrial 
development. Hence the involvement of multinational corporations has been a 
central feature in the 'process of Malaysian industrial expansion. By 
comparative standards this has been extremely successful. 
In a case study on industrial estates in Penang, McGee et al (1989, pp 268-69) 
report that between 1971 to 1984 the number of factories increased from 36 to 
243, while employment rose from 4500 to 56,000. The electronics and 
electrical industries accounted for 47 percent of the new jobs created, and a 
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further 24 percent was created in the textile and garment factories. Industries 
which were labour-intensive were also female-intensive. Almost 62 percent of 
the workers ý were females, of which over four-fifths were employed in the 
electronics and textile industries. Malays made up Ahe majority of the 
workforce; in 1982 some 45 percent of them were employed on the industrial 
estates, compared with 33 percent of the total manufacturing employment in 
Penang state in 1980. 
I PACT OF INDUSTRIALISATIO 
ON WOMEN'S LABOUR POWER 
The effect of international capital accumulation involves a new division of 
labour in which young women become migrant wage earners The demands of 
world capitalism have dislocated the peasant economy. The commercialisation 
of land, heavy investment in commodity cash crops at the expense of 
subsistence agriculture'and the undervaluation of women's work in crop 
cultivation are some of the reasons why young women rely on multinational 
corporations as providers of better employment opportunities. The majority of 
rural Malaysian women who migrate to the urban centres, in order to seek 
employment in the industrial sectors. Although absorbed in large masses by the 
industries, in general they are concentrated in low-wage, labour-intensive 
industries such as food, textile and garments, and electronics and electrical 
industries. 
it is the women's labour power that has played a paramount role in establishing 
the electronics industry as the driving force behind Malaysia's transformation 
from a commodity producer to a manufacturing power. The electronics 
industry plays a dominant role in the country's economy. Malaysia is now the 
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world's biggest exporter of semi-conductor devices and the world's third 
largest producer after Japan and the United States ((FEER, 7.9.1990, p 98)., In 
1988 exports from the electronics industries amounted,, to $14.7 billion, 
equivalent to 56 percent of all manufacturing exports, compared to 48 percent 
in 1980 (ibid. ). I.. 
Literature on female employment in industries tend to blame export-oriented 
multinationals as the leading exploiters of female labour. For instance, Hua 
(1983, p 188) mentions that, in 1981 women made up 90 percent of the 
assembly workforce in the electronics factories in Malaysia, with low wages 
ranging between $100 to $200 a month. In 1986 women were still earning low 
wages compared with men; production workers inýthe textile and electronics 
industries were eaming monthly wages of $277 and $317 respectively, while 
monthly wages in the male-dominated machinery and motor vehicle industries 
were $570 and $425 respectively (Ministry of Labour, 1986, Table 9-3, p 
153). Due to frequently layoffs resulting from vulnerability to the world 
market, work in multinationals offer no job security. With the absence of a 
pension scheme, the greatest fear is retrenchment. In the 1984-85 recession the 
electronics industry retrenched some 30,000 workers (FEER, 21.12.1989, p 
34). 
Economic development policies adopted by the state are not specifically 
accompanied by the necessary social and welfare facilities. Female migrants 
are known to live under oppressive conditions. Generally where there is a 
shortage of modem housing or where rents are high, female migrants live in 
squatter settlements, where amenities such as, piped water, flush toilets and 
garbage collection are limited. Several of these settlements are located on the 
fringes of urban centres such as Kuala Lumpur, Petaling Jaya and Penang. 
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In a study on the overseas expansion, of Japanese capitalist economy, in 
particular the Toray textile industry, Haruhi (1984) observed some 8000 
workers or 16 percent of the 50,000 employees in Malaysia's textile industry. 
The young women workers, recruited from the rural areas, were 
accommodated in houses rented by Toray in housing estates close to the Export 
Processing Zones. Dormitories were set up in'these houses, accommodating 
sometimes up to 30 workers in each house. The workers' private lives were 
controlled by the patriarchal system, headed by a Housemaster and 
Housemistress who lived nearby. Workers must seek permission before they 
go out and record the times when they leave and come back. 
In Malaysia there are limited opportunities of initiating political consciousness 
amidst women workers in the export-oriented industries. The fact that these 
women were brought up in a patriarchal'society, and because they spend a 
greater proportion of their daily life either in the factories or restoring their 
energy after work, they have little opportunity to raise their consciousness as 
women and as workers. 
Why then do women choose to work in multinational factories? Although it 
may be inferior by white collar working standards, work in multinationals, 
with shorter working hours and better working conditions, generate more 
income compared with traditional housework or unpaid family labour in the 
agricultural sector. Besides there is access to the city, independence and 
freedom of movement, compared with the strict patriarchal system in the 
villages. Furthermore, factory work is more readily regulated by the state then 
unpaid family agricultural labour or domestic work, where working hours are 
anything up to 14 to 16 hours daily. 
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MIGRATION AND WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
The impact of-migration on women's reproductive responsibility results, in 
adjustments in child-rearing patterns. Migrant women with young children, 
foR example, find child-care -facilities in urban areas beyond their financial 
Means. State-run or state-subsidised creches are non-existent. As a result, these 
women migrants have to depend on their close Idn ties for certain welfare 
facilities. ýIý 11 ý 
in a study in Rembau, a rural area in the state of Negri Sembilan, Stiven 
(1987), shows that despite large-scale migration to towns, women maintain 
close kinship ties with the rural areas. Migrants generally contribute towards 
the extended farnily's, economy. Women therefore are not released from a 
system in which there are obligations which hold implications of major unpaid 
work. Single and married children make extensive monetary remittances to 
their immediate families. Malay women are' manipulating elements of 
traditional codes to help them get along'in the marginal world in which they 
live; working women who send their children to the rural areas to live with 
their grandparents$ periodically forward remittances for child support. In 
return grandparents contribute significantly towards the care of migrants' 
children, thus encouraging the maximisation of the welfare role of the kin, in 
lieu of state provision of welfare facilities. 
EXPL! QITATION OF FEMALE GUEST WORKERS , 
The exploitation of Malaysian female labour-, power ý transgresses national 
boundaries. Heyzer (1982) asserts that Malaysian migrants worldng in labour- 
intensive industries in Singapore is an example of this type of exploitation. The 
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creation of a mobile workforce that is fully employed during the boom period 
and which could be removed from production during the slump contributes to 
the development of a peripheral or marginal workforce within the industrial 
sector, separated from the more affluent sectors of the Singaporean society. 
Precisely because Singapore is a small nation-state without the adequate female 
labour force, workers were recruited from the rural areas in neighbouring 
Peninsula Malaysia. Thus, young women workers with marginal income 
needs, and who can be easily reabsorbed into the family structure, are regarded 
as ideal for a "floating workforce" (Heyzer, 1982, p 18). 
Although migrant workers formed 51 percent of the total manufacturing 
workforce in Singapore (Heyzer, 1982, p 187), they have little control over 
their employment'and constantly suffer considerable insecurity. In absolute 
terms, compared with their counterparts in Malaysia, migrant workers in 
Singapore receive higher wages. The average hourly rate for Singapore factory 
workers in 1985 was US$1.58, compared with US$0.84 for factory workers in 
Malaysia (FEER, 22.12.1989, p 33). However, because the cost of living is 
higher in Singapore than in Malaysia, it proved difficult for migrant workers to 
save money for periods of unemployment. 
In order to prevent the permanent settlement of migrant workers and therefore 
pose a threat to political and economic stability, Heyzer (1982) points out that 
the Singapore state enforces strict regulations on migrant workers. One such 
regulation concerns the marriage between , work-permit 
holders - and 
Singaporeans. In exchange for a marriage license they are required to sign a 
bond that both parties will be sterilize after. the birth of the second child. 
Besides, employers are required to furnish reports on semi-annual pregnancy 
tests administered to female migrant workers, and those found pregnant are to 
be repatriated at the expense of their employers. 
311 
Thus far the discussion has shown that the absorption of women into the 
industrial workforce reinforces their subordinate position as a gender. Women 
are favoured by capital in industries because wage levels for women are almost 
always lower than for men. Furthermore, women are more easily manipulated 
and generally less'organised - and therefore more susceptible to domination by 
male employers. The fact that women are easily hired and fired makes their 
labour power favourable to the process of accumulation by global factories 
which are acutely vulnerable to demand fluctuations and protectionism. 
pY COMMODITY PRODUCERS 
Capitalism and the creation of an urban industrial workforce is indirectly 
responsible for the proliferation of what Moser (1978) terms as petty 
commodity production. His approach "focuses on the structural linkages and 
relationships between different production and distribution systems (which 
include technical as well as social relations of production)..... [and] identifies 
the constraints on the expansion of small-scale enterprises, the levels of capital, 
accumulation possible and the dynamics of -production at this level, and the 
transitional processes, whether to capitalist production, or proletarianization" 
(Moser, 1978, p 1061). In other words, due to its subordination to capital, the 
extent of either cohabitation or articulation of petty commodity production 
depends not on its own interests, but on its contribution to the interests of 
capital. As was pointed out in the preceding sections, industrial capital 
accumulation also creates a substantial low-income or impoverished category in 
the workforce. 
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Harrison (1978, p'33) asserts that ýa commodity is a use value which has 
exchange value. It is produced for exchange - made to be swapped or sold on 
the market" Under this definition a commodity need not be an object; if it is 
something people need, it has a use value. Lebrun and Gerry (1975) assert that 
by creating an urban industrial workforce, capitalism has formed a market for 
commodities, which has resulted in the production of commodity for exchange. 
In Malaysia one"form, of petty commodity production that is linked with the 
urban industrial workforce is the spread of hawker/foodstall sector. One is able 
to observe this phenomenon occurring on the parameter of industrial'zones and 
in the suburban residential areas. 
Generally in Malaysia it is the women who dominate the petty food production 
sector. Poor women find that trading allows them the flexibility necessary to 
integrate daily maintenance'of'a household and income-generating pursuits; 
and thus allows them to reduce, in part at least, the conflict stemming from 
their dual responsibilities as income earners and mothers. These women sell 
food in order to supplement the incomes of their spouses. They cater mainly 
for the low-income workers. The types of food they prepare are local fast- 
foods, such as noodles, rice, meat kebabs, cakes and drinks. A decent meal 
may cost within the region of $1.50 to $2.00 (or equiýalent to 40 to 50 pence). 
Thus, in this case, food is the commodity produced for exchange between the 
petty producers and the wage labour force of the capitalist sector. 
owing to their low capital outlay, the food hawkers use rudimentary modes of 
production. Often the stalls are simple sheds built of wood with corrugated 
iron sheets as roofs; and the use of -minimal utensils helps to keep the costs of 
production down. The major component of the costs lie in the purchase of raw 
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ingredients and fuel, which is often supplied by middlemen traders, and thus 
prices would have been inflated in order to account for the suppliers' profits. 
owing to sales which depend largely on a labour force that receive low wages, 
these food vendors -are unable to accrue high profits. This is an indirect 
manifestation of the control exerted by the capitalist mode of production on 
petty producers. Other constraints include the capitalist state's control over 
licenses, contracts and credit facilities. As they do not have a fixed income, it 
is almost impossible for petty producers to obtain credit facilities in order to 
expand production. In a study on petty producers in Dakar, Gerry (1978) 
concludes that petty producers are forced into a dependent and peripheral 
status, in this case, within the complex Senegal social formation -a situation 
which can occur in other countries too. 
The process of unequal exchange and the transfer of value occurs from the 
petty to the capitalist production, and the result is the articulation of the petty 
production sector. Bienefeld (1975) argues that there is net transfer of value 
from petty producers to the capitalist sector by way of "a transfer of surplus to 
the modem sector, within which their surplus may be shared by the Wage 
earners involved in the production of such commodities" (Bienefeld, 1975, p 
72). His study of street traders in Tanzania found that virtually none of them 
earned incomes that might make accumulation of capital a real possibility; 
hence-"their ability to accumulate capital to raise the forces of production is 
both limited by and dependent upon the activities of the "modem" sector, as an 
extension of the international capitalist system" (Bienefeld, 1975, p 71). 
Mazumdar (1976) states that the petty production, sector 'contains a higher 
proportion of women than the wage employment sector. The denial of higher- 
income employment for women reflects their oppressed status, While their 
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involvement as petty producers in food vendoring or vegetable and fruit selling 
illustrates the marginal nature of employment in this sector. Thus by 
minimising the costs of commodities purchased by wage-labour, petty 
producers certainly play a vital role in the procreation of capitalism. Yet it is 
the same process which leads to the impoverishment of petty producers. ý 
In short, women petty producers are often exploited by middlemen, harassed 
by public officials (who see the use of ramshackle stalls and makeshift carts as 
an affront to modemisation efforts and who do not realise the significant of 
these activities for family survival) and denied access to both credit and 
technical expertise in capital management. The fact that these women- are 
burdened by both household and income-generating -activities contributes to 
their powerlessness as a group. Often they do not participate actively in 
community agencies. - which would help them become aware of their common 
needs as working mothers, or in labour unions, which would foster their sense 
of solidarity. Women petty producers equally contribute to the economy's 
resilience. Hence they ought to be given economic assistance, such as 
appropriate infrastructure and permanent trading sites, and access to working 
and investment capital, as well as training and marketing skills, so as to allow 
them to circumvent the middleman system. -. - ,w 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
For the most part, as understood from the foregoing discussion, the capitalist 
labour market penalises the female labour-force, and has a number of direct 
effects, reducing many to a peripheral status. - State policies implicitly recognise 
that women are primarily responsible for reproduction the unwaged activities 
contributing, to the maintenance and welfare of household members. Any 
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analysis needs to bring out that important relationship, and needs to distinguish 
the sheer quantity of unpaid from paid working hours3. 
It is true that a developing country like Malaysia has few resources to expend 
on welfare services. In the choice between production or reproduction the state 
has opted for the former as a means of increasing levels of economic growth. 
But that has been at the expense of discriminating between types of labour in 
remuneration more'severely and creating a low paid, insecure workforce, that 
is, -women in the manufacturing industries. The "trickle down" assumption of 
growth, therefore, have to be questioned. The discussion in this chapter has 
itemised the component contributing to low income and poor social status of 
different institutionalised developments directly attributable to the priorities of 
Malaysian economic development. Commitment by the state to social 
expenditure is generally small. In the Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-90 the 
proportion of Federal development expenditure for social welfare is only 0.08 
percent, housing 2.5 percent, and health 1.7 percent; compared with 59 
percent allocated for the economic sector (5MP, pp 242; 518; 530; 541). In 
the light of this expenditure structure it is implicit that the state endorses and 
indeed rely upon the activities of private individuals, who are primarily 
women, to reproduce the workforce. As mothers and housewives, it is women 
who usually provide essential welfare services for which public finance cannot 
be found. Due to its unwaged status, women's reproductive responsibility 
actually subsidises the state and enables it- to make substantial savings in 
expenditure in social services. 
3. Studies in the United States and Canada show the value of housework as 
share of personal income range between 41 and 53 percent, while in Malaysia 
the ratio is 38.5 percent (Kusnic and DaVanzo, 1980, p. 108). Malaysian 
women with children spend about 12 to 12.7 hours aily on non-market 
activities - child-care and food preparation are the two most important 
activities of the mother (DaVanzo and Lee, 1983, p 72). 
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State policies; designed primarily by male bureaucrats, need to recognise the 
reproductive responsibility of women in contributing to the well-being of wage 
labour force. Hence radical structural changes are needed in the state policy- 
maldng process. For example, it is absolutely essential that the dimension of 
gender is introduced in state development planning documents. The dimension 
of gender in the measurement of poverty is vital; even if income is measured 
in terms of household income, it is pertinent to point out the gender of heads 
of households rather than to assume that males are heads of households or 
principal breadwinners. - 
Feminity has never been equated with financial self-sufficiency. It is vital that 
we challenge the notion, of women's financial dependence on men. On a 
practical level, women's greater share of unpaid domestic work has inhibited 
their ability to generate an adequate income for old age. Even if they have 
been absorbed into the wage labour force, the fact that they are in low-paid, 
insecured jobs, makes it impossible for them to save for periods of 
unemployment or old age. There is hardly any safety-net for them to fall back 
to in cases of contingincies. 
As follows, development policies must recognise and accept the survival 
strategies of poor women so as not to undermine further the tenuous economic 
position of these women. Policy makers need to formulate policies and 
implement programmes which consider the needs of women with low-income, 
so as to balance their dual roles as economically active persons and mothers. 
Such policies ought to be based on the acceptance of the vital significance of 
women's contribution in the economic production as well as social 
, reproduction processes; and the acceptance of the legitimacy of poor women's 
, economic activities. 
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Adequate employment security for low-paid women in the labour-force ought 
to be given priority by labour unions. Labour unions would be expected to 
demonstrate their welfarist and social democratic roles in the unequal struggle 
between labour and capital at the periphery of the global economic system. On 
the contrary, labour unions, being patriarchal in nature4, tend to play a role in 
fostering the interests of male members, while issues pertaining to women and 
work are not given priority by the unions (Ariffin, 1989, p 79). 
In summary, the argument in this chapter has gradually appreciated both the 
wider meanings of social security and the need to trace the structural causes, 
and especially economic, industrial , and social discriminatory causes, of 
insecurity and poverty. ' Inevitably this must include consideration of both race 
and gender. 
4. Arrifin (1989, p 90) observes that in Malaysia, women formed 27.4 percent 
of the total trade union membership in 1983 but only 4 percent of the 
leadership structure was composed of women members - an evidence that trade 
unionism is considerably a male institution. 
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Chapter Eleven 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
iNTRODUCTIO 
The review of the development policies in Malaysia, which have been 
presented in preceding chapters, suggests that economic growth by itself does 
not reduce poverty. While it is true that the Malaysian government has made 
explicit attempts to alleviate the problem of absolute poverty, relative 
inequalities appear to be on the increase and these replace or add to the 
problems of absolute poverty as defined historically. Perhaps the reason for 
this is the state's choice of capitalism as its path of economic development, 
which results in a maldistribution of resources,, new forms of deprivation, the 
existence of a segregated labour market which is weak in bargaining power, 
and an economy which is'dependent upon domestic as well as, international 
economic forces. 
How could we achieve a substantial reduction in income inequalities and 
economic insecurity in order to establish a basis of minimum or acceptable 
living standards for the poor? In advanced industrial countries elaborate social 
security systems have been developed with the basic aim of relieving, the 
problem of low income and poverty. There is now a tendency for developing 
countries to initiate such schemes. Thus to answer, the question posed above, it 
is necessary to understand what is meant by the term "social security". ý 
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In this chapter the intention is to review the concept of social security, and 
then explain some of the reasons for the development of, social security. The 
second part of this chapter will examine some social security programmes 
found in industrial countries as well as those in selected Third World countries, 
with a focus on the major social security schemes in Malaysia. 
WHAT IS SOCIAL SECURITY? 
Like "poverty" the , term, "social, security" has no universally accepted 
definition. ý Comparative studies on social security usually raise issues 
pertaining to the difficulties relating to definitions and data. This chapter will 
review a number of -examples of how the term has been used by different 
scholars. III 
Altmeyer (1966) perceives social security as "a specific governmental 
programme designed to promote the economic and social well-being of 
individual workersand their, families through providing protection against 
specific hazards which otherwise cause widespread destitution and misery" 
(Altmeyer; 1966, p 3).. This definition upholds the importance of government 
taking major responsibility- in social security in a capitalistic and industrial 
nation, like the United States. The definition is closely aligned to a market 
interpretation of society, that action only needs to be taken when for reasons of 
"hazard" people are unable to earn an income for themselves. 
Brown (1982) defines social security as "that part of policy which is concerned 
directly with maintaining income, primarily when people are unable to work, 
and thereby securing them against falling into poverty" (Brown, 1982, p 30). 
This definition reflects the nature of the British social -security, system with its 
primary concern for income maintenance and not being short of money. 
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In a comparative study on social security in ten industrial countries Kaim- 
Caudle (1973, pp 6-13) draws attention to the different meanings of the term. 
In the United States the term is popularly used to refer to old age, survivors', 
disability and health insurance programmes of the Federal government, while 
the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare attaches a 
much wider meaning to, the term which encompasses all public programmes 
pýpyiding protection against loss of income, retirement provisions for 
government employees, veterans' compensation and pensions and privately- 
organised pensions and occupational welfare. In the United Kingdom social 
security benefits cover cash. transfers in the context of social insurance, social 
assistance and veterans' pensions, while in New Zealand the term includes a 
comprehensive system of cash benefits plus a universal health service. 
Thus so as to overcome the complexities involved in what is meant by the term 
social security, Kaim-Caudle's study (1973) uses the same terminology which 
is adopted by the ILO: "it refers to rights of individuals to provisions which 
have the objective of (a) granting curative or preventive medical care; (b) 
maintaining income in case of involuntary loss of earnings or of an important 
part of earnings, or (c) granting supplementary incomes to persons having 
family responsibilities" (ILO, 1972, p 2; quoted in Kaim-Caudle, 1973, p 9). 
Kaim-Caudle (1973, pp 9-11) draws up a, typology of social security 
pýovisions. According, to this typology social security not only includes 
Organised income maintenance services provided by the state, but it also 
encompasses indirect benefits provided through fiscal measures, and those 
pýovided by voluntary organisations as well as occupationally-linked benefits 
provided by employers. Statutory provisions of. social security include (a) 
social insurance schemes which provide income maintenance, health care, and 
321 
related benefits to insured workers, (b) means-tested social assistance, (c) 
demogrant allowances, (d) a variety of mandatory benefits provided by 
employers, such as workmen's compensation and redundancy payments, and 
(e) tax allowances and concessions. Non-statutory provisions include (a) the 
payment of sickness benefits and retirement pensions to all staff, and other 
occupational benefits given to certain grades of staff only, all of which are 
provided by the employers, i. e. occupational welfare, and (b) the provision of 
benefits by voluntary organisations. In'short, Kaim-Caudle (1973) incorporates 
the notion'of Titmuss' (1968) "social divisions of welfare" in his typology of 
social security. Kaim-Caudle's typology may be too wide but nevertheless it 
provides a- useful * framework for classifying services which have been 
designated as social security in differe nt countries and for making cross- 
national comparisons. 
The ILOs definition of social security is widely used in formal definitions of 
social security (for example, as adopted in Kaim-Caudle's study) The'ILO 
views social security as "the result achieved by a comprehensive and successful 
series of measures for protecting the public (or a large sector of it) from the 
economic distress that, ' in the absence of such measures, would be caused by 
the stoppage of earnings in sickness, unemployment and old age, and after 
death; for making available to that same public medical care as needed; and for 
su6sidizing families bringing up young children" (ILO, 1958, p 11). This is 
t the is the meaning of social security which was implicit in the ILO's Social 
Security (Minimum Standards) Convention No. 102 of 1952, adopted by the 
international Ubour Conference of that year. Under this Convention social 
security schemes are divided into nine types of statutory provisions, namely, 
medical care, sickness benefit, unemployment benefit, old age benefit, 
employment injury benefit, family benefit, maternity benefit, invalidity 
benefit, and survivors' benefit. 
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In an earlier document the ILO had differentiated between two forms of social 
security, namely social insurance and social assistance (ILO, 1942). The 
former is financed through contributions by potential beneficiaries subsidised 
by employers and the state, while the latter is financed from general taxation 
and is subject to a test of means. The ILO also emphasised that to be described 
as . social security ý these, measures must be provided by the state. The ILO's 
definition of.,, social, security, has the advantage that it corresponds to 
internationally comparable statistics on social security collected and adjusted 
by the ILO, and published from time to time in its occasional publication "The 
Cost of Social Security". 
I-. 1,1. 
Despite the comprehensive range of benefits classified under the ILO's 
definition of social security, many ILO documents as well as those published 
by other organizations, such as the International Social Security Association, 
"place far more-emphasis on social insurance than on other types of social 
security such as social assistance" (Midgley, 1984, p 82). This is true in the 
case of the 1952 ILO Convention mentioned above which did not include 
social assistance as one of the major types of social security. For this reason 
the term social security carries a notion that benefits are designed primarily for 
wage or salary earners rather than self-employed people, and as a form of 
deterrence the benefits are "earned" through regular contributions by the 
beneficiaries. - 
In practice,, the term social security normally excludes certain benefits, such as 
education, training, housing, children's services and social case-work. On the 
other hand, there are benefits which are categorised as fiscal welfare which 
may be accounted for as social security benefits. One example is the married 
manis tax allowance, which is available in Britain to married men. This 
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allowance enhances the disposable income of married couples, though not 
directly paid through the social security system. 
Social security schemes also differ fundamentally from commercial insurance 
schemes. The former is a statutory and governmental service which functions 
through sizeable contribution (sometimes a third, sometimes even more) from 
general taxation and contributions by the insured, while commercial insurance 
is normally a business venture, in which the insurer can, and usually does, 
make profits from the contributions by spending less for the benefit of the 
insured persons. 
Yet the definitions referred to in the above paragraphs emphasise more on cash 
transfer programmes and this reflect the narrower sense of the term "social 
security" which Atkinson (1989, p 99) suggests is usually used to describe the 
set of social security policies in industrialised countries. In developing 
countries it would be more appropriate to use the term "social security" to 
refer to an objective of government policies. According to Atkinson (ibid. ) this 
may include several strategies that may be applied to improve the degree of 
such security, such as asset redistribution, labour market interventions, 
agricultural reform, food programmes and public works. It is this wider sense 
of the term "social security" that is adopted in this study. It means that if 
"social protection" is to exist in a society this study contends that a social 
security programme should include not only cash transfers but should also 
encompass the other strategies mentioned above. Hence these are the points to 
be borne in mind when recommending for an alternative social programme for 
M alaysia. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
The term social security - an -incorporation of "economic security" and "social 
justice" - is an American invention originating from the 1935 Social Security 
Act. Basically' modem social security had its origin in Europe during the 
industrial revolution in the second half of the nineteenth century. In general the 
English Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, under which for the first time the 
traditional relief for paupers was centralized, influenced much of the 
institutionalisation of social welfare in the West. 'However, in the Poor Law 
the underlying belief was that the condition of the poor was due to their own 
laziness and improvidence. 'Hence the Poor Law was less concerned with the 
alleviation of poverty and hardship than with establishing conditions 
encouraging a return to work. Pressure groups such as charitable organisations 
and trade unions opposed the idea of centralised social security provisions on 
mixed grounds; sometimes to object to poor people being allowed to abandon 
self-reliance, 'and partly due to the'ilme and resources required to develop a 
funded scheme. 
The first institutionalised social insurance was created in Germany between 
1883 and 1889 during the'rule of Chancellor Bismarck. The German social 
insurance system was implemented in three stages. The sickness insurance was 
introduced in 1883, followed by employment injury insurance scheme in 1884, 
and the invalidity and old-age'insurance scheme in 1889 (Zollner, 1982, ). 
Following Germany's pioneering effort, in 1892 Denmark introduced a non- 
i 
contributory pension scheme for men and women above the age of 60 years 
who had lived in Denmark for five year immediately before applying. The 
scheme was financed by local authorities who were reimbursed half the 
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expenditure by the state. The Danish pension scheme was more in the nature of 
a public assistance but'withouf the m6ral-stigma normally associate&With the 
receipt of poor relief in'those days (Kaim-Caudle, 1973, pp 147-48). In' 1898 
New, Zealand became'the second country in the world to introduce a means- 
tested non-contributory old-age pensions for men and women aged 65'years 
and 'over' who' had lived in the colony for at least 25 years (Kaim-Caudle, 
19739 pp 156-57). 
In Britain different forms of legislative intervention designed to confer some 
form of'protection against- thei'major social hazards were introduced between 
1880'and 1911. Under 'the' Employers Liability Act of 1880 employers were 
liable for industrial "accidents and diseases. The workmen's compensation 
scheme was introduced'in 1897 and coverage was extended later in 1906 
(Ogus, 1982, p 15 1). The old-age pensions introduced in 1908 marked the first 
real departure'from the'principles of the Poor Law. The scheme provided non- 
contributory pensions of 25'pence a week to all men and women when they 
reached the age of 70 years; however, the award of the pension was subject to 
a means'test, character test and residence and nationality qualifications (Kaim- 
Caudle, 1973, p 166). ' 
Social insurance was' not introduced in Britain until thirty years after 
Bismarck's' 'pioneering' leigislation. The National Insurance Act of 1911 
introduced two different forms of national insurance schemes, namely the 
health insurance scheme which -was compulsory for all employed manual 
workers between the age of 16 and 70 years, and secondly the unemployment 
scheme under which flat-rate benefits were payable for a maximum period of 
15 weeks in a year (Ogus, 1982, p 154). 
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The Great Depression of the 1930s and the inter-war years further spurned the 
development of social security systems in the West. The American Congress 
enacted the Social Security Act in 1935 ( and was amended in 1939), which set 
up, a Federal scheme of, old-age pensions for employees in industry and 
commerce. Payroll taxes were first collected in, 1937 and the ý first monthly 
benefits were -paid out in 1940. The Act covered retirees at age 65 and 
provided a, lump-sum death benefit to survivors (Aaron, 1982, pp 2-3). 
Contributions were compulsory and had to be shared between the employees 
and their employers; the funds collected had to be invested in government 
securities, -and, for the first time in America contributors' right to pensions 
were clearly defined in law pmd pensions were paid out irrespective of means 
and unearned income (Kaim-Caudle, 1973, p 185). 
In Britain - the publication of the Social Insurance and Allied Services, 
commonly known as the Beveridge Report, in 1942, envisaged a greater 
commitment to social security. Beveridge recommended a universal, 
comprehensive and adequate , social insurance scheme, with flat-rate 
contributions, and flat-rate benefits which could be claimed as a right, 
regardless of - income. These recommendations were implemented in the 
National Insurance Act of 1946 and was to become the basis of the "welfare 
state" (Kaim-Caudle, -1973, p 38). While it is true the Beveridge Report 
affirmed the importance, of. social insurance as a means of protecting 
individuals against social risks, Ogus (1982, p 193) asserts that central to 
Beveridge's philosophy was the "reciprocal model of welfare" whereby people 
had to earn the right to beneffis through their contributions. 
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" ''V 
V" " -V 
THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
Several' studies "on the'development or evolution of social security systems have 
been . conducted mainly - on schemes - found , in the industrial countries. For 
example, Kaim-Caudle (1973) and the ILO (1988) focus on the operational 
aspects of social security and compare levels of social security expenditures in 
different countries. In a'study on how political forces have influenced the 
extension of modem social policy, Heclo (1974) provides a historical analysis 
of differences in the evolution of social security policies in Britain and 
Sweden. Gordon'(1988) provides a comparative analysis of social security 
policies in twenty eight- industrial countries, and compares the major features 
of those policies, their scope and adequacy as well as the structure of financing 
social security provisions. -In this chapter the discussion on the ideologies 
behind the development of social security systems will be based largely on 
Rimlinger's (1971) work. --ý 
Rimlinger'(1971) compares the historical development of social security in five 
industrial countries, Britain, Germany, France, the United States and Russia. 
The study concludes that there are several different economic conditions and 
political and social structures which play a role in the shaping of social security 
in those countries. The need for social security increases as a society becomes 
industrialised and that "modem social security is a by-product of the shift from 
agrarian into industrial society" (Rimlinger, 1971, p 7). 
However, Rimlinger's study shows that the evolution of social security 
programmes in those five industrial countries mentioned above were influenced 
by, different socio-economic situations. Countries which were industrialised by 
private entrepreneurs developed their social security programmes when 
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economic development was -beyond the industrialization phase. The United 
States,, England - and France are examples in this group. Secondly,, social 
security was developed as a means of reinforcing the traditional relationships 
between the "ruling" and the "lower",,, classes in the-countries where 
industrialisation was achieved in an authoritarian political and social structure, 
of which Germany and Tsarist Russia were examples. Thirdly, social security 
was developed by the direction of a ruling totalitarian party under socialised 
industrialisation, such as in Soviet Russia. 
Rimlinger's study , is ý- based on a theory of industrial functionalism. As 
industrialisation becomes more advanced a common institutional pattern 
emerges, based on the functional relation between the industrial economy and 
the social, structure. Rimlinger asserts that social security develops out of the 
changing nature of want., With the development of the industrial society in the 
eighteenth century, two, major changes emerged. Firstly there were economic 
and social changes such as a market for labour and the promise of greater 
affluence, and secondly, there emerged. a radical new conception of rights of 
the individuals. - 
Rimlinger's examination of the relationship between the economy and social 
security assumes a close functional relationship. Social security develops in 
conjunction with and is functional to industrialisation and the market economy. 
It affects the quantity and quality of a country's manpower resources. As 
industrialisation progressed; labour became not only scarce in relation to 
capital but it achieved a much higher level of skill. Its willingness to cooperate 
in large scale organisation became important. Thus it became profitable from 
the point of view of productivity to develop and to maintain the capacity and 
the compliance to work. 
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According to Rimlinger, social, insurance is a way of investing in human 
capital. In the Soviet economy, "social insurance has been an important means 
for the maintenance of industrial discipline" while in the market economies "its 
explicit work incentive role is less ý important, but its role as an automatic 
stabilizer is much more significant" (Rimlinger, - 1971, p 10). Therefore social 
security's role as an automatic stabilizer for the maintenance of industrial 
-discipline imply that people, do not get benefits, without earning for them 
through contributions and that they stand to lose entitlement to benefits (like 
pensions and other occupational welfare benefits) if they leave their jobs. Also 
they get much less income when they are out of work. 
Rimlinger views the development of the state and the market as 
complementary. This implies a functional relationship between the state and 
social security and industrialisation. The major task of social security "was to 
wipe out the extremes of inequality and insecurity in order to attenuate 
alienation and alleviate suffering" (Rimlinger, 1971, p 341) and with the 
advent of industrialisation social security becomes "a means of integrating the 
individual into the society as a whole, a means of enabling him to participate 
to a'greater extent in the common possession of our industrial civilization" 
(ibid. )., Although we may doubt whether Rimlinger adopts the right priorities 
on the basis of a really independent analysis of the distribution of income, this 
brings out the variety of objectives which different countries do not all serve in 
the'ýsame way. Some predominate over others. Control, for instance, can 
dominate the motivation to "alleviate suffering". 
In the concluding chapter of his study, Rimlinger states that the maintaining of 
a standard of living achieved through work rather than preventing poverty will 
become the accepted standard for mature industrial societies, and that 
inequality arising from work appears necessary -and legitimate. Rimlinger 
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further states: "It is only by helping the citizen to maintain the rather higher 
standard of living, to which he has become accustomed, that modem social 
security can prevent what Runciman, call "relative deprivation" and the sense 
of social justice that it generates. ý In mature industrial society, social security, 
therefore, has the dual task of eliminating unacceptable manifestations of 
economic and social- inequality and of maintaining inequalities that are 
legitimate - and purposeful" (Rimlinger, 1971, p 343). These statements 
illustrate the functional unity between industrialisation and social security and 
imply that as society matures social, security ceases to play a role in, pacifying 
the working class, but rather becomes socially ameliorative and produces (it, is 
believed), integration, and, harmony. But plainly much will depend on the 
assessment of inequality (especially the deg of inequality which is necessary 
or - natural to the division of labour) and the adequacy of low-level benefit 
payments or indeed their coverage. 
Analogous to Rimlinger's theory of industrial functionalism is Mishra's [1977] 
(1987,1 chapter 3) convergence theory, which emphasises the functionalist role 
of industrialisation in shaping the institutions of welfare. This theory explains 
the-nature and development of the social situations in industrial societies in 
terms of "the"pull' (requirements or functional necessities) and the ýpushl 
(consequences) of an industrial technology and economy" (Mishra, 1987, p 
40). ' ý Mishra (ibid. ) argues that "the key determinant of the social structure of 
advanced industrial society is neither ideology, nor class conflict, nor again 
culture, but technology". In the long run the problems and long term solutions 
in these societies are conditioned by the consequences and requirements of 
industrial technology. 
The political elite leading the process of industrialisation moulds the process of 
industrialisation to, its own ideology, and interests. in countries where 
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industrialisation is led'by the'middle-class who believe in the freedom of the 
market place, a "residual" form of welfare is likely to develop. On the other 
hand, where industrialisation is led by dynastic or traditional groups, such as in 
Germany and Japan,, social policy tends to be paternalistic. The state accepts a 
measure of responsibility for workers' welfare in return for loyalty of the 
workei, and this collectivist tendency of the state leads to the formation of an 
"institutional" pattern of welfare provisions. In communist industrial states, it 
is the state which assumes full responsibility for meeting the needs of its 
population. Resources are distributed on the basis of need, as interpreted at the 
centre, and a "structural" pattern of welfare provisions becomes the norm. 
These different patterns of welfare provisions refer to the early phases of 
industrialisation. As societies become more advanced, these systems are 
modified with i convergence towards the centre; a common institutional 
pattern of welfare emerges, based on the functional relation between the 
industrial economy and the social structure. 
In contrast to Rimlinger's and Mishra's theories, George (1973) advances the 
idea that it is social class conflict which has played a very dominant part in the 
formulation of social security. While it is true that government policies benefit 
the poor in varying degrees, they also tend to safeguard the interests of the 
ruling class. George's model of a social system is one of conflict of interests 
ratherthan consensus of values and interests between the working class/poor 
and the upper class/rich, and that the upper classes have been able to resolve 
conflict situations to their advantage (George, 1973, pp 1-2). His analysis of 
the development 'of social security in Britain shows that the ruling class 
ensured, that social security provisions always took into account the ideologies 
and interests of the ruling class either openly or in the name of national 
interests. For this reason social security services (at least in Britain) "have 
developed into a complex administrative maze which openly reinforces the 
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inequalities of themage system and helps to accommodate the worldng class to 
its inferior position in the social structure" (George, 1973, p 36). 
The development, of social security provisions in the advanced industrial 
countries could be seen from, the theoretical perspectives discussed above as a 
natural or evolutionary process. It is the very process of industrial development 
which created the need for social security, but of course the underlying reasons 
for introducing the provisions depend upon which theoretical perspective we 
adopt. 
SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE THIRD WORLD 
Iq developing countries traditionally the family and kinship/community-based 
institutions- like, mutual benefits societies catered for the needy people. 
However industrialisation, urbanization and, social mobility have resulted in the 
disintegration of traditional forms of social protection. Development creates 
the need for formal social security provisions. 
, 
The origin of the modem-day concept of social security in several Third World 
, 
countries could be traced back to poor relief policies introduced by the colonial 
. rulers of the metropolitan countries 
(Midgley, 1984, chapter 5). In particular 
, the 
British favoured social assistance (also known as public assistance) schemes 
which were derived from principles of the English Poor Law of 1834 which 
distinguished between the deserving and undeserving poor. Social assistance 
was introduced in Jamaica as early as 1682, in Mauritius in 1902, in Trinidad 
and Tobago in 1931, and in Malaysia in 1948. 
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In general social assistance schemes found in Third World countries are used 
to'- meet 'contingencies by providing different kinds of benefits - monetary 
benefits are commonly paid but other benefits in kind such as clothing and 
food parcels are also provided. These schemes are strictly means-tested, low 
income is the principal determinant of eligibility. In India, for example, a 
claimant has to be totally destitute so as to qualify for assistance. In Malaysia 
benefits are not provided for claimants who have relatives who are liable and 
able to support, them. Furthermore there is the tendency for benefits to be 
biased towards claimants in the urban areas. Theoretically all needy people 
qualify but most rural dwellers are excluded through the administrative 
technique of limiting procedures for receiving and processing applications in 
the larger urban centres. 
In general we may safely classify social assistance in Third World countries as 
residual welfare. For example, in Malaysia economic development planners 
regard the role of social welfare services as marginal to the development 
process precisely because these services do not generate income. Under the 
Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-90), for example, development expenditure for 
welfare'services, at $34 million (5MP, App. A), formed only 0.08 percent of 
the total development allocation. The residual role of social assistance is 
illustrated further in Table 11.1. Between 1980 and 1983 public (or social) 
assistance forms a minute proportion, ranging between 1.3 percent and 2.3 
percent, of the'total expenditure on social security benefits. What is urgently 
needed is a reassessment of the role social assistance can play in ameliorating 
the problem of poverty and deprivation. 
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Table 11.1 
Malaysia: Distribution of Social Security benefits exl2pnditure (as 12prcentage of 
total benefit) 








(in million $) 
58.2 30.1 39.8 45.2 
40.5 67.6 57.9 52.8 
1.3 2.2 2.3 2.1 
437.4 863.5 1012.6 1192.4 
Source: ILO, 1988, ' Table 5, p 97 (adapted) 
After the 'Second World War international agencies such as the ILO 
(International Labour Organization) and the ISSA (International Social Security 
Association) have played prominent roles in the diffusion of social security 
schemes in' developing 'countries (Rys, 1964). Within this "international 
cooperation factor" (Rys, 1964, p 3) such international agencies have 
ý'romoted the spread of social security programmes by providing channels for 
the exchange of information', materials and expertise. 
Subsequently what emerges in developing countries is a trend of adopting 
social security models from advanced countries. Often these programmes are 
adopted deliberately according to the country's needs and then adapted to the 
circumstances within the country. Hence there is the belief that "developing 
countries, unlike the pioneers of industrialisation, do not have to demonstrate 
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the practicality of modem social rights; their problem is one of choosing the 
most suitable pattem. -There is a pattern that corresponds to the needs of the 
country; one that is consistent with its development goals and that is adapted to 
its social-and economic order" (Rimlinger, 1971, p 334). Rimlinger is in the 
opinion that developing countries could choose one or a combination of social 
security programmes which are already in existence in developed countries. 
However, Midgley (1984, p, 179) contends that recommendations by 
international agencies such as the ILO and the ISSA were based on "modem" 
conceptions of welfare, in particular social security, based on the concept of 
social insurance, which are largely appropriate for Western, industrial societies 
rather than developing societies. Social security in developing countries should 
be seen as part of the overall income maintenance programmes which caters to 
the needs of the population, particularly those in -the lower income brackets, 
and not necessarily as programmes protecting the welfare of workers only. But 
that would seem to depend upon accepting a class or conflict model of the 
development of social security 9see George, 1973 and 1983), and to 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
While it is true, that -social security redistributes income within a country's 
population, the crucial question is whether redistribution is of a horizontal or 
vertical nature ý and to what extent this redistribution mechanism benefit the 
lower income groups, particularly in developing countries. 
Social security has two channels for income redistribution. Firstly there is the 
collection of funds necessary for financing the, system, through taxation and 
social insurance contributions. Secondly redistribution takes place through the 
336 
provision of benefits; -either cash and other benefits provided by social 
insurance programmes, ' or benefits which are provided according to a 
claimant's, eligibility and financed out of public revenue such as public 
assistance and non-contributory old-age pension schemes. 
Paukert (1968, p 449) argues that it is not possible to be precise about vertical 
redistribution, of income. Nevertheless developing countries tend to spend a 
large proportion of social security expenditure on public employees while other 
schemes are rather'- fragmentary, thus resulting a regressive form of 
redistribution. This is true in the case of Malaysia where expenditure on 
benefits for public employees forms more than half of total benefit expenditure 
(refer to Table 11.1)., Furthermore the Malaysia has a non-contributory 
pension scheme for public employees who were appointed into service before 
1987. This means that the scheme is financed out of general revenue, of which 
the lower income groups (themselves not necessarily covered by any social 
security scheme) contribute through general taxation. On the contrary 
expenditure classified under public assistance forms a tiny proportion of total 
benefit expenditure and it is this category of benefit which deals directly with 
the poorest members of the population and therefore has a more direct 
redistributive effect. 
Midgley (1984, Chapter 5) argues that social security has failed to redistribute 
resources and even accentuated inequality in developing countries. In these 
countries social security caters only for a small proportion of the labour force 
who are -engaged in regular wage employment in the modem sector of the 
economy. Thus inequality is reinforced and exacerbated because the majority 
of the population who work in subsistence agriculture or the urban petty 
commodity sector are excluded from the social security system. 
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A larger modem sector in the country's economy also mean a wider coverage 
in terms of social security provisions. This in turn leads to a larger proportion 
of the national resources which passes through the social security system. To a 
large extent there is a correlation between the share of national income devoted 
to social security and the level of economic development in a country (Paukert, 
1968, p 431). As a case in point, Table 11.2 compares receipts and 
expenditure of social security schemes as percentages of GDP in Malaysia and 
its neighbour Singapore. Malaysia's receipts and expenditure are 
proportionately less than those of Singapore. A major reason for this difference 
is Singapore's position as a newly-industrialised economy, and the absence of a 
rural subsistence sector and almost all of its workforce are in the formal 
industry and services sectors, whereas in Malaysia there is a larger proportion 
of the working population in agriculture, whether self-employed, labourers or 
tenant farmersi. 
1. The following - table compares the proportion of the labour force (in 
percentages) in the three major sectors in Malaysia and Singapore for the year 
1987. 
Agriculture Industry Services 
Malaysia 31.8 23.2 45.0 
Singapore 0.9 35.1 60.0 
s. ource: World Labour 
ieport, 1989, 
Table A-2, p 156 (adapted). 
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Table 11.2 
Malaysia and Singaj4re: Receipts and exl&nditure 
of social security schemes (as 1&rcentage of GDP 




1980 4.0 1.0 0.8 
1981 5.4 1.6 1.5 
1982 6.4 1.7 1.6 
1983 6.3 1.8 1.7 
. Singapore 1980 12.0 3.8 3.5 
1981 13.2 6.4 4.0 
1982 15.4 6.9 4.2 
1983 16.2 8.3 5.2 
Source: ILO (1988), Table 2, p 73 (adapted) 
Still, there are those who tend to emphasise on the "quasi-fiscal" function of 
social security schemes because funds are used as a source of term finance for 
the country's economic development. Shome (1978) cites the case of Malaysia 
where-savings generated through social security institutions form a significant 
stable source of long-term investment for economic development. In 1988 the 
investments by Malaysia's Employment Provident Fund accounted for $31,621 
million or 58 percent of all the outstanding government securities (TER, 
1988/89, p 93). 
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Likewise, in Singapore and Chile compulsory pension funds have contributed 
significantly to the supply of long-term investment funds (World Development 
Report, 1989, p 107). In Singapore the accumulated resources of the country's 
Central Provident Fund are now equivalent to about 65 percent of the 
country's GNP. In Chile, since 1981, compulsory pension contributions, at 10 
percent of salaries, are privately managed by competitive firms. In the first 
eight years the system has functioned, the total value of assets grew to about 
18 percent of GDP and two-thirds of the funds are invested in government 
securities. - 
SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES IN MALAYSIA 
Contemporary social security schemes in Malaysia derived its origin from 
provisions introduced during the colonial era. Apart from the social assistance 
scheme, which had been discussed briefly earlier in this chapter, Malaysia's 
social security schemes tend to be related and therefore covers those in the 
waged -or salaried groups. The earliest social security provisions were a 
workmen's compensation scheme which was established in 1929, and an 
employer liability, sickness, and maternity scheme for plantation and tin mine 
workers which was introduced in 1933 (Midgley, 1984, p 144). 
What follows in this section will be a somewhat descriptive analysis of the 
major Malaysian social security schemes. Currently there are some twelve 
social security schemes in the country, although only a few schemes are 
national in coverage and function. Basically there are four main methods of 
providing organised social security for the Malaysian labour force. 
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EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY SCHEM 
First, there is the employer's liability scheme as in the case of employment 
injury compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance of 1952, 
and the sickness and'maternity benefits under the Employment Ordinance of 
1955. 'Thesýe schemes are entirely the responsibility of the employers, who are 
legally bound to 'meet'the costs and'provide benefits to their workers who 
qualify for such benefits. '' ' 
The ILO'considers the workmen's compensation law as a "Primitive form of 
protection" (ILO, ' 19741ý p$ 3). Since the responsibility of payment of 
compensation is placed on the employer, employers who are not financially 
stable may find it difficult to discharge their obligations to the injured workers. 
In the'case of heavy financial liabilities arising out of permanent disablement 
or fatal'cases, ' small'or financially weak employers might become insolvent. 
Hence it is a common practice for employers to purchase commercial insurance 
schemes'to'cover their liabilities under the workmen's compensation scheme. 
Furthermore', payments of compensation is not automatic. In the case of death 
or if the worker is permanently disabled, claimants might encounter difficulties 
in enforcing their claimS. 'Delays in the payment of compensation "appears to 
be'inherent in the' Ordinance" (ibid. ). The payment of a lump sum has its 
disadvantage as the lump sum often'diminishes in a short period and the victim 
becomes a -charge of public welfare. 
SOCIAL INSURANCE 
Secondly, there is the social insurance system which was established under the 
Employees' Social Security Act of 1969. It also meant that for the first time 
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the principle - of social insurance and the pooling of risks and finances was 
introduced in the, country. This scheme covers workers who earn less than 
$1000 a month and is financed by contributions from workers and employers, 
and administered by a, central government agency, the Social Security 
Organisation, popularly known as Socso. Benefits are paid out in the form of 
periodical payments on an earnings-related basis. There are two schemes which 
are covered under this Act; the Employment Injury Insurance scheme and the 
Invalidity Pensions scheme. Under the first scheme the employee does not 
make any contribution, but the employer is required to contribute about 1.25 
percent of the employee's monthly earnings. The benefits provided include 
medical benefit, temporary disability benefit, permanent disablement benefit, 
dependents' benefit, funeral benefit and rehabilitation benefit. The Invalidity 
Pensions scheme provides coverage against invalidity or death due to any 
cause. Payments of contributions are equally shared between the employer and 
the employee, each, party contributes ý at the rate of 0.5 percent of the 
employee's monthly wages. The benefits provided are related to temporary or 
permanent disability and rehabilitation, funeral grant and survivors' pension. 
This scheme, however, do not apply to those workers who are covered by the 
Employees' Provident Fund scheme. 
Contributions by employers may appear as a transfer of income from 
employers to -workers. However, in reality it is difficult to comprehend 
whether - the income of employers are really - affected by social security 
contributions. Paukert (1968, pp 440-41) believes that the real incidence is on 
consumers because employers are able to assume their contributions as 
production -costs and transfer them to the consumers, and thus social security 
benefits financed out of employers' contributions represent a redistribution of 
income from the consumers to the insured persons. 
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in 1987 some 80,340 employers and 3.39 million employees were registered 
with Socso, and the accumulated contribution funds totalled $147.6 million. 
Total investments by Socso amounted to $1261.6 million of which 83 percent 
were in government securities. Benefits paid out for that year amounted to 
approximately $46 million, equivalent to 3.6 percent of the total investments 
(Socso Annual Report, 1987, p 10). 'This reinforces the argument that social 
security contributions play a prominent role in the supply of long-term 
investment funds for the country's economic development. 
PROVIDENT FUND 
For the majority of workers outside the public sector there is the statutory 
provident fund which provides retirement benefits under the Employee 
Providenf " Fund Act of 195 1. Popularly known as the EPF, this scheme 
consists of'individual and entirely separate accounts for each worker, into 
which the contributions of'the worker and the employer are accumulated to 
earn dividends "until the amount is paid out in a lump sum on the occurrence of 
the prescribed contingencies of retirement, invalidity or death, provided that 
retirement is not before'the' statutory retirement age of 55 years. The 
contributions are made up of on"a-ratio of 45: 55 between employee and 
employer and amounts'to 20'percent of the employee's monthly earnings. 
Although the funds was initially set up for the waged and salaried groups, 
since 1977 the self-employed could become members too, but agricultural 
workers are specifically excluded from the fund. 
There is a provision for those who have reached the age of 50 years to apply 
for an'advance of one-third of their savings. Those who intend to emigrate 
may request for authorization to: withdraw all their savings before reaching 
retirement age. Employees are also allowed to withdraw 20 percent of their 
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savings, subject to a maximum withdrawal of $20,000, for the purchase of 
housing. 
ýn 1988 some 5.3 million employees were registered with the EPF, - quite an 
impressive figure - but it was not stated what proportion of these were active 
savers who paid contributions regularly. As in the case of the social insurance 
scheme, savings accumulated with the EPF are invested in government 
'securities. 
In 1988 investments by EPF totalled to $35.5 billion, of which 91 
percent were in government securities (Utusan Melayu, 18.2.1989). 
Provident funds, though useful in its own way, has its limitations. It provides 
for a measure of protection for old-age but where invalidity is concerned, it 
ýcan, hardly provide, the desired income security. Lump sum payments do not 
provide the life-long security as is available under a scheme of social insurance 
which provides periodical payments throughout life. Furthermore, the 
provident fund has the disadvantage of not pooling risks. Benefits are based 
directly on contributions and, therefore, they are not always sufficient to deal 
adequately with the contingencies which may arise. Unlike insurance-funded 
pension schemes, which pay regular benefits and provide a steady income, the 
Jump sum may be small and, thus, is soon used up. This problem is 
: particularly pressing in the case of workers who are invalided or die at a young 
age or who join the fund shortly before retirement. 
CIVIL SERVICE PENSTO 
The Government Pensions Ordinance of 1951 introduced a non-contributory 
pension scheme for civil servants. This Ordinance was amended subsequently 
by the Tensions Act of 1980. This scheme provides income protection for all 
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employees in the public'sector who were appointed to off 2 ice before 1987 . 
Benefits provided under this scheme include those relating to employment 
injury, disability pension, superannuation and derivative pensions for 
dependents in the event of death while in service and death after retirement. 
The generous , provisions of the civil service pension scheme is funded 
substantially by, the government from tax revenues and this is a manifestation 
of the power of civil service elites in securing - generous provisions for 
themselves. Table 11.3 shows the gradual increases in government expenditure 
on public -pensions and gratuities over the years between 1984 to 1989. This 
trend reflects a system in which members of low income groups not covered 
by social security are at ,a- disadvantage, not only by being excluded in 
coverage but also as a result of their contributions to the general taxation, 
which are provided - largely by - the low income groups through regressive 
indirect taxation and the overtaxation of agricultural produce (the smallholders' 
export cess mentioned in Chapter 9 is an example). 
Table 11.3 
Expgnditure on Public Pensions and Gratuities 
Amount as % of total 
(Willion) operational 
expenditure 
1984 681 3.4 
1985 775 3.9 
1986 817 4.1 
1987, 938 4.6 
1988 1021 4.8 
1989 1050 4.7 
Source: TER 1988/89, Table 4.5, p xxxvi. 
2. Public employees who are appointed into their jobs since 1987 are covered 
by the EPF scheme instead of the civil service pensions scheme. 
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AUXILIARY SCHEMES 
There are _. 0 ther social 'security 'schemes which are limited in coverage but 
worth mentioning in'this' chapter. The first one is the Smallholders' Social 
Security Scheme, which was started on March 26,1982. The scheme is 
administered by Risda (Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority), 
a federal government agency. This is a social insurance scheme which covers 
all' registered working smallholders and their families. Benefits provided 
include lump sum benefits of $10,000 which are paid for contingencies arising 
out of death or permanent disability, $200 a year for medical expenses in the 
case of temporary disablity, and $25 weekly (for a maximum of 104 weeks) 
for loss of income due to injury or sickness. Smallholders contribute $1.20 per 
month for a period of six years (Amin, 1982, pp 127-28). However, there is 
no provision for old-age income protection - presumably those who are not 
able io 'support themselves adequately during old-age have to seek social 
assistance. 
Additionally, two states have implemented non-contributory income 
maintenance schemes for two groups in the population (Amin, 1982, pp 171- 
73). In 1978 the Trengganu state government introduced a system of social 
security for fishermen who were born and are residing in the state. Financed 
fully by the state government, with annual allocations of $150,000, benefits 
include a lump sum payment of $3000 for death due to accident at sea, or 
$2000 for invalidity or permanent disability as result of the accident. Other 
benefits include hospital allowances, compensation for loss of boat, and 
contribution towards cost of repair of boats. Fishermen need not be registered 
in order to be covered by the scheme. In the event of contingencies claims are 
made by the fishermen of Members of his family. Some 12,000 fishermen are 
covered !; y'this scheme. 
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1' 
In - 1979 the Sabah state government 
introduced an Old Age Assistance Scheme 
for Malaysian citizens who are permanent, residents in the state. The scheme 
provides a financial assistance of $60 per month for those over the age of 60, 
years,, on condition that they do not have any disposable income and are not in 
receipt of any social assistance and are not adequately provided for by their 
children. The state government allocates $17 million annually towards this 
scheme. 
SOCIAL SECURITY IN MALAYSIA -A REAPPRAISAL 
The above account of different social security schemes in Malaysia shows that 
different benefits are not neutral so, far as coverage, adequacy and 
redistributive effects are concerned. There is definitely a case for a 
comprehensive income maintenance programme which would provide a wider 
coverage, particularly for those earning low incomes. The crucial question is 
to what extent are the Malaysian social security and income maintenance 
programmes geared primarily to meeting the needs of the lower income 
groups. 11 r 
The Malaysian economyý is intrinsically agricultural in nature. In 1988, for 
example, 33 percent of the labour force work in agricultural sector while 59 
percent of the population live in the rural areas (5MP, pp 119; 134). In 1976 
the Socso scheme was extended to cover workers in the modem agricultural 
sector, i. e. the plantation sub-sector. Subsistence farmers and fishermen as 
well as those in the urban petty commodity sector are, however, excluded from 
the scheme and these groups do not have any income protection from 
contingencies such as old age, invalidity or death. 
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There are at least two cogent reasons why social security income maintenance 
programmes should be extended to the lower income groups, especially those 
in the subsistence rural and the urban petty commodity sectors. These groups 
make significant contributions to the economy. For example, in 1988 rubber 
smallholders produced 71, percent of the nation's total rubber production 
(R5MP, p, 59)., In, 1985. rice farmers produced 76 percent of Malaysia's 
domestic rice consumption (5MP, p 304). These are examples of groups who 
toil under unpleasant conditions to provide for the nation's prosperity, yet they 
are not covered by any major income protection scheme. 
Private savings as a means of protection against unforeseeable circumstances 
cannot be considered as an effective substitute for income maintenance 
purposes. Furthermore, people who earn low incomes, especially in the rural 
sector where price fluctuations are not uncommon, are unlikely to have enough 
income to be saved for contingencies like sickness and old age. Thus there is 
an urgent need to examine the appropriate type of income maintenance 
programme for those not yet covered by the major social security schemes. 
There are several examples which may serve as models for the future income 
maintenance and social security programmes in Malaysia. For instance, 
Euzeby (1987, pp 253-276) proposes a scheme which guarantees a minimum 
, social ý 
income for persons whose income are below the poverty line This 
scheme could be integrated into the existing network of welfare benefits and 
financed by local welfare committees and social security bodies and 
contributions by the state. This would allow the creation of an ad hoc 
"solidarity fund", which could be used to finance the minimum income scheme 
and also provide specific reintegration activities such as training courses and 
apprenticeships. Euzeby's (ibid. ) proposal is based on broad principles 
currently applied by France in its anti-poverty programme. 
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Brazil has a special social security scheme which provides medical care, and 
limited cash benefits for the rural population (Malloy, 1979, chapter 5). The 
country's Rural Workers' Assistance Fund or FUNRURAL was established in 
1963 The insured workers make no direct contribution to the fund. The Fund 
provides four flat-rate cash benefits, namely, a monthly retirement benefit for 
those aged 65 years and over, a benefit for invalidity, a monthly survivors' 
pension, and a one-time funeral benefit - all are one-half of the highest national 
minimum salary. Additionally curative medical assistance is also available to 
injured workers. The scheme is funded by a2 percent tax on rural products 
paid by wholesalers and a 2.5 percent tax over the wage bill of urban 
enterprises. 
MMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARK 
The discussion in this chapter has concentrated first on the theoretical 
perspectives of the evolution of social security in industrial societies. In those 
societies industrialisation was an important factor in the development of social 
security. The chapter has concentrated, secondly, on the evolution of social 
security in developing countries, especially Malaysia. In developing countries 
international agencies like the ILO and the ISSA have played a role in the 
spread of Western-type social security institutions based on the principle of 
social insurance. As such social security in the Third World, including 
Malaysia, tends to be biased towards those in regular waged or salaried 
employment, while the vast majority of the labour force are not covered by 
any income protection scheme. Furthermore, social insurance contributions 
lead to a regressive form of redistribution as employers tend to pass on the cost 
of their contributions to the consumers. 
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Those concerned with social planning and development in Malaysia should 
recognise that, like other social policies, social security and income 
maintenanýe programmes should be seen as remedial rather than curative 
welfare provisions. The "preventive" objectives of income distribution deserve 
close attention. Hence the evidence from the comparative analysis in this 
chapte ,r supports the need for extended income maintenance programmes 




CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF DEVELOPMENT 
Iý1t 
This thesis examines the social, political and economic development of 
Malaysia with particular, reference, to trends in poverty and the alleviating 
effects of different policies, ' particularly income maintenance. Its principal 
conclusion is that a complex strategy directed towards equality of opportunity, 
investment in, new forms, of employment, development of balanced regional 
employment are necessary pre-conditions of the elimination of poverty and that 
an accelerated development of income maintenance programmes, especially for 
children, old and disabled people, will be a necessary feature of anti-poverty 
programme. I- 
The analysis begins with the theoretical background of development in 
Peninsula Malaysia. In chapter Two the discussion centres upon the main 
paradigms of the development and underdevelopment debate. The theories of 
modernisation, dependency, and world-system are critically reviewed. This 
study, rejects, the applicability of the modernisation thesis. because of its 
emphasis on the diffusion of Western values, which are argued to be 
inappropriate in the Third World countries. ý The modernisation perspective 
views Third World poverty too much as a consequence of failure of the poor 
countries to transform their economy in line with the Western model of social, 
cultural, technological and political development. The dependency theory, 
which perceives Third World poverty as a result of the exploitation of these 
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countries by the industrialised countries, is pessimistic about improvements by 
the poorer nations - any improvement could only be achieved by a global 
socialist revolution, the occurence of which is questionable. There are of 
course theoretical -off-shoots and modifications of both these schools. The 
world-system theory, a tributary of the dependency school, is more appropriate 
in the analysis of underdevelopment in Third World countries because it 
stresses . the social 
factors of development and emphasises the value of 
increasing a country's self-reliance, for example in food-production, in order 
to achieve economic progress. For this reason this study inclines towards this 
perspective. tYet this does not mean that the country has to be detached from 
the world capitalist system. What is recommended for different Third World 
countries is an -attempt to reconcile the national economy's vulnerability to 
external- forces by adopting selected de-linldng strategies with the centre 
economies. The balance of evidence seems to favour this alternative as both 
possible in practise and politically realistic. At the same time, there should be 
a stronger cooperation between the peripheral economies which would lead to 
a, mutually advantageous South-South relationship in place of an exploitative 
North-South relationship. i,. 
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Chapter Three seeks to provide the historical analysis to correspond with the 
theoretical stance. It traces the penetration of colonial capitalist economy in the 
Malay Peninsula from the 1880s. The extraction of tin and the cultivation of 
rubber by colonial entreprenuers, and the importation of labour from India and 
China, saw, the beginning of Malaysia's integration into the global economic 
system, ý and turned the country into a dependent economy. The liberal colonial 
immigration policies turned the Malay Peninsula into a plural society; ethnic 
divisions were discernible vocationally and spatially - the Malays prevailed in 
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the rural areas, the Indians worked in rubber plantations and the Chinese were 
employed in the tin industry and the commercial sector of the urban centres. 
Colonial policies on infrastructural and social development gave priority to the 
needs of the expatriate community. The voluminous incomes accrued from the 
export, of rubber - and tin were repatriated to Europe. The British gave little 
attention to the economic, advancement of the Malay peasantry. in general there 
was'small concern for the social needs and welfare of the population. 
Chapter Four goes on to analyse some of the crucial features of economic 
development in independent Malaya. The government's allegiance to priority 
for economic growth came to be pursued along a capitalist path. No concious 
plan was evolved to introduce radical reform of the economic and social 
structure. Inter-ethnic inequalities and the problem of rural poverty persisted, 
as resources were not equitably distributed so as to mitigate social inequalities. 
The racial riots of May 1969 provided a watershed in the state's planning 
philos-oPhy., A re-evaluation of national economic and social policies was 
assumed and the New Economic Policy was formulated for the period 1971- 
1990. This accepted equal opportunity principles without yet implementing 
them more than marginally in practice. 
Chapter Five concentrates on the more recent period of the debate about 
economic. development and examines the economic and social development 
policies in Peninsula Malaysia from 1971. Concious efforts by the state in 
attempts to reduce poverty and mitigate ethnic inequalities did not produce the 
desired results. A general reduction in the incidence of poverty did not lead to 
an equitable distribution of income and resources within the population. Rural- 
urban inequalities and rural poverty are some of the issues that needs further 
examination. 
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THE PROBLEM OF POVERTY IN MALAYSIA 
The issue of poverty was regarded as central and was therefore given separate 
attention. As a prelude in'the inquiry on the state of poverty in Peninsula 
Malaysia, chapter Six then examines the main approaches in determining the 
level of poverty. The concept of absolute or subsistence poverty appears to be 
popular in several developing countries including Malaysia. On the other hand, 
as prompted by bodies like the ILO, the basic needs approach has been adopted 
more enthusiastically by countries like China and Tanzania, where attempts to 
emphasise self-reliance have achieved some degree of success. 
Not only must poverty, in its alternative senses, be shown to exist widely. It 
has to be explained if appropriate action to deal with it is to be adopted. 
Chapter Seven presents some theoretical explanations of poverty in Malaysia, 
mainly based on a structural-institutional framework. Malaysian scholars of 
poverty relate ý the ý causes of poverty, particularly rural poverty, to issues of 
exploitation, not only by middlemen, but also as a result of Malaysia's 
dependence on international trade and the effects of global economic cycles on 
prices of primary commodities. This thesis has found their inspiration highly 
relevant to Malaysian poverty today. In chapter Eight some methods of 
determinig the poverty line income in Peninsula Malaysia are reviewed, as the 
minimum subsistence income adopted by policy makers would have 
implications for the level and adequacy of social benefits and therefore 
calculations of the resources to be found from production and reproduction. 
Malaysian anti-poverty policies, as discussed in Chapter Nine, appear to be 
influenced by forms of traditional neo-classical economic practice which are 
acceptable to the World Bank. Reforms are carried out in what has been 
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characterised as a Liberal-Pluralist, manner; the state implements an 
incremental rather than a comprehensive structural approach in its policies. It 
is true that the state, in combination with industrial management, has 
succeeded in raising the absolute levels of income of the poor and subsequently 
reducing r the, incidence of absolute 'poverty, but the paradox lies in the 
existence of structural, inequalities, in . terms of income differentials and 
ownership of wealth between the rich and the poor, and also in terms of the 
biased distribution of social services in favour of the urban rather than the rural 
areas. There are worrying, indications that these fundamental problems in the 
Malaysian social structure and economy are not yet being addressed. 
STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
One major problem is gender. Chapter Ten explores the position of women in 
the, Malaysian' economy. ' Structurally capitalist labour market reduces the 
position of women in the labour force to a peripheral status; women are not 
equitably -rewarded for their reproductive responsibility - nor even for the real 
value of their contribution to conventionally defined industrial production. 
Industrialization policies which rely on the transnational corporations in the 
expansion of employment exacerbates the marginalization of the female labour 
force. Labour unions do not promote issues pertaining to women and work. 
All these have serious implications for the provisions of social security for 
women and partly explains the unsatisfactory structure of social security 
benefits.. The question of gender therefore requires much more prominence in 
planning and policy documents. The issue of. female poverty and its possible 
alleviation and elimination; for instance, needs further examination. ,, - 
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In chapter Eleven - some of the specific issues of social security and income 
maintenance are examined., Malaysia does not have a comprehensive social 
security and income maintenance policy. Existing social security programmes, 
based on social insurance contributions, are shown to be biased towards those 
in regular waged or salaried employment. The only non-contributory income 
maintenance programme available is the social assistance programme, which is 
basedýon strict tests of, means. Because government expenditure on welfare 
transfer programmes is small, social assistance cannot be an effective poverty 
relief programme. Hence this study calls for an alternative non-contributory 
social protection scheme for those who are not covered by any existing 
schemes. 
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY 
Some specific alternatives, are prompted by this analysis of existing social 
security ý and development - programmes. The principal social security and 
income maintenance programmes in Malaysia have been examined. On the 
whole the schemes are limited in coverage and inegalitarian in nature. It must 
norbe assumed that- social security coverage will expand with economic 
development or that the problem of unequal access will be solved when more 
people are absorbed into wage employment. Therefore there is a case for a 
major reform of the existing system. 
At least two scholars have proposed new schemes in addition to the existing 
programmes. In a study on the distribution of economic rewards in Malaysia, 
Mehmet, (1986, pp 169-70) proposes a "need based social safety net" as an 
anti-poverty measure. This scheme proposes the distribution of a National 
Dividend for poor households, by providing a cash supplement to each poor 
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household so as to push up their income at least to the level of poverty line 
income. Mehmet (ibid. ) proposes that the system be financed by the 
introduction of a capital gains tax, that would redistribute income from 
speculators - and rich rent-seeking middlemen. Mehmet claims this is an 
egalitarian form of redistribution since his study shows that income shares in 
Malaysia are not competitively determined and that those in the upper- income 
brackets do not derive their income share through productive employment. 
Amin (1982, pp 130-31) proposes a "comprehensive social security system" 
which would cover all primary contingencies, except unemployment benefit; - 
he is of the opinion that unemployment is an economic problem and thus it 
needs economic instead of social remedies. He calls for the need to integrate 
all existing social security schemes into a national system and emphasises the 
introduction of "a social security coverage for all contingencies facing workers 
including the self-employed persons through social insurance" (Amin, 1982, p 
130; emphasis added). This scheme would provide sickness, employment 
injury, maternity, retirement and survivors' benefits. However he opposes the 
provision of employment injury for farmers and fishermen and proposes 
instead a crop insurance for farmers and a bad weather insurance for 
fishermen. At the same time EPF and SOCSO should continue to administer 
their existing functions. - 
Certainly there are disadvantages in the two schemes mentioned above. 
Inasmuch -as it involves a degree of radical innovation, Mehmet's (1986) 
proposal should be seen strictly as an anti-poverty, measure which would 
augment the income of poor households so as to place these households above 
the poverty line. It may be presumed that the scheme would guarantee 
provisions for members of households who are above the retirement 
357 
age group. Still, the scheme could be regarded as inadequate in the context of 
contingencies'such is employment injury, sickness and disability. 
On the other hand, Amin's (1982) proposed scheme is based on the principle 
of social insurance. It would -mean those who want to be covered by the 
scheme have to pay contributions. The majority of those who are not covered 
by existing social security schemes are those who are subsistence farmers or 
agrkýltural labourers -in the rural sector and also those people who are self- 
employed in th&urban petty commodity producer sector. If these groups were 
made to pay social insurance contributions it would be an additional strain on 
their low'income, in-addition to the high incidence of regressive indirect taxes 
bome by them. 
It is essential that social security and income maintenance programmes should 
be seen as a mechanism for equitable redistribution of income. For example, 
George (1973, p 35) recommends that the only radical and effective solution 
for the payment of social security benefits is a scheme without any means test 
and without any reference to insurance contributions. This would simplify the 
administrative requirements for entitlement to benefits and would also 
emphasise'the social aspect of social security rather than its economic criteria 
of eligibility based on insurance contributions. Furthermore, George (1973, p 
132) stresses that if social security is to achieve a substantial reduction in 
income inequality, it should be financed out of general taxation, and provide 
adequate flat-rate' benefits. These are some of the principles that ought to be 
considered in the design of an alternative social protection programme for the 
low income groups. 
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OPTIONS FOR THE FUTUR -' 
What are the more general, as well as specific, income maintenance proposals 
for effective anti-poverty strategy? The concluding part of chapter Nine 
suggests some of the programmes that would reduce poverty and inequality. 
Land reform, and the' subdivision of commercial plantations into family 
smallholdings is one way of reducing the concentration of power, wealth and 
income. Secondly, the government might promote domestic food production, 
particularly in the rice growing sector, as this would lead to the country's self- 
sufficiency in food production. Additionally, a food coupons or food stamps 
system could be introduced for families in the lower income groups, 
particularly to cater to the nutritional needs of children in these familiesl, and 
this policy would also mean increasing the real incomes of poor families. Food 
stamp programmes have been introduced in some rich countries (for example 
the United States) and have been greatly criticised. Nonetheless, provided they 
are placed within the context of more substantial poverty alleviation measures, 
they can be said to have a transitional role to play in poor countries. 
Poverty alleviation is not totally impossible provided there is a strong political 
and moral commitment on the part of those who hold the power to redistribute 
resources equitably. A- satisfactory system of income maintenance in a wider 
sense, not in -the narrow sense of programmes funded by social insurance 
contributions, will compensate for - if not entirely, partially - the problems of 
dependency, and would achieve the objective of a substantial reduction in 
1. Malaysia does not have a child-benefits scheme. Only five developing 
countries have such schemes; namely, China, Israel, the Cook Islands, Nauru 
and Chile. Of these only the Cook Islands provide benefits of a uniform rate 
for all children under the age of six years (Dixon, 1986, pp 85-86). 
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income, inequalities, in the society. Therefore there is a need for a social 
protection and income maintenance programme that. would serve egalitarian 
purposes. 
One specific option that policy-makers could consider is the establishment of a 
non-contributory scheme specifically for the low income groups employed in 
the subsistence agricultural sector and the urban petty commodity producer 
sector. This would mean - the creation . of a state fund to provide limited 
monetary benefits or a guaranteed minimum social income, chiefly to cover 
retirement, invalidity, medical and survivors' benefits and a lump sum funeral 
grant. The -level at which the minimum social income should be set would 
depend on several factors, such as the amount of existing income maintenance 
or public assistance benefits and the officially recognised poverty line income. 
The crucial question that would concern policy-makers would be: what could 
be the sources of funding for the scheme? Funding could be raised through a 
variety of sources. Firstly, a special primary commodity tax of at least two 
percent could be imposed on primary commodities where smallholders are not 
affected in the production process, namely the petroleum and liquidified 
natural gas and the timber sectors, plus the privately-owned commercial 
plantation sector. It would be inequitable to impose additional taxes on all 
primary commodities as it would mean smallholders and subsistence farmers 
would also have to bear these taxes. In addition, Mehmet's (1986) proposal for 
a capital gains tax should also be incorporated in this special tax system. 
Besides there is a need to extend social work services into the rural areas. This 
would give the rural population the opportunity to gain better access to 
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social assistance funds, medical and orthopedic aid, and legal aid. Presently 
those who live in the urban areas are the ones who have better access to these 
services. 
In summary, this, study is concerned with poverty, inequality and social 
insecurity. Its objective has been to analyse trends in economic development in 
Peninsula Malaysia and explain the major factors that contribute to the 
problems of low income and poverty; and finally propose an alternative social 
protection programme especially for those in the lower income groups. The 
analysis led to the formulation of a special non-contributory social protection 
programme for those who are employed in the subsistence agricultural sector, 
either as farmers, fishermen, tenants or labourers, and those in the urban petty 
commodity sector. Such provisions inevitably would reduce the problems of 
relative inequality a great deal. In linking conventional analysis of poverty to 
the analysis of social and economic development this thesis has called attention 
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